Category: Probate Litigation

BC Lawyer-Disinherited. When Do Spouses Separate?

Trevor Todd and Jackson Todd have been doing contested estate disputes for over sixty combined years, including acting for separeted spouses.

Dixson v Moss 2023 BCSC 1248 discussed the law relating to a contested claim as to when the spousal parties separated.

The date of spousal separation can be very important in some estate litigation claims.

The question when the parties separated is a question of mixed fact and law that requires the application of the legal test for same.

In S. (H.S.) v. D. (S.H.), 2016 BCSC 1300. While that was a decision under the former FRA, the court referred and relied upon decisions under the FLA in considering the principles that apply to the determination of whether parties have separated:

[42] … The Court’s task is to assess objectively, on the totality of the evidence, whether one spouse held a settled intention to separate and communicated that intention through his or her conduct to the other spouse. An express statement is only one of the factors for consideration in what is necessarily a contextual analysis.

[43] The Ontario Court of Appeal in Re Sanderson and Russell (1979), 1979 CanLII 2048 (ON CA), 24 O.R. (2d) 429 (C.A.), held, in the context of a common law relationship, that a relationship has come to an end “when either party regards it as being at an end, and by his or her conduct, has demonstrated in a convincing manner that this particular state of mind is a settled one”: at 432. This statement was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), 2004 SCC 65 at para. 42.

[44] In Gosbjorn v. Hadley, 2008 BCSC 219, Madam Justice Gray adopted the analysis articulated in Hodge:

[142] Using the analysis suggested in Hodge, parties cease to live and cohabit in a marriage-like relationship when either party regards the relationship to be at an end, and by his or her conduct, demonstrates in a convincing manner that this particular state of mind is a settled one. [Emphasis added.]

[45] In Nearing at para. 54, Madam Justice Fleming recognized that there must be a unilateral intention, as well as “action consistent with that intention”. At para. 56, she observes that “a clear statement by one of the parties of his or her desire to terminate the relationship” is one of a range of factors a court will consider in determining whether there has been a separation. In my view, the Court did not endorse the notion that such a statement is necessary.

[46] The Court in Weber v. Leclerc, 2015 BCCA 492, recently considered the definition of “spouse” under the Family Law Act. The Court reviewed the appellate authorities that have evaluated the characteristics of a “marriage-like” relationship and observed that the jurisprudence has evolved in accordance with the changing societal norms surrounding marriage. The Court must apply a holistic approach, having regard to all aspects of the relationship. While the Court must consider the evidence expressly describing the parties’ intentions, the Court must test that evidence by considering whether the objective evidence of the parties’ lifestyle and interactions is consonant with those intentions: at para. 23.

[143] The determination of a date of separation can be a somewhat arbitrary exercise. The dissolution of a long-term relationship is often a long and convoluted process. The Court must attempt to locate the point at which at least one of the parties regarded the relationship as at an end, and by their conduct demonstrated in a convincing manner that that state of mind was a settled one.

[144] In making this determination, s. 3(4)(b) of the FLA provides:

(b) the court may consider, as evidence of separation,
(i) communication, by one spouse to the other spouse, of an intention to separate permanently, and
(ii) an action, taken by a spouse, that demonstrates the spouse’s intention to separate permanently.

Severance of a Trial

In civil suits severance refers to the division of a trial into two or more parts. Plaintiffs in civil suits base their cases on a cause of action—facts that give the plaintiff the right to sue. For reasons of judicial economy, the court may order the lawsuit divided into two or more independent causes of action.

For example the case law indicates that a wills variation action should be severed from an action that also includes a claim that the will is invalid. The courts have stated that the validity of the will should firstly be determined before the wills variation claim is heard and have ordered severance in such situations.

Whether or not to sever part of a trial is within the discretion of this Court and the scope of the Court’s discretion must be interpreted in light of the overall object embodied in Rule 1-3 to “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits”: Kitsul v. Slater Vecchio LLP, 2015 BCSC 1394 at paras. 22–23.

