Witness Credibility Assessment

Witness Credibility Assessment

Robledano v Jaconto 2018 BCSC 152 reviewed the law relating to the criteria to be used when assessing the truthfulness/credibility of a witness.

The case involved a claim of same sex marriage where it was disputed between the parties that such a relationship existed prior to death.

The court reviewed the law relating to assessing the truthfulness of a witnesses testimony and found the claimant’s testimony to be more trustworthy than the opposing family members.

The court followed the decision of Faryna v. Chorny (1952) 2 DLR 354 ( BCCA) at 357 stating that the proper approach to assess the truthfulness of any interested witnesses testimony is based on:

“ The credibility of interested witnesses, particularly in cases of conflict of evidence cannot be gauged solely by the test of whether the personal demeanor of the particular witness carried conviction of the truth.

The test must reasonably subject his story to an examination of its consistency with the probabilities that surround the currently existing conditions.

In short, the real test of the truth of the story of a witness in such a case must be its harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions.”

The factors identified in Bradshaw v. Stenner 2010, BCSC 1398 when assessing whether the evidence of a witnesses, truthful, but also accurate are:

  • The capacity and opportunity of the witness to observe the events at issue;
  • his or her ability to remember those events;
  • the ability of the witness to resist being influenced by his or her interest in recalling those events;
  • the internal and external consistency of the witnesses evidence; did his or her testimony change between direct and cross examination; are there inconsistencies in between, prior statements, discovery evidence and his or her evidence at trial;
  • whether the witnesses evidence harmonizes with or is contradicted by other evidence, particularly independent or undisputed evidence;
  • whether his or her evidence seems unreasonable, improbable are unlikely, bearing in mind the probabilities affecting the case; and-the witnesses demeanor, meaning the way here she presents while testifying.

S.58 and 59 WESA Application Ordered to Trial

S.58 and 59 WESA Application Ordered to Trial

Estate of Palmer 2017 BCSC 1430 dealt with  an application to cure defects in a will under sections 58 and 59 of WESA, but was ordered to trial rather than having been dealt with summarily by affidavits.

Ms. Palmer executed a short will on August 18, 1988. By that document, she appointed Montreal Trust and her cousin, Emily Takats, as her executors and trustees. She also named Ms. Takats as the sole residual beneficiary of her estate. Ms. Takats died well before Ms. Palmer.

[5] Following her death, a copy of Pauline Palmer’s 1998 will was discovered bearing various handwritten alterations and initials. Some of the changes are in black ink and some in blue ink. The changes include:

• updating Ms. Palmer’s address;
• deleting Montreal Trust and Emily Takats as executors and trustees and substituting in their place “Alan Homeniuk (sic), 10 English Way, St. Albert, Alberta”; and
• deleting the name Emily Takats as a residual beneficiary.

[6] The operative words of the will containing the handwritten changes now read as follows:

• “I nominate, constitute and appoint Alan Homeniuk of 10 English way, St. Albert, Alberta, and my cousin [name deleted], presently of [city deleted] to be the executors and trustees of this my Will”;
• “To deliver the rest and residue of my estate unto my said cousin [name deleted] for his [changed from “her”] own use and benefit absolutely.”

WESA and the Determination of Testamentary Intentions

[27] The recent case of Estate of Young, 2015 BCSC 182, describes the legal framework applicable to s. 58 of WESA and the curing of “deficiencies” related to the making or alteration of a will. The history and intent of the legislation, including the case law in other jurisdictions addressing similar provisions, is set out in paras. 16–33 of that decision and will not be repeated here. The law is summarized in paras. 34–37 of the decision and can be paraphrased as follows:

• the courts’ curative power with respect to non-compliant testamentary documents is inevitably and intensely fact-sensitive;
• the first threshold issue is whether the document in question is authentic;
• the second, and core, issue is whether the non-compliant document represents the deceased’s testamentary intentions;
• a testamentary intention means much more than the expression of how a person would like his or her property to be disposed of after death. Rather, the document must record a deliberate or fixed and final expression of intention as to the disposal of the deceased’s property on death;
• the burden of proof that a non-compliant document embodies the deceased’s testamentary intentions is the balance of probabilities;
• factors relevant to establishing the existence of a fixed and final testamentary intention may include the presence of the deceased’s signature, the deceased’s handwriting, witness signatures, revocation of previous wills, funeral arrangements, specific bequests and the title of the document; and
• generally speaking, the further a document departs from the formal validity requirements of the legislation, the harder it may be for the court to find that it embodies the deceased’s testamentary intention.

