Overcoming the Presumption of Indefeasible Title

Overcoming the Presumption of Indefeasible Title

Estate disputes frequently involve issues relating to who is the true beneficial owner of a property due to a myriad of fact patterns, and the legal arguments invariably refer to the presumption of legal and beneficial ownership of indefeasible title.

The first thing any lawyer will do in any dispute as to the legal vs beneficial ownership of a parcel of property is to conduct a land title search.

British Columbia uses the Torrens property regime, and section 23(2) Land title Act creates a statutory presumption that the registered owner on title is presumed to be the legal and beneficial owner of the property.

Fellowship Deaconry Association of BC v Fellowship Deaconry Inc. 2019 BCSC 1476 dealt with a dispute of “ownership” – the plaintiff  Church asserting that the defendant held the property in trust for the Church . The defendant relied inter alia on the presumption of S. 23(2) Land Title Act, that the defendant as registered owner was the presumed legal and beneficial owner of the property.

Like any presumption in law, contrary evidence will often overcome the presumption, and the same section 23(2) of the Land Title act provides three options in which the presumption may be rebutted:

1) The operation of a resulting trust, which may be inferred where no value is given for a legal interest;
2) the operation of an agreement between the parties that is contrary to the registered legal title;
3) taking into account the underlying equitable interests between the parties ( for example, a claim such as unjust enrichment)

Most estate disputes involve the law of resulting trust, and while the Deaconry case did review the law of resulting trusts, it ultimately decided the case on the basis of the parties intention based on a review of correspondence and conduct prior to and at the time of the purchase of the property.

In the Deaconry decision , the court ultimately decided it did not have to result to the presumption of resulting trust, as the court found after a review of the evidence and correspondence, that the defendant did not intend to retain a beneficial interest in the church, and that legal title was transferred to the defendant until some agreement about repayment had been reached or fulfilled. The court found that this was the mutual intention of both parties that both the time of the purchase and when title was transferred in 1971.

The court specifically found that the evidence was sufficient to establish the three certainties necessary to create a trust, namely :

1) certainty of intention,
2) certainty of the object of the trust,
3) certainty of subject matter of the trust.

With respect to the law relating to the three certainties necessary to create a trust, the court referred to Norman Estate v . Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of Canada, 2014 BCCA 277 at paragraph 35.

S. 52 WESA and Rebutting the Presumption of Undue Influence

S. 52 WESA and Rebutting the Presumption of Undue Influence In Wills

Ali v Walters Estate 2018 BCSC 1032 reviews the law relating to rebutting the presumption of undue influence in regard to a will as dealt with in S.52 of WESA that creates such a presumption and specifies who bears the burden of proof.

S 52 WESA states that in a proceeding, if a person claims that a will or any provision of that resulted from another person:

a) being in a position where the potential for dependents or domination of the will maker was present, and

b) using that position to unduly influence the will maker to make the will or the provision of it that is challenged,

and establishes that the other person was in a position where the potential for dependents or domination of the will maker was present, the party seeking to defend the will or the provision of it that is challenged or to uphold the gift has the onus of establishing that the person in the position where the potential for dependents or domination of the will maker was present did not exercise undue influence over the will maker with respect to the will or the provision of it that is challenged.

In Ali , the court found that the presumption was unnecessary to address because ample evidence made clear that Ali did not exercise do undue influence, and had the presumption applied, she had rebutted it.

The court followed Leung v Chan 2013 BCSC 976:

“ in order to invalidate a will on the grounds of undue influence, the asserting party must prove that the influence exerted against the will- maker mounted to coercion, such that the will did not reflect the true intentions of free will- maker and was not the product of the will- makers own act. The undue influence must constitute coercion, which could not be resisted by the will maker and which destroyed his or her free agency. It is well-established on the authorities that if the will- maker remains able to act freely, the exercise of significant advice or persuasion on the will- maker, or an attempt to appeal to the will- maker, or the mere desire of the will- maker to gratify the wishes of another, will not amount to undue influence.

In Woods v Woods 2013 BCSC 1030 aat para.37 stated that undue influence is not equivalent to coercion. To amount to undue influence, something more is required that causes the testator to express something that they do not really mean, or that does not express their own mind or free will. Sometimes this same concept is expressed as requiring that the donor acted of their own free will and informed thought in the transaction “ Geffen v Goodman (1991) 2 SCR 353 at 378-379.

In Stewart v. McLean 2010 BCSC 64 the court summarized the factors that assist in determining whether the donor or gave the gift is a result of their own free full and informed thought:

To rebut the presumption of undue influence, the defendant must show that the donor gave the gift is a result of her own full, free and informed thought. A defendant could establish this by showing:

a) no actual influence was used in the particular transaction or the lack of opportunity to influence the donor;
b) the donor had independent advice or the opportunity to obtain independent advice;
c) the donor had the ability to resist any such influence ( Calbick v Wayne 2009 BCSC 1222 at 64);
d) the donor knew and appreciated what he or she was doing Vout v Hay (1995) 2 SCR 876 AT para. 29; or
e) undue delay in prosecuting the claim, acquiescence or confirmation by the deceased.

Another relevant factor may be the magnitude of the benefit or disadvantage.

The Court of Appeal in Cowper-Smith v. Morgan 2016 BCCA 200 adopted the following, referring to the Stewart decision:

Factors to be considered in determining whether the donor acted of her own full, free and informed thought in entering the transaction include:

a) the lack of actual influence or opportunity to influence the donor;
b) the receipt of or opportunity to obtain independent legal advice;
c) the donor’s ability to resist any such influence
d) the donors knowledge and appreciation about what she was doing