The principles relevant to the exercise of discretion under Rule 12-5(67) were summarized in British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2007 BCSC 1014 at para. 69 (citing Nguyen v. Bains, 2001 BCSC 1130 at para. 11), aff’d 2008 BCCA 107:

…
a. A judge’s discretion to sever an issue is probably not restricted to extraordinary or exceptional cases. However, it should not be exercised in favour of severance unless there is a real likelihood of a significant saving in time and expense.
b. Severance may be appropriate if the issue to be tried first could be determinative in that its resolution could put an end to the action for one or more parties.
c. Severance is most appropriate when the trial is by judge alone.
d. Severance should generally not be ordered when the issue to be tried is interwoven with other issues in the trial. This concern may be addressed by having the same judge hear both parts of the trial and ordering that the evidence in the first part applies to the second part.
e. A party’s financial circumstances are one factor to consider in the exercise of the discretion.
f. Any pre-trial severance ruling will be subject to the ultimate discretion of the trial judge.

The Public Guardian and Trustee for BC v Johnston 2016 BCSC 1388 has an excellent review of the law as to when the courts will order that court actions be severed from the other and heard separately.

This decision was upheld by the BCCA in 2017 BCCA 59.

In that action there were claims that the will was invalid and alternatively in the same action , that if the will was valid, that it should then be varied as per wills variation provisions.

The application was to sever the two claims from the other and the court ordered that the trial firstly be held on whether the will is valid, and then after that trial, if necessary, the wills variation claim would be tried.

[67] Rules 22-5(6) and (7) state:

Separation

(6) If a joinder of several claims or parties in a proceeding may unduly complicate or delay the trial or hearing of the proceeding or is otherwise inconvenient, the court may order separate trials or hearings or make any other order it considers will further the object of these Supreme Court Civil Rules.
Separating counterclaim or third party claims

(7) If a counterclaim or a third party proceeding ought to be disposed of by a separate proceeding, the court may so order.

The key factors engaged in a general sense on an application to sever were canvassed in Schaper v. Sears Canada, 2000 BCSC 1575 (CanLII) [Schaper] at para. 19:

1. …the party making the request must show that hearing the claims together would unduly complicate, delay the hearing, or otherwise be inconvenient. If a party applying does not meet this threshold, the court need not go further in any analysis and the application should be dismissed.

2. Have the actions of any party in the proceeding been unreasonable and have they contributed to the complication, the delay, or the inconvenience alleged by the party applying? If this found, that would strengthen the argument to sever.

3. Are the issues between the plaintiff and defendant and the issues between the defendant and the third party sufficiently distinct so as to allow them to be tried separately? If so, that strengthens the argument to sever off third party proceeding.

4. Is the relief claimed by, or the potential obligation of, any party best determined by hearing the evidence of all parties at one hearing? If so, that weakens an application to sever.

5. Does the prejudice to the party applying, prejudice based on undue complication, delay or inconvenience, outweigh any benefit of matters being heard together, or outweigh any considerations related to the overall objective of the rules to ensure a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits, including the avoidance of a multiplicity of proceedings for the benefits of litigants and having concern to congestion in the courts generally?

[69] Guidelines that focused attention more keenly on the efficacy of the trial process were helpfully laid out in O’Mara v. Son, Kim et al., 2007 BCSC 871 (CanLII) [O’Mara] at para. 23:

1. whether the order sought will create a saving in pre-trial procedures;
2. whether there will be a real reduction in the number of trial days taken up by the trial being heard at the same trial;
3. whether a party may be seriously inconvenienced by being required to attend a trial in which the party may have a marginal interest;
4. whether there will be a real saving in expert’s time and witness fees;
5. whether one of the actions is at a more advanced stage than the other;
6. whether the order sought will result in delay of the trial of any one of the actions and, if so, whether any prejudice which a party might suffer as a result of that delay outweighs the potential benefits which a consolidated trial might otherwise have;
7. the possibility of inconsistent findings and common issues resulting from separate trials.