[28] Both s. 58 and 59 of WESA provide for an “application” to court to determine whether a certain document represents the testamentary intentions of a deceased person and/or rectification is warranted because the will fails to implement the deceased’s intent.

[29] Rules 2-1(2)(b) and (2.1) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules provide for the initiation of proceedings in estate matters or in respect of any application authorized by statute to be made to the court. It is possible that the manner in which the present application has been brought does not properly comply with those rules but, in any event, there is no doubt that a chambers hearing is ultimately contemplated thereby triggering the application of Rule 22-1, including the following sub-rules:

Evidence on an application

(4) On a chambers proceeding, evidence must be given by affidavit, but the court may
(a) order the attendance for cross-examination of the person who swore or affirmed the affidavit, either before the court or before another person as the court directs,
(b) order the examination of a party or witness, either before the court or before another person as the court directs,
(c) give directions required for the discovery, inspection or production of a document or copy of that document,
(d) order an inquiry, assessment or accounting under Rule 18-1, and
(e) receive other forms of evidence.
…

Power of the court

(7) Without limiting subrule (4), on the hearing of a chambers proceeding, the court may
(a) grant or refuse the relief claimed in whole or in part, or dispose of any question arising on the chambers proceeding,
(b) adjourn the chambers proceeding from time to time, either to a particular date or generally, and when the chambers proceeding is adjourned generally a party of record may set it down on 3 days’ notice for further hearing,
(c) obtain the assistance of one or more experts, in which case Rule 11-5 applies, and
(d) order a trial of the chambers proceeding, either generally or on an issue, and order pleadings to be filed and, in that event, give directions for the conduct of the trial and of pre-trial proceedings and for the disposition of the chambers proceeding.

[30] I have attempted to explain above why the affidavit evidence tendered on this application respecting certain matters is insufficient to do justice to the testamentary intentions of Ms. Palmer. In my view, oral evidence from the three affiants is desirable including cross-examination of those affiants on certain aspects of their testimony. As well, evidence must be adduced respecting Ms. Palmer’s physical and mental health and, in particular, her testamentary capacity at the time the changes to her will were made.

[31] Furthermore, three of the potential beneficiaries under WESA have not been included in the proceedings to date. It appears that Ms. Perret has no interest in actively participating in the present proceeding, however the court is not satisfied that any meaningful effort has been invested by any of the parties in tracing and notifying each of Bradley Palmer, Grant Palmer and Dolores Palmer. Their legal interests are at stake in this proceeding and they cannot simply be ignored.

[32] Rule 22-1(7)(d) permits the court to order a trial of any chambers proceeding and to give directions respecting the filing of pleadings and the further conduct of the matter. The legal test for converting a chambers proceeding into a trial was recently reviewed by the Court of Appeal in British Columbia (Milk Marketing Board) v. Saputo Products Canada G.P., 2017 BCCA 247. It is akin to the test applicable for summary judgment under Rule 9-6, i.e., whether a bona fide triable issue arises on the evidence before the court which warrants determination at a trial. The threshold is relatively low in that regard.

Decision and Orders Made

[33] In my view, there is a bona fide triable issue between the parties whether the handwritten amendments to Ms. Palmer’s will record a fixed and final expression of intention to make Mr. Homeniuk the sole beneficiary of her estate, an issue which cannot be satisfactorily resolved based solely on the affidavit evidence adduced to date. Accordingly, I make the following orders:
1. the within chambers proceeding will proceed to a trial;

Unwitnessed Will Valid: S.58 WESA

Unwitnessed Will Valid: S.58 WESA

Re Riguidel Estate 2017 BCSC 1667 found a signed but unwitnessed will to be valid by invoking the curative provisions of Section 58 WESA.

The Facts:

The people present when the deceased signed the handwritten and typed documents were the deceased, Ms. Leonard and Mr. Kapinus. The deceased was present when Ms. Leonard and Mr. Kapinus signed their names as witnesses to the deceased’s signature.

