Unjust Enrichment in Common Law Relationships

Unjust Enrichment in Common Law Relationships

The Ontario Court of Appeal in Reiter v Hollub 2017 ONCA 186 reviewed the law of unjust enrichment and dismissed a 6 year common law spouse’s claim that she should share in the increase in the property value of the matrimonial home owned by her male spouse .

The appeal Court reviewed the law of unjust enrichment and in particular the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Kerr v Barranow 2011 SCC 10.

  1. The appellant, Jessica Reiter, appeals from the dismissal of her application for an interest in the increase in equity of a home owned by the respondent, Tiar Hollub, which she shared during their six year common law relationship.
  2. Ms. Reiter advanced her claim on the basis of unjust enrichment. She argued that she had contributed to the $410,000 increase in the net value of the home over the course of the relationship. She relied on contributions she made to common living expenses and to the maintenance and repair of the residence. She also relied on the fact that she had given Mr. Hollub a one-time payment of $5,000 toward the mortgage.
  3. Ms. Reiter also took the position that her relationship with Mr. Hollub amounted to a joint family venture as defined in Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269.
  4. The application judge held that Ms. Reiter was unable to establish a joint family venture to support the requested remedy. She found no evidence that would support a conclusion that Ms. Reiter’s contributions had led to an increase in the value of the property. The application judge also found that the evidence did not support a joint family venture as defined in Kerr v. Baranow. As to Ms. Reiter’s $5,000 payment toward the mortgage, the application judge held that although Mr. Hollub had been enriched to Ms. Reiter’s detriment as a result of this contribution, his retention of the payment was justified by the parties’ agreement to share living expenses.
  5. I see no reason to interfere with the application judge’s rejection of Ms. Reiter’s claim for a proprietary interest in the house. The application judge’s conclusions about the circumstances of Ms. Reiter’s contribution to expenses and about the nature of the relationship are entitled to deference. I would therefore dismiss that aspect of Ms. Reiter’s appeal. However, I would allow the appeal on the treatment of the $5,000 lump sum payment to Mr. Hollub.

In Kerr v. Baranow, at para. 31, Cromwell J. recognized that “[a]t the heart of the doctrine of unjust enrichment lies the notion of restoring a benefit which justice does not permit one to retain”. Since the Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, unjust enrichment principles have been available to support claims made by domestic partners upon the breakdown of their relationship.

17      The test for unjust enrichment is well-settled. To establish unjust enrichment, the person advancing the claim must prove three things:

  1. An enrichment of or benefit to the defendant;
  2. A corresponding deprivation of the plaintiff; and
  3. The absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment.

18      There are two steps to identifying whether there is a juristic reason for the responding party to retain the benefit incurred. First, the court must consider whether the case falls within a pre-existing category of juristic reason, including a contract, a disposition of law, donative intent, and other valid common law, equitable or statutory obligations: Kerr, at para. 43. If a case falls outside one of these established categories, the reasonable expectations of the parties and public policy considerations become relevant in assessing whether recovery should be denied: Kerr, at para. 44.

19      In Kerr v. Baranow, at para. 46, the Supreme Court outlined two possible remedies where unjust enrichment is established — a monetary award or a proprietary award. The court counselled, at para. 47, that the first remedy to consider is always the monetary award and that, in most cases, a monetary award is sufficient to remedy the unjust enrichment.

20      To obtain a proprietary award, the person advancing the claim based on unjust enrichment must demonstrate that monetary damages are insufficient and that there is a sufficiently substantial and direct causal connection between his or her contributions and the acquisition, preservation, maintenance or improvement of the disputed property: Kerr, at paras. 50-51. A minor or indirect contribution will not suffice.

21      The court held that there are two different approaches to valuation for a monetary award: Kerr, at para. 55. First, a monetary award may be based on a quantum meruit, value received or fee-for-services basis. Second, a monetary award may be based on a value survived basis. This is where the joint family venture analysis becomes relevant.

22      To receive a monetary award on a value survived basis, the claimant must show that there was a joint family venture and that there was a link between his or her contributions to the joint family venture and the accumulation of assets and/or wealth: Kerr, at para. 100. Whether there is a joint family venture is a question of fact to be assessed in light of all of the relevant circumstances, including the four factors noted above — mutual effort, economic integration, actual intent and priority of the family: Kerr, at para. 100.

23      Justice Cromwell was careful to note that cohabiting couples are not a homogenous group: Kerr, at para. 88. The analysis must therefore take into account the particular circumstances of each relationship. The emphasis should be on how the parties actually lived their lives, not on their ex post facto assertions or the court’s view of how they ought to have done so: Kerr, at para. 88.

24      While the four factors identified above are helpful to determine whether the parties were engaged in a joint family venture, there is no closed list of relevant factors: Kerr, at para. 89. The factors Cromwell J. suggested were not a checklist of conditions, but a useful approach to a global analysis of the evidence and examples of relevant factors that a court may take into account: Kerr, at para. 89.

Recommended Posts