Severance may well be appropriate where the determination of one issue will render another one moot: Lawrence v. ICBC, 2001 BCSC 1530 (CanLII) [Lawrence].

The judicial discretion to sever trials or hearings is to be exercised sparingly: Morrison Knudsen Co. v. British Columbia Hydro & Power Authority, 1972 Carswell B.C. 62, 24 D.L.R. (3d) 579 (S.C.); Lawrence at para. 43. The test for severance is not applied in a vacuum; it is to be considered against the backdrop of the nature of the particular case at hand: Wirtz v. Constantini, 1982 CanLII 282 (BC SC), 137 D.L.R. (3d) 393, 1982 CarswellBC 588 (S.C.). Because the determination involves an individualized assessment of the unique case before the Court, there is no closed list of uniformly applied considerations that inform the exercise of the Court’s discretion.

Applications for Extension of Time to Appeal

In accordance with R. 6(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, B.C. Reg. 120/2022, is required to file and serve a notice of appeal not more than 30 days after the order was pronounced.

Section 32 of the Court of Appeal Act, S.B.C., 2021, c. 6, provides that a justice may extend a time limit in the Act or Rules, including for filing and serving a notice of appeal.

The burden is on the applicant to establish that the criteria for granting such an extension are met: Rapton v. British Columbia (Motor Vehicles), 2011 BCCA 71 at para. 19.

In considering an application to extend time to file and serve an appeal, certain factors are described in Davies v. C.I.B.C. (1987), 15 B.C.L.R. (2d) 256 at 259–260 (C.A.):

a. Was there a bona fide intention to appeal?
b. When were the respondents informed of the intention?
c. Would the respondents be unduly prejudiced by an extension of time?
d. Is there merit in the appeal?
e. Is it in the interest of justice that an extension be granted?

The interests of justice is “an overriding question and embraces the first four questions”: Davies at 260–261.

But it is “not all that comprises the fifth factor.” The interests of justice include a myriad of factors, such as the interests of the parties and compliance with the Rules of Court: Clock Holdings Ltd. v. Braich, 2009 BCCA 437 at paras. 23–24.

Notices to Admit

One of the most powerful yet under utilized litigation tool is the Notice to Admit.

Civil Rule 7-7(14) reads in part:

(1) In an action in which a response to civil claim has been filed, a party of record may, by service of a notice to admit in Form 26, request any party of record to admit, for the purposes of the action only, the truth of a fact or the authenticity of a document specified in the notice.

The Civil Rule 7-7(2) speaks to the effect of a notice to admit and provides that:

(2) Unless the court otherwise orders, the truth of a fact or the authenticity of a document specified in a notice to admit is deemed to be admitted, for the purposes of the action only, unless, within 14 days after service of the notice to admit, the party receiving the notice to admit serves on the party serving the notice to admit a written statement that

(a) specifically denies the truth of the fact or the authenticity of the document,

(b) sets out in detail the reasons why the party cannot make the admission, or

(c) states that the refusal to admit the truth of the fact or the authenticity of the document is made on the grounds of privilege or irrelevancy or that the request is otherwise improper, and sets out in detail the reasons for the refusal.

Civil Rule 7-7(4) provides that the court may order a party who unreasonably refuses to admit a fact, pay the costs associated with the proof of those facts which the party unreasonably refused to admit. If a responding party unreasonably denies or refuses to admit the truth of a fact or the authenticity of a document specified in a notice to admit, the court may order the party to pay the costs of proving the truth of the fact or the authenticity of the document and may award as a penalty additional costs, or deprive a party of costs, as the court considers appropriate.