[28] Mr. Kapinus also states that he was unaware that two witnesses were required. He used the same language as Ms. Leonard did in her Affidavit, where he swore:

16. The Deceased appeared confident about signing the Will. He did not hesitate. I asked him if the Will was exactly what he wanted and he advised me that it was.

17. At no time did I observe anyone pressuring the Deceased to change his Will or to make any specific gift.

18. The Deceased and I discussed the Will and it was clear that it reflected his final wishes. The Will is consistent with my prior discussions with the Deceased.

19. I have no reason to believe that the Will is not an accurate reflection of the Deceased’s final wishes. I observed no evidence that the Deceased was forced or compelled to distribute his estate in the manner set out in the Will. The Deceased appeared to be thinking clearly at the time. He was not confused and he understood what he was doing.

[29] The most compelling evidence is that of Donna Malley, the deceased’s daughter. She states that when she learned of her father’s cancer diagnosis in January 2016. She travelled to Kamloops in order to be with him, arriving on or about February 11, 2016. She swears to the following:

3. I have learned that prior to my arrival on February 11, 2016, my father signed a document to vary his will (the “Codicil”), a true copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “A”.
(Exhibit A is the typewritten document prepared by Mr. Kapinus).

[30] Ms. Malley also swears the following:

4. On or about February 13, 2016, I had a conversation with my father, at which time he advised me that it was important to him that my sister, Debi, was to obtain the house that he owned after he died, as she had done so much for him.

5. Debi and her husband, Vince, lived with my parents for many years and contributed to the construction and upkeep of the house.

6. It is my understanding and belief that after my mother died, my father realized that he did not have enough money to pay his mortgage. In or about early November 2015, I was present during a conversation between my sister Debi Riguidel, Vince Kapinus, and my father in which Debi and Vince told my dad not to worry that they would pay his mortgage and bills and ensure that he would always be taken care of financially.

[31] In her Affidavit, Ms. Malley sets out her understanding as to why her sister and Mr. Kapinus were to receive the house, and describing their relationship as a “trusting and loyal friendship”, and that it is “his way of saying that he will always take care of them in the same way that they did for him”. She further swears:

11. I believe that my father intended to provide Debi and Vince with his house in part because both my sister, Kimberly, and I have houses of our own and we did not live with my parents as adults.

12. I am confident that the February 11, 2016, Codicil prepared by my father and attached hereto as Exhibit “A” is a true and accurate reflection of my father’s wishes.

The Law

[34] In Young Estate (Re), 2015 BCSC 182, Madam Justice Dickson, as she then was, described some of the factors that should be present when seeking a non-compliant document to represent the deceased’s person’s intention under the curative provisions of s. 58(3) of WESA. In determining the deceased’s final testamentary intentions, Madam Justice Dickson wrote:

[36] The burden of proof that a non-compliant document embodies the deceased’s testamentary intentions is a balance of probabilities. A wide range of factors may be relevant to establishing their existence in a particular case. Although context specific, these factors may include the presence of the deceased’s signature, the deceased’s handwriting, witness signatures, revocation of previous wills, funeral arrangements, specific bequests and the title of the document: Sawatzky at para. 21; Kuszak at para. 7; Martineau at para. 21.

[37] While imperfect or even non-compliance with formal testamentary requirements may be overcome by application of a sufficiently broad curative provision, the further a document departs from the formal requirements the harder it may be for the court to find it embodies the deceased’s testamentary intention: George at para. 81.

[35] The curative provisions of s. 58(3) of the WESA are fact sensitive.

[36] Extrinsic evidence is permitted in order to determine whether the non-compliant document is the deceased’s final expression, as to his or her testamentary intentions pursuant to s. 58(3) of WESA: Litke Estate (Re), 2017 BCSC 1079 at para. 39.

[37] It comes down to this – whether the document presented was prepared by the deceased and that its contents represent a “deliberate or fixed and final testamentary intention at the material time for the disposition of the estate: Litke Estate (Re) at para. 42.

Discussion

[38] I am satisfied, on the evidence, that the documents dated February 7, 2016, copies of which are in Appendix 1 to these reasons, are the deliberate expressions of the deceased’s wishes as to the disposition of his property upon his death.

[39] I also find that the handwritten document signed by the deceased and the witnesses, Ms. Leonard and Mr. Kapinus, in the deceased’s presence was to record and confirm that the typewritten document set out the terms of the handwritten document, which reflected the deceased’s intentions before the deceased signed the typewritten document.

