Passing Over an Executor

Passing Over an Executor

Passing over an executor utilizes essentially the same legal criteria as removing an executor except it occurs before the named executor starts to act in the representative capacity.

Re Thommasson Estate 2011 BCSC 481 removed a named  executor who was not a beneficiary but his siblings wished to review a questionable land transaction made to him by the deceased prior to death .

The criteria for the passing over of an executor is essentially the same as removing an executor- the court’s are reluctant to do so except for good reason having regard to the best interests of the beneficiaries.

19      Courts are hesitant to interfere with the testator’s right to nominate his or her executor. However, the court has both a statutory power under s. 31 of the Trustee Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 464 and an inherent power to remove or pass over a trustee or executor: Mardesic v. Vukovich Estate (1988), 30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 170 (B.C. S.C.); Seaton Estate, Re, 2003 BCCA 555 (B.C. C.A.).

20      Section 31 of the Trustee Act provides:

If it is expedient to appoint a new trustee and it is found inexpedient, difficult or impracticable to do so without the assistance of the court, it is lawful for the court to make an order appointing a new trustee or trustees, whether there is an existing trustee or not at the time of making the order, and either in substitution for or in addition to any existing trustees.

21      In Mardesic, Finch J. (as he then was) in finding it necessary and expedient to remove the trustee because he was in a conflict of interest with the interests of all the beneficiaries of the estate, noted that s. 31 conferred a very broad power on the court.

22      The test for removal of an executrix or trustee is set out in Conroy v. Stokes, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 124 (B.C. C.A.), where the Court confirmed at 126-127 that the main test for removal of a trustee is the welfare of the beneficiaries:

In Letterstedt v. Broers (1884), 9 App. Cas. 371, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that the main principle upon which the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity has been exercised to remove old trustees and substitute new ones in cases requiring such a remedy, is the welfare of the beneficiaries of the trust estate.

23      In Stadelmier v. Hoffman (1986), 57 O.R. (2d) 495 (Ont. Surr. Ct.), (sub nom. Stadelmier v. Hoffman), the Court found the executor should be passed over because there was a conflict as a result of the fact the executor could not attack the gift and transfer of properties to him while at the same time maintaining in his personal capacity that the transfers were proper. The Court summarized the findings at 500:

In considering the fitness of the respondent to act as an executor I have considered also the duties of an executor in a general way. One duty of an executor is to bring in the estate for distribution among the beneficiaries. If it is perceived, on good grounds, that that important duty is compromised by a personal conflict of interest because the executor will be asked to sue himself to recover what may be a large part of the estate property, he must be passed over. That consideration is particularly important when the action against the executor is for a very significant amount in respect to the size of the estate.

24      In this case, Alex asserts he should not be removed because it would be pre-judging the case. He says that Brian is seeking to overturn the testators’ right to nominate an executor. Alex submits that the possibility of a future lawsuit is not sufficient to overturn a testator’s right to nominate an executor. He relies on the following cases for the proposition that this is not an appropriate case in which to pass over him as an executor: Hautakoski Estate, Re, 2009 BCSC 868 (B.C. Master); De Cotiis v. De Cotiis, 2008 BCSC 1206 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); Le Roux v. Shannon, 2009 BCSC 331 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); and Fawcett Estate v. Steiner, 1998 CarswellBC 625 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]).

25      Brian provided the following authorities in which the courts found a conflict that warranted either passing over or removal of an executor or trustee because of either a potential or actual conflict: Stadelmier v. Hoffman; Mardesic; Montgomery v. Osborne Estate1993 CarswellOnt 3482 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Maki Estate, Re, 2007 BCSC 1034 (B.C. Master); and Stern v. Stern, 2010 MBQB 68 (Man. Q.B.).

26      It is clear from reviewing the case law that each case turns on its own facts.

27      In this case, Alex is not a beneficiary under either of his parents’ wills, and his only interest in the estates is as an executor. The other named executor wants to make enquiries into the transfer of the Property to Alex in order to determine what, if any, interest the estates have in the Property, and what, if any, obligations Alex and his wife have to the estates as a result of the transfer.

28      The application is not to remove Alex as an executor but simply to pass over him so that an enquiry can be undertaken of the transfer of the Property to him and his wife by the deceased in 2006, and a determination can be made if any further actions need be taken in regards to the Property.

29      In the circumstances of this case, it is my opinion that there is a perceived conflict of interest between Alex in his role as an executor and his interest in his personal capacity. If an action is instituted by the executors as a result of the transfer of the Property, it would be against Alex. In my opinion, Alex, in his capacity as executor, cannot attack the transfer of the Property to himself while at the same time maintaining, in his personal capacity, that the transfer of the Property was proper. By making such a finding I am not prejudging the case. I am simply of the view that, in the circumstances of this case, if an action is commenced as a result of the enquiries into the transfer, Alex cannot conscientiously act as a plaintiff in his capacity as an executor in a case where he will be the defendant.

30      As a result I conclude that the passing over of Alex is necessary and expedient. His right to apply to be added as a co-executor under the grant of probate after the enquiry has been completed is reserved. There will be a grant of probate naming Brian as the personal representative of the estate of Herbert Thomasson and the estate of Agnes Annie Thomasson.