In the present case, at paras. 4-29 of the notice to admit, the defendants have provided a boilerplate refusal which reads; “Refuse to make admission. The circumstances surrounding the dealing of the parties are outlined in the pleadings filed by the defendants. This is a triable issue and cannot be dealt with by way of admissions.”

In Ceperkovic v. MacDonald, 2016 BCSC 939, Madam Justice Dillon discusses the purpose of a notice to admit at para. 30, where she says: I

The purposes of the notice to admit are multiple. The primary purpose is to “save both the Court and litigants the time and expense involved in proving the authenticity of documents or in proving facts” (Clarke v. Minister of National Revenue (2000), 189 F.T.R. 76 at para. 43, [2000] F.C.J. No. 475). The rule is intended to eliminate issues altogether from a case or to facilitate proof of issues that cannot be eliminated (Garry D. Watson & Derek McKay, eds., Holmested and Watson: Ontario Civil Procedure (Toronto: Carswell, 1993) (looseleaf updated 2014, release 1) vol. 5 at 51§7 (Holmested and Watson)). Thus, the notice to admit can isolate important factors from a strategic and cost efficient perspective [citation]. It enables the parties to “prepare for an efficient trial focused on what is disputed” (Orlan Karigan & Associate Ltd. v. Hoffman (2000), 2000 CanLII 22725 (ON SC), 52 O.R. (3d) 235 at para. 21 (Sup. Ct. J.)). The notice to admit obviates the necessity and expense of calling evidence at trial (Canada Southern Petroleum v. Amoco Canada Petroleum (1994), 1994 CanLII 9096 (AB KB), 168 A.R. 126 at para. 16 (Q.B.)). Ultimately, it is a means to foster the timely adjudication of a claim on its merits (Furgiuele v. Don Casselman Global Enterprises, 2013 ONSC 7032 at para. 44 (Furgiuele)).

The decision canvasses the factors enumerated in Civil Rule 7‑7(2) and discusses some of the valid refusals for admitting a fact; namely, that the requested fact is privileged, that the party simply does not have the information necessary to answer it, or that the requested admission is somehow improper, or a veiled attempt to obtain particulars or ensure compliance with discovery obligations. The court also states, at para. 35, that the notice might be overly repetitious, overly broad, in the nature of argument, or vague.

At para. 38, she summarizes that:

[38] …the failure to admit the truth of a fact may be unreasonable within the meaning of [the rule] if:

(a) the truth of the fact is subsequently proved;

(b) the fact was relevant to a material issue …;

(d) the notice to admit was not otherwise improper;

(e) the notice to admit was reasonably capable of evaluation within the time required for response; and

(f) the refusing party had no reasonable grounds for believing that it would prevail on the matter.

Admissibility of Expert Opinion Evidence

The law governing admissibility of expert opinion evidence stems from the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 1994 CanLII 80, subsequently clarified in White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23 [White Burgess]. The party seeking to admit the evidence must satisfy each element in a two-stage inquiry:

a)At the threshold stage, the party seeking to admit the evidence must demonstrate that the evidence satisfies the Mohan That is, the evidence must be relevant, necessary, absent of an applicable exclusionary rule, and that the expert providing that evidence is properly qualified: White Burgessat para. 23.
b)At the second stage, the trial judge, exercising the gatekeeping role, must decide whether the benefits of admitting the evidence outweigh its potential risks: White Burgessat para. 24.

The element of a “properly qualified expert” under Mohan requires that the expert has acquired special or peculiar knowledge through study or experience in respect of the matters the expert undertakes to testify: McEwan v. Canadian Hockey League, 2022 BCSC 1104 at para. 186. The court must be satisfied that the person under consideration has expertise with respect to the opinions to be advanced, which is something distinct from just familiarity or involvement: Hughes v. Haberlin, 49 B.C.L.R. (3d) 366, 1997 CanLII 2186 at paras. 14 and 21 (S.C.).