[40] It is clear from all of the evidence that the deceased recognized a moral, if not a legal obligation, to his daughter and son-in-law for their contributions to his estate.

[41] I determine that the typewritten document dated February 7, 2016 represents and embodies the deceased’s testamentary intentions sufficient to alter his Will as to the disposition of the assets of his estate and is effective as part of the Will

Section 58-59 WESA Rectification Application Referred to Trial

Section 58-59 WESA Rectification Application Referred to Trial

Estate of Palmer 2017 BCSC 1430 dealt with an application by affidavits pursuant to Sections 58 and 59 WESA to cure deficiencies in a will left by a deceased who hand wrote certain changes to a typed and properly witnessed prior will.

The  Judge referred the matter to the trial list under a rule 22-1-(7) (d) finding that there was a triable issue, particularly concerning her competence.

WESA and the Determination of Testamentary Intentions

[27]         The recent case of Estate of Young, 2015 BCSC 182, describes the legal framework applicable to s. 58 of WESA and the curing of “deficiencies” related to the making or alteration of a will.  The history and intent of the legislation, including the case law in other jurisdictions addressing similar provisions, is set out in paras. 16–33 of that decision and will not be repeated here.  The law is summarized in paras. 34–37 of the decision and can be paraphrased as follows:

  • the courts’ curative power with respect to non-compliant testamentary documents is inevitably and intensely fact-sensitive;
  • the first threshold issue is whether the document in question is authentic;
  • the second, and core, issue is whether the non-compliant document represents the deceased’s testamentary intentions;
  • a testamentary intention means much more than the expression of how a person would like his or her property to be disposed of after death.  Rather, the document must record a deliberate or fixed and final expression of intention as to the disposal of the deceased’s property on death;
  • the burden of proof that a non-compliant document embodies the deceased’s testamentary intentions is the balance of probabilities;
  • factors relevant to establishing the existence of a fixed and final testamentary intention may include the presence of the deceased’s signature, the deceased’s handwriting, witness signatures, revocation of previous wills, funeral arrangements, specific bequests and the title of the document; and
  • generally speaking, the further a document departs from the formal validity requirements of the legislation, the harder it may be for the court to find that it embodies the deceased’s testamentary intention.

[28]         Both s. 58 and 59 of WESA provide for an “application” to court to determine whether a certain document represents the testamentary intentions of a deceased person and/or rectification is warranted because the will fails to implement the deceased’s intent.
[29]         Rules 2-1(2)(b) and (2.1) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules provide for the initiation of proceedings in estate matters or in respect of any application authorized by statute to be made to the court.  It is possible that the manner in which the present application has been brought does not properly comply with those rules but, in any event, there is no doubt that a chambers hearing is ultimately contemplated thereby triggering the application of Rule 22-1, including the following sub-rules:

Evidence on an application

(4)        On a chambers proceeding, evidence must be given by affidavit, but the court may
(a)        order the attendance for cross-examination of the person who swore or affirmed the affidavit, either before the court or before another person as the court directs,
(b)        order the examination of a party or witness, either before the court or before another person as the court directs,
(c)        give directions required for the discovery, inspection or production of a document or copy of that document,
(d)        order an inquiry, assessment or accounting under Rule 18-1, and
(e)        receive other forms of evidence.
…

Power of the court

(7)        Without limiting subrule (4), on the hearing of a chambers proceeding, the court may
(a)        grant or refuse the relief claimed in whole or in part, or dispose of any question arising on the chambers proceeding,
(b)        adjourn the chambers proceeding from time to time, either to a particular date or generally, and when the chambers proceeding is adjourned generally a party of record may set it down on 3 days’ notice for further hearing,
(c)        obtain the assistance of one or more experts, in which case Rule 11-5 applies, and
(d)        order a trial of the chambers proceeding, either generally or on an issue, and order pleadings to be filed and, in that event, give directions for the conduct of the trial and of pre-trial proceedings and for the disposition of the chambers proceeding.

2 Ways the Revocation of Wills Can Happen in Vancouver

A revocation of a will in British Columbia can happen in two different ways. For example, the test dater can rip it up with the intention of revoking it. He can burn it, destroy it, and any other matter of destruction of the will with the intention of revoking it, or it can happen by operation of law. For example, when a married couple divorced, the gift to the husband is revoked. The rest of the will is valid.

Revocation is a very important topic in the estate litigation issue as you can well imagine. It is important to safeguard that original will because if the original will cannot be produced, there is a presumption in law that the testator intended to revoke it provided that the will was in his or her possession at the time it went missing. This can have disastrous effects to some of the main beneficiaries. So, anything you need to know about revocation of wills, please feel free to contact us.

Understanding the Wills Variation Act in British Columbia

A tribute to Wills Variation Act that we have here in British Columbia, Canada. We’ve had this act for approximately 90 years and we obtained it from New Zealand. It allows certain types of classes of people to contest a will if they have been inadequately provided for. It allows spouses, either legal spouses or common law spouses or same sex couples who have either legally married or lived in a marriage-like relationship for two years to contest a will and it also allows children, whether they be adopted children or natural children or illegitimate children but not stepchildren to also contest a will if they also have been inadequately provided for. The article basically gives several examples of extreme cases where a great injustice would have occurred but not for the Wills Variation Act.

The Basics of the Wills Variation Act

This video is about the basics of the Wills Variation Act in British Columbia, Canada. The Wills Variation Act only applies to this province so people from elsewhere must realize that we can only contest wills in this province where the assets are in this province. In any event, this is a detailed look at the statute and some of the requirements to comply with it and some of the problems that we run into in pursuing the many, many claims of disinherited.com that we have pertaining to this statute.

The Wills Variation Act allows children of the deceased and spouses of the deceased to contest a will if they have been inadequately provided for. The action must be commenced within six months of the grant of probate or the person would be out of time to do so. So people should consult disinherited.com for legal advice as soon as possible either before a death or immediately after death to get legal advice as to what claims, if any, they may have if they feel they have been inadequately provided for. The article and video also deal with various ways that can be used to circumvent the Wills Variation Act, and those are some of the problems that we have in trying to recoup inheritances for people who have been disinherited. Thank you very much for watching.

Mr. Attorney – Don’t Change the Wills Variation Act

The Wills Variation Act was written in approximately 2007 after the government of British Columbia the year prior announced that they intended to make slipping changes to wills and succession legislation in British Columbia. The overriding change was to change the Wills Variation Act provision so that adult independent children could no longer contest the will in British Columbia if they were inadequately provided for. The overriding reasoning for this change was that it would now bring British Columbia into more accord with the law of the rest of Canada.

My wife Judith Milliken and I led the fight against these proposed changes. I travel to various bar meetings. We wrote letters, and Judith in particular wrote this article and mailed it to the attorney general and republished it. It is a compelling story as to why the Wills Variation Act should not have been changed and I’m pleased to say that at the end of the day, we won. The government of British Columbia backed down and are not changing that provision of the Wills Variation Act.

Dysfunctional Families: The Predator Spouse

Dysfunctional Families - Disinherited

A disturbing and increasing trend in dysfunctional families is the advent of the predator spouse who takes advantage of elderly victims and assumes control of usually financial affairs and marries the victim in short order.

Even if the family had been reasonably functional prior to this event, the interference of the predator spouse upon an elderly loved one can wreak severe consequences for both the victim and his or her family.

Every estate litigator has likely had experience with the predator spouse.

Typically they are much younger women, often a caregiver, who single out an elderly and vulnerable man who is typically recently widowed , and does so for the purpose of personal profit and exploitation.

Family members are usually cut off, excluded from the life of their loved one and not informed of the marriage ceremony.

The goal of the predator spouse is to enter into a legal form of marriage, while making the victim increasingly excluded from family members and totally dependent upon the predator. The overwhelming control exerted by the predator spouse is often backed up with the terrifying threat of putting the elderly spouse in a care facility .

In my experience the elderly widower is often cognitively impaired, significantly depressed and unable to care for himself. The predator spouse is often skilled at befriending such victims and often has a history of prior marriages for the same exploitive purpose.

The children are often beside themselves as they see both their family connection totally disrupted, as well as their possible inheritance going to an intervening stranger.

The relationship usually begins as either a hired caregiver or as someone who quickly befriends the elderly person and gains his trust through companionship and assistance. Many such men find the younger female predator to be sexually irresistible and cannot avoid the “temptation”.