In addition, as noted in R. v. Abbey, 2017 ONCA 640 at para. 48, a properly qualified expert includes the requirement that the expert be willing and able to fulfil the expert’s duty to the court to provide evidence that is:

a)impartial,
b)independent, and
c)

Expert witnesses must be impartial in the sense that their evidence must reflect an objective assessment of the questions presented to them. They must be independent in the sense that their evidence must be the product of their independent judgment, uninfluenced by the party who retained them or the outcome of the litigation. An expert’s lack of impartiality and/or independence is relevant not just to the weight to be given to the evidence under the second stage of the test, but also to its admissibility under the first stage of the test, to be addressed under the “qualified expert” element of the Mohan framework: McEwan at paras. 182–183.

Survey evidence may be admissible, assuming the survey responses are elicited by a relevant question, where the survey is both reliable, “in the sense that if the survey were repeated it would likely produce the same results”, and valid, “in the sense that the right questions have been put to the right pool of survey respondents in the right way, in the right circumstances to provide the information sought”: Masterpiece Inc. v. Alavida Lifestyles Inc., 2011 SCC 27 at para. 94. Like all expert evidence, survey evidence must be prepared by a properly qualified expert: Tokai of Canada Ltd. v. Kingsford Product Company, LLC, 2021 FC 782 at para. 25.

Evidence tendered on an application for certification must meet the usual criteria for admissibility: Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Microsoft Corporation, 2008 BCSC 1263 at para. 25; McEwan at paras. 29–32. The court exercises an important gatekeeping function in a proposed class proceeding and must not “shirk” its responsibility to consider the admissibility of evidence: McEwan at para. 31, citing Carter v. Ford Motor Company of Canada, 2021 ONSC 4137 at para. 9.

Testimonial Competence

Karrington v Morrisonn 2023 BCSC 570 dealt with the thorny issue of testimonial competence.

The court appointed a litigation guardian for the personal defendant and then ordered that an examination for discovery of the said demented persona take place as the threshold for testimonial competence is not high.

Under Rule 9-2(8) of the SCFR, a mentally incompetent person can only be examined with leave from the court. Rule 7-2(9) of the Civil Rules is identically worded. The court should grant leave only if the party seeking examination can establish that the proposed examinee can give sufficiently reliable evidence: DeMerchant v. Chow, 2010 BCSC 1447 [DeMerchant] at para. 44.

In considering whether the proposed examinee is able to give sufficiently reliable evidence, the elements of testimonial competence may provide useful guidance, namely, the proposed examinee’s capacity to observe, recollect and communicate. If the person satisfies the low threshold of testimonial competence, the court should grant leave for them to be examined, provided the person would not suffer psychological damage in the process.

The onus for showing that a mentally incompetent person should be examined rests on the party seeking examination: Penn v. Secord, [1980] 1 W.W.R. 464, 1979 CanLII 693 (B.C.S.C) at para. 7.

In DeMerchant, the Court frames the inquiry in terms of the reliability of the proposed examinee’s testimony: at paras. 44-47. If the court is satisfied that the person’s evidence would be unreliable, and that examining them would be futile, then leave should not be granted: at para. 44. Ultimately, in that case, the Court declines to grant leave to examine the proposed examinee due to medical evidence indicating that they have a tendency to fill in memory gaps by confabulating.

Courts outside of British Columbia have also considered whether a person under a disability should be examined for discovery. For example, in Abrahamson v. Buckland, [1990] 5 W.W.R. 193, 1990 CanLII 7809 (S.K.C.A.) [Abrahamson], at paras. 32–33, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal set out a useful framework that has been cited by courts in Saskatchewan, Ontario and Alberta, including the Alberta Court of Appeal in Bilawchuk v. Wawryko, 2002 ABCA 178 at para. 67.