The marriage ceremony often occurs in secret within several weeks of the start of the insidious relationship.

One of the major difficulties with such marriage ceremonies is that they are often very difficult in law to set aside, primarily on the basis of lack of mental capacity.

The courts generally speaking have had difficulty in defining exactly the test for capacity to marry, but seem to have adopted a standard that it is to be treated as quite low on the basis that marriage is a “simple contract.“ The judicial reasoning in my opinion could not be more incorrect given the complexity of current matrimonial laws, particularly as they relate to the division of property and assets, and the consequent  difficulty of divorce in present day.

Such judicial reasoning continues however that marriage is a “simple contract” requiring very little cognitive reasoning to understand the consequences of same.

Cases of the Predator Spouse

There has been at least one judicial decision where the court recognized the effect that a marriage has on one’s property and children and a higher standard of capacity to marry was applied.

That decision was in Alberta case of Barrett Estate v. Dexter 2000 ABQB 530. In that decision, the deceased had been tested for mental capacity prior to his death, and was found to have significantly impaired cognitive function and judgment. A geriatric physician opined that a person must understand the nature of the marriage contract, the state of previous marriages, one’s children and how they might be affected.

Probably my most egregious case was a widower who began to frequent the services of a prostitute who “specialized in seniors”. Within a short while the prostitute moved in with the elderly man, changed the locks and telephone number and cut him off from his three children. They married shortly thereafter, she arranged for him to change his will to provide for her exclusively, and  within three months of their marriage, she physically beat him to death, and was convicted of his murder.

Another successful challenge to a predator marriage was in Juzumas v Baron 2012 ONSC 7220 where the marriage was set aside on the basis that the contract of marriage was unconscionable due to the inequality of bargaining power, and undue influence.

The court stated as follows:

8     In his text, The Law of Contracts, John McCamus addresses the “cluster of doctrines” that apply “where a stronger party takes advantage of a weaker party in the course of inducing the weaker party’s consent to an agreement.” John D. McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012), at p. 378. The cluster of doctrines includes undue influence and unconscionability. If any one of these doctrines applies, the weaker party has the option of rescinding the agreement.

9      McCamus describes the equitable doctrine of undue influence as providing a “basis for setting aside a gift or a transaction where the transfer of value has been induced by an ‘unconscientious use by one person of power possessed by him [or her] over another.'” McCamus, at p. 402; see also Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd. (1965), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 710 (B.C. C.A.), at p. 713; and Knupp v. Bell (1968), 67 D.L.R. (2d) 256 (Sask. C.A.), at p. 259. He addresses the distinction between the two categories of undue influence: actual and presumptive undue influence. As an example of actual undue influence, McCamus refers to Craig v. Middleton, [1970] 2 All E.R. 390 (Eng. Ch. Div.), in which a caregiver threatened an elderly dependent with abandonment: McCamus, at p. 403-404. The onus is on a plaintiff to establish actual undue influence.

10      A presumption of undue influence arises from the nature of a recognized relationship (e.g., solicitor and client, doctor and patient etc.). The presumption can also arise from the particular circumstances of the case, where one party has the ability or potential to “dominate the will of another, whether through manipulation, coercion, or outright but subtle abuse of power.” Goodman Estate v. Geffen, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 353 (S.C.C.), at p. 377.

11      Such a presumption is rebuttable by evidence that the transaction was an exercise of independent free will: Geffen, at p. 379; and Bank of Montreal v. Duguid (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 737 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 24-25. Evidence of free will may be demonstrated by evidence of independent legal advice, or at least an opportunity for the individual

Gift to Witness to Will Cured By S 43 WESA

Gift to Witness to Will Cured By S 43 WESA

Bach Estate 2017 BCSC 548  cured a gift to witness to will to be valid   when prior to WESA  on March 31, 2014 it would  have been invalid.

One of the witnesses to the will was the husband of the deceased and a beneficiary under her will.

The Court followed the reasoning of previous decisions made under S 58 WESA to cure defective wills  and allowed extrinsic evidence to be introduced to show the true testamentary intention of the testator.

Validity

(2) A person may witness a will even though he or she may receive a gift under it, but the gift may be void under section 43 [gifts to witnesses].

(3) A will is not invalid only because a witness was, at the time the will was signed by the will-maker, or afterwards became, legally incapable of proving the will, unless the witness was not 19 years of age or older at the time the will was signed by the will-maker.

47      The document signed by Mr. Bach on September 9 meets the requirements of ss. 37(1) and 40 and is therefore a valid will under the WESA. This act revoked all prior wills created by Mr. Bach: s.55 WESA.

48      The difficulty arises from s. 43(1):

43(1)  WESA states:

Unless a court otherwise declares under subsection (4), a gift in a will is void if it is to

(a) a witness to the will-maker’s signature or to the spouse of that witness,

(b) a person signing the will by the will-maker’s direction, or the spouse of the person signing, or

(c) a person claiming under a person, other than the will-maker, referred to in paragraph (a) or (b).

49      One of the witnesses to this will was Mr. Thibodeau, the husband of the beneficiary under the will.

50      Prior to 2014, the law was clear: the court had no discretion to allow for such gifts: see Estate of Jason M. Bird, 2002 BCSC 1584. This rule operated as a safeguard against fraud and undue influence, however, the rigid application often defeat the genuine intention of the testator. Under the rule, the gift to Ms. Thibodeau would have failed.

51      However, on March 31, 2014, WESA came into force. Under this new legislation, gifts made in these circumstances are still presumptively void however, the court now has the discretion to declare them valid under s. 43(4):

(4) On application, the court may declare that a gift to a person referred to in subsection (1) is not void and is to take effect, if the court is satisfied that the will-maker intended to make the gift to the person even though the person or his or her spouse was a witness to the will.

52      I am not aware of any case in British Columbia in which this provision has been applied. I find however, that recent jurisprudence under s. 58 of the WESA (concerning court-ordered curing of formally deficient wills) that relates to testamentary intent instructive.

53      For example, in Yaremkewich Estate (Re), 2015 BCSC 1124, Watchuk J. considered s. 58 and the concept of testamentary intent. She stated:

[29] WESA, which came into effect on March 31, 2014, contains a new provision in s. 58 that even if a document fails to comply with the formalities of the statute, a court may nonetheless order that the document is fully effective as if it had complied with the statute.

The provision reads as follows:

Court order curing deficiencies

58(1) In this section, “record” includes data that

(a) is recorded or stored electronically,

(b) can be read by a person, and

(c) is capable of reproduction in a visible form.

(2) On application, the court may make an order under subsection (3) if the court determines that a record, document or writing or marking on a will or document represents

(a) the testamentary intentions of a deceased person,

(b) the intention of a deceased person to revoke, alter or revive a will or testamentary disposition of the deceased person, or

(c) the intention of a deceased person to revoke, alter or revive a testamentary disposition contained in a document other than a will.

(3) Even though the making, revocation, alteration or revival of a will does not comply with this Act, the court may, as the circumstances require, order that a record or document or writing or marking on a will or document be fully effective as though it had been made

(a) as the will or part of the will of the deceased person,

(b) as a revocation, alteration or revival of a will of the deceased person, or

(c) as the testamentary intention of the deceased person.

(4) If an alteration to a will makes a word or provision illegible and the court is satisfied that the alteration was not made in accordance with this Act, the court may reinstate the original word or provision if there is evidence to establish what the original word or provision was.

[30] Accordingly, s. 58(3)(a) empowers the court to order that a document or other record is fully effective as the will of a deceased person if the court is satisfied that the document represents the testamentary intentions of that deceased person.

[Emphasis added.]

54      The same inquiry is relevant under s. 43(4). Watchuk J. continued:

Evidence

[31] As a preliminary matter, the statements that Ms. Yaremkewich made to the various affiants and the other evidence of her intention in the affidavits are admissible evidence in this case.

[32] The approach to evidence under Manitoba’s Wills Act, R.S.M. 1988, c. W-150 was summarized by Philp, J.A. in Langseth Estate v. Gardiner (1990), 75 D.L.R. (4th) 25 at 33 (Man. C.A.)

The general rule that extrinsic evidence is not admissible in construing a will (the function of a court of construction) does not apply to the probate court whose duty is to determine whether a document is a valid will. Extrinsic evidence is admissible on the question of testamentary intent, and the Court is not limited to the evidence that an inspection of the document provides.