The relevant portions of the framework described in Abrahamson are as follows:

In deciding whether to grant leave, the court should consider whether the person’s evidence would be sufficiently reliable and whether examining them would be futile: DeMerchant at para. 35. In this regard, the court may consider whether the person is “legally fit and qualified to give evidence” (Abrahamson at para. 29) and whether they possess the capacity to observe, recollect and communicate evidence: Marquard at para. 12. If the proposed examinee can give sufficiently reliable evidence, and there is no concern that they would suffer psychological damage in the process, the court should grant leave for them to be examined.

The threshold for testimonial competence is not high. If the person is shown to have basic abilities to observe, recollect and communicate, along with an understanding of the nature of an oath, their evidence should be admitted: Marquard at para. 14.

The authorities indicate that a deficit in a person’s ability to observe, recollect or communicate is not necessarily a disqualifier to testimonial competence. That is because, after it has been determined that their evidence should be admissible, any deficiencies in their ability ought to go to weight: Marquard at para. 14.

Factors In Assessing a Witness’ Testimony

The validity of a witness’ testimony depends on whether their evidence is consistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole and shown to be in existence at that time: Faryna v. Chorny, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A.) at 357.

In Bradshaw v. Stenner, 2010 BCSC 1398, aff’d 2012 BCCA 296, Justice Dillon adopted a three-step approach in which the court first considers the testimony of a witness on a “stand alone” basis followed by an analysis of whether the story is inherently believable.

If the testimony survives the first part of the test, the second step is to evaluate the testimony based upon its consistency with other witnesses and with documentary evidence.
Lastly, the court determines “which version of events is the most consistent with the ‘preponderance of probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions’”: at para. 187.

At para. 186 of Bradshaw the court set out a non-exhaustive list of the factors to be considered in assessing a witness’ evidence:

1. the capacity and opportunity of the witness to observe the events at issue;
2. his or her ability to remember those events;
3. the ability of the witness to resist being influenced by his or her interest in recalling those events;
4. the internal and external consistency of the witness’ evidence;
5. whether the witness’ evidence harmonizes with or is contradicted by other evidence, particularly independent or undisputed evidence;
6. whether his or her evidence seems unreasonable, improbable or unlikely, bearing in mind the probabilities affecting the case; and
7. the witness’ demeanor, meaning the way he or she presents while testifying.

The testimony of non-party disinterested witnesses may provide a “reliable yardstick for comparison”: Bradshaw at para. 187

S. 151 WESA – Leave of the Court Required to Bring Action Against Estate

Under WESA leave of the court is required to commence legal proceedings in the name of a specified person and on behalf of the estate of the deceased person and the requirements are set out in S 151 WESA.

Section 151 of WESA states:

Who may sue with leave of court

151(0.1) In this section, “specified person” means a beneficiary, an intestate successor or a person who may commence a proceeding claiming the benefit of Division 6 [Variation of Wills] of Part 4 [Wills].

(1) Despite section 136 [effect of representation grant], a specified person may, with leave of the court, commence proceedings in the name of the specified person and on behalf of the estate of the deceased person
(a) to recover property or to enforce a right, duty or obligation owed to the deceased person that could be recovered or enforced by the personal representative, or
(b) to obtain damages for breach of a right, duty or obligation owed to the deceased person.
(1.1) A specified person may apply for leave of the court under subsection (1) in the proceedings described in that subsection.
(2) Despite section 136, a specified person may, with leave of the court, defend in the name of the specified person and on behalf of the estate of a deceased person, a proceeding brought against the deceased person or the personal representative.
(2.1) A specified person may apply for leave of the court under subsection (2) in the proceeding described in that subsection.
(3) The court may grant leave under this section if
(a) the court determines the specified person seeking leave
(i) has made reasonable efforts to cause the personal representative to commence or defend the proceeding,
(ii) has given notice of the application for leave to
(A) the personal representative,
(B) any other specified persons, and
(C) any additional person the court directs that notice is to be given, and
(iii) is acting in good faith, and
(b) it appears to the court that it is necessary or expedient for the protection of the estate or the interests of a specified person for the proceeding to be brought or defended.
(4) On application by a specified person or a personal representative, the court may authorize a person to control the conduct of a proceeding under this section or may give other directions for the conduct of the proceeding.