Testamentary Intent

[33] The s. 58 curative provision was well summarized in Estate of Young, 2015 BCSC 182 [Young]. This provision is one of WESA‘s “most far-reaching remedial provisions”, and it represents a marked departure from the traditional, formalistic approach to the creation of wills (at para. 16). It confers the court with a broad discretion to treat a testamentary record as valid even if it does not comply with the formalities of the statute. However, this provision can only be used to cure errors concerning formalities, and cannot cure substantive errors such as testamentary incapacity or undue influence (at para. 17).

[34] To apply s. 58, the applicant must prove on the balance of probabilities that the record at issue is authentic and that it represents the testamentary intentions of the will-maker: Young at paras. 19, 36; and Bunn Estate (Re) (1992) 100 Sask. R. 231 at 237 (C.A.) [Bunn Estate]. This analysis asks whether the court is satisfied that the document records the will-maker’s deliberate or fixed and final expression of intention as to the disposal of her property upon death. This was summarized in Young as follows:

[34] As is apparent from the foregoing, a determination of whether to exercise the court’s curative power with respect to a non-compliant document is inevitably and intensely fact-sensitive. Two principal issues for consideration emerge from the post-1995 Manitoba authorities. The first in an obvious threshold issue: is the document authentic? The second, and core, issue is whether the non-compliant document represents the deceased’s testamentary intentions, as that concept was explained in George.

[35] In George the court confirmed that testamentary intention means much more than the expression of how a person would like his or her property to be disposed of after death. The key question is whether the document records a deliberate or fixed and final expression of intention as to the disposal of the deceased’s property on death. A deliberate or fixed and final intention is not the equivalent of an irrevocable intention, given that a will, by its nature, is revocable until the death of its maker. Rather, the intention must be fixed and final at the material time, which will vary depending on the circumstances.

[Emphasis added.]

55      The question, then, is whether the gift expresses the testamentary intentions of Mr. Bach, despite the fact that the will was witnessed by the spouse of Sharon Thibodeau. Extrinsic evidence is admissible.

56      Here, there is the evidence from Ms. Veres: she deposed that when she visited Mr. Bach in August, 2014, he made no mention of intending to change his will. He was frustrated in his efforts to sell the house and said to her in this regard: “you would just have to deal with selling the house yourself”.

57      I note that if a person chooses to exclude a relative from her or his will, it is human not to mention it. The statement he apparently made, however, implies that he was not intending to change his will.

58      But the evidence to the contrary is overwhelming. First, Ms. Thibodeau deposed that on July 17, 2014 the deceased told her that he intended to change his will.

59      Her affidavit goes on:

  1. We were sitting in Terry’s house, and Terry started a conversation with me and said he was going to change his Will, and that he wanted to leave everything to me, including his house. He said that I had always been there for him, and I had been so good to him all his life. He said that he did not know what he would have done without me. Terry said, “why should Jamie have my house?”, and that he had worked hard for it.
  2. Terry stated that Jamie [Veres] has a farm and all that land, she doesn’t need it. He further stated that Jamie had always told him that she did not want the house.
  3. Terry told me he was going to call Jamie and let her let her know that he was going to change his Will. I have no knowledge as to whether Terry told Jamie that he intended to change his Will or not; I never questioned him about that at any time.

60      Furthermore, as outlined above, Mr. Bach advised his friend Wendy Boyes that he was leaving all of his estate to his sister Sharon. He told her that on August 9, 2014. On September 2, 2014 he told his sister, Diane Vanderburg, that he wished to leave all of his estate to Ms. Thibodeau.

61      Dr. Willms’ evidence in this regard is significant as well. She deposed that a document expressing Mr. Bach’s intention to leave his estate to his sister was signed. She said that it was read aloud to him and that he stated that he agreed with the contents of the document and that he understood that the document was intended to indicate his wishes for the estate.

62      Finally, there is the evidence of the last 24 hours of Mr. Bach’s life. The deceased had asked Ms. Thibodeau and her husband to take him to a notary for the purpose of making a new will and making other final arrangements. That included signing a power of attorney appointing Ms. Thibodeau as his attorney.

63      On all the evidence, I am satisfied that the document executed on September 9, 2014 amounts to a will and represents Mr. Bach’s testamentary intent. The gift is not void.

64      The application is therefore allowed.