For leave to be granted under s. 151 of WESA the applicants must meet the requirements summarized in Hoggan v. Silvey, 2022 BCCA 176:

In summary, the factors that are relevant in an application pursuant to s. 151 may vary depending on the nature of the application.

The statutory factors will always apply,

-so the petitioner must have standing as a specified person,
-must have made reasonable efforts to cause the personal representative to commence or defend the action,
-must have given the necessary notice, and must be acting in good faith.
-There must be an arguable case, as a meritless case would be neither necessary nor expedient to protect the interests of the estate or the specified person.

However, it will not always be necessary to consider whether the potential relief outweighs the inconvenience to the estate and whether the litigation is in the best interests of the estate.

Rather, as mentioned, s. 151(3)(b) is to be read disjunctively, such that there are four possible ways the standard may be met:

it may be necessary to protect the interests of the estate;

it may be expedient to protect the interests of the estate;

it may be necessary to protect the interests of a specified person;

or it may be expedient to protect the interests of a specified person.

Surreptitious Recordings Are Admissible

In C.C. v. S.P.R., 2022 BCSC 1057 [C.C.], the court considered the admissibility of surreptitious recordings. During the trial, the respondent who had made the recordings sought to adduce them, along with transcripts, into evidence. The court . noted (at para. 4) that while the practice of secretly recording a party for use in a family law proceeding should be discouraged, “there are circumstances where the probative value of admitting surreptitiously made recording outweighs the prejudicial effect of its admission”.

Note that it is a criminal offence to secretly record a conversation that is between third parties that you are not privy to the conversation , it is not illegal to record a conversations that you are a party to.

In C.C., at paras. 31-32, Gibb-Carsley J. set out the test applicable in British Columbia for determining the admissibility of surreptitious recordings:
[31] In British Columbia, the court has developed a four-part test to determine the admissibility of surreptitious recordings.

This test as set out by Justice Skolrood in Finch v. Finch, 2014 BCSC 653 at para. 62 [Finch] can be summarized as follows:

i. the recordings must be relevant;
ii. the participants must be accurately identified;
iii. the recordings must be trustworthy; and
iv. the court must be satisfied that the probative value of the recordings outweighs its prejudicial effects.

The court considered the leading cases in this province regarding the use of surreptitious recordings including A.D.B. v. E.B., [1997] B.C.J. No. 227, 1997 CarswellBC 104 (S.C.), Sweeten v. Sweeten, [1996] B.C.J. No. 3138, 1996 CanLII 2972 (S.C.) [Sweeten], and Mathews v. Mathews, 2007 BCSC 1825 [Mathews], and accepted that as a starting point there is a limited discretion for the court to exclude the evidence simply on a policy basis.

Admission of Extrinsic Evidence in Wills Interpretation Post WESA

Zalechuk Estate 2023 BCSC 523 discussed the modern approach to wills interpretation post WESA.

The Court’s power to rectify a will is found in s. 59 of the WESA:

59 (1) On application for rectification of a will, the court, sitting as a court of construction or as a court of probate, may order that the will be rectified if the court determines that the will fails to carry out the will-maker’s intentions because of

(a) an error arising from an accidental slip or omission,
(b) a misunderstanding of the will-maker’s instructions, or
(c) a failure to carry out the will-maker’s instructions.
(2) Extrinsic evidence, including evidence of the will-maker’s intent, is admissible to prove the existence of a circumstance described in subsection (1).
(3) An application for rectification of a will must be made no later than 180 days from the date the representation grant is issued unless the court grants leave to make an application after that date.

(4) If the court grants leave to make an application for rectification of a will after 180 days from the date the representation grant is issued, a personal representative who distributes any part of the estate to which entitlement is subsequently affected by rectification is not liable if, in reasonable reliance on the will, the distribution is made
(a) after 180 days from the date the representation grant is issued, and
(b) before the notice of the application for rectification is delivered to the personal representative.
(5) Subsection (4) does not affect the right of any person to recover from a beneficiary any part of the estate distributed in the circumstances described in that subsection.

In Thiemer Estate, 2012 BCSC 629 which also predated the coming into force of the WESA, Justice Dardi summarized some useful principles of construction. She said that the objective of the court is to ascertain the intention of the testator as expressed in his or her will when it is read as a whole in light of any properly admissible extrinsic evidence. The testator’s intention is to be gathered from the will as a whole and not solely from the provisions in dispute (para. 45 citing Perrin v. Morgan, [1943] A.C. 399 at 406 (H.L.) and (H.L.); Re: Burke (1960), 20 D.L.R. (2d) 396 at 398-399 (Ont. C.A.).

The court is to ascertain the express intention of the testator which is the meaning of the written word as opposed to what the testator may have meant to do when he or she made a will (Thiemer at para. 46 citing Perrin at 406).
Earlier lines of authority endorsed an objective approach to will interpretation but modern jurisprudence recognizes a strict literal approach can defeat the intention of the testator (Thiemer at para. 47, citing “The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia”, Report on Interpretations of Wills, LRC 58 at 6).
[68] At para. 48 Justice Dardi said:

[48] In keeping with contemporary judicial thinking, the courts of this province have favoured the subjective approach to interpreting wills, wherein the objective is to ascertain the actual meaning the testator ascribed to the words he or she used in the will. In determining the testator’s intention the courts have endorsed the analytical approach commonly described as the “armchair rule”. The rule requires that the court put itself in the position of the testator at the point in time when he or she made the will, and from that vantage point construe the language in the will in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances known to the testator.
In Jamt Estate, 2021 BCSC 788, ss. 58 and 59 of the WESA is discussed by Justice Coval. He says that s. 58 is remedial in nature covering a broad discretion in prescribed circumstances to order a writing or marking on a will be fully effective. Section 59, like s. 58 is remedial in nature conferring a broad discretion to rectify a will that fails to carry out the makers intentions in prescribed circumstances. Prior to the enactment of the WESA there was no such statutory authority in British Columbia to rectify wills and common law rectification had very narrow boundaries.

Since there were no judicial considerations of s. 59(1)(a) Justice Coval took guidance from the United Kingdom decision in Re Segelman [1996] Ch. 171 at p. 180 which considered similar but not identical sections of the Administration of Justice Act 1982. He raised three questions:

1) what were the testator’s intentions with regard to the issue for which rectification is sought?
2) does the Will as written fail to carry out those intentions?
3) is that failure a consequence of one of the reasons specified in ss. 59(1)(a)-(c).

Justice Coval concluded that the extrinsic evidence strongly supported granting the rectification sought under s. 59(1). He concluded that Mr. Jamt intended to leave his estate to the petitioner. The accidental slip had been the use of the wrong middle name for the petitioner.

Section 59(2) of the WESA admits extrinsic evidence to prove the circumstances described in s. 59(1) if the court is of the view that the will fails to carry out the will-maker’s intentions because of an error arising from an accidental slip or omission or a misunderstanding or failure to carry out the will-maker’s instructions. Since the Will was prepared by the deceased, I will only consider whether there has been an accidental slip or omission.

In Simpson, the Court of Appeal applied s. 59 to rectify a will in a case where they found a denial of rectification in those particular circumstances would deprive the respondents of the gift the deceased intended them to have, and provide the appellant with a windfall the deceased never intended her to have. An accidental omission arose from the deceased’s failure to realize that his intended gift of the shares would never get to the respondents due to the operation of the survivor clause of the shareholders agreement.

The trial judge allowed the extrinsic evidence of the drafting solicitor’s notes to determine what the testator’s intentions were.
The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the rectification.