Statute Barred Debt to Estate Deducted From Beneficiary

Statute Barred Debt to Estate Deducted From Beneficiary

Re Johnston Estate 2017 BCSC 272 upheld the rule in Cherry v. Boultbee  which provides that where a legatee of a share of the residue is a debtor of the estate, he or she is not entitled to receive his or her legacy without bringing his or her debt into account, even though the debt owed by the beneficiary in that case was 43 years old and was statute barred.

The rule derives from the case of Cherry v. Boultbee (1839), 4 My. & Cr. 442. It is an equitable principle designed to ensure fairness.

The purpose of the rule was to prevent a beneficiary who owed money to an estate from receiving more than his or her fair share of the estate.

In the case of Re: Akerman, Akerman v. Akerman, [1891] 3 Ch. 212, Kekewich J. stated:

A person who owes an estate money, that is to say, who is bound to increase the general mass of the estate by contribution of his own, cannot claim an aliquot share given to him out of that mass without first making the contribution which completes it. Nothing is in truth retained by the representative of the estate; nothing is in strict language set off; but the contributor is paid by holding in his own hand a part of the mass, which, if the mass were completed, he would receive back.

29      The rule has been held to apply even where the debt is statute-barred: see Re: Akerman.

30      The applicant submits that the rule continues to apply in Canada and relies on the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada Trust Company v. Lloyd et al, [1968] S.C.R. 300.

In that case, the Supreme Court applied the rule in Cherry v. Boultbee in finding that the contribution of three directors who had improperly withdrawn funds from the company some 43 years earlier, had to be taken into account in the distribution of the residue by the receiver. The court noted that the situation was analogous to that of a “legatee who must bring into account even a statute barred debt before he can claim a legacy left to him in the testator’s will”.

31      The applicant also relies on a more recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 129, where the court confirmed that the rule in Cherry v. Boultbee has been accepted in Canadian decisions and, where appropriate, applied.

The rule in Cherry v. Boultbee does not confer on the estate any right to recoup the amount owing but rather operates to ensure fairness in the distribution of an estate, recognizing that the relationship between a testator and his or her beneficiaries is typically not at arm’s length. The fundamental purpose of the rule is to ensure that beneficiaries are treated fairly and it embodies the principal that he who seeks equity must do equity. As the court noted in Re: Akerman, nothing is being retained by the representative and nothing is being set off but rather, the contributor is paid by what he is holding in his own hand.

The court in Re: Goy & Co Ltd., [1900] 2 Ch. 149, also noted that the claimant has in his own hands that which is applicable to the payment and should pay himself out of that. The question of whether the testator or the estate can recover the debt or whether the debt is statute barred is therefore largely irrelevant to the application of the rule. In my view, the change in approach to limitation provisions by the Supreme Court of Canada in Tolofson does not affect the application of the rule in Cherry v. Boultbee.

37      The decision of the Yukon Territory Court of Appeal in Leeper Estate makes it clear that the rule in Cherry v. Boultbee continues to apply in Canada.

39      The Estate of William Leonide Johnston is, however, entitled to retain and deduct from the share of the estate otherwise payable to the respondent an amount on account of the debt owed to the Estate of William Johnston by the respondent that was outstanding and owing on his death.

Relationship Between Parent and Child Is Fiduciary

Relationship Between Parent and Child Is Fiduciary

A (LS) v A. ( WH) Estate 2014 BCSC  1910  (Antrobus v Antrobus) discusses that the relationship of parent and child is fiduciary in nature, and that parents have an obligation to care for, protect and rear their children .

This line of authority was also  established by the BC Court of Appeal in  in M (M.) v F (R.) 1997 BCJ 2914.
The traditional focus of breach of fiduciary duty is breach of trust. A child is particularly vulnerable to her at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion of power. Morelli v Morelli 2014 BCSC 106.
In the A (LS) v A. (WH) Estate case a 62-year-old female plaintiff was awarded in excess of $400,000 damages against her parents who knowingly allowed their child to be sexually abused by her grandfather and his friend as a child,  who were both  deceased by the time of trial.
The plaintiff’s evidence was  accepted that her parents permitted her  grandfather to have opportunity to sexually assault and sexually abuse or even though they knew the grandfather was a child molester .
The Court  found such behavior to be a breach of the parent’s fiduciary duty owed to their, as well as negligent in their parental duties.
The court held  that the parents owed their child a duty of care to take reasonable care to protect her from the danger that they knew of and that their failure to take such reasonable care was responsible for damages caused to the plaintiff daughter.
But for the negligence of the parents, the injuries that  the plaintiff suffered would not have occurred.
The plaintiff was able to prove that the defendant’s negligence caused or materially contributed to her injuries.
The primary test for causation asks ” But for” the defendant’s negligence, would the plaintiff have suffered the injury.
The “but for” test recognizes that compensation for negligent conduct should only be made where there is a substantial connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct. Hanke     v Resurface Corp. 2007 SCC 7
The plaintiff also sued her father for the intentional infliction of harm or mental suffering, alleging that he verbally psychologically and physically abused her and intentionally inflicted mental suffering on her by inappropriate and cruel forms of discipline.

The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering are set out in the Ontario Court of Appeal decision Prinzo v Baycrest Centre For Geriatric Care (2002) 60 O.R. (3d) 474 at paragraph 48, as follows:

1) flagrant or outrageous conduct;
2) calculated to produce harm; and
3) resulting in a visible and provable illness.

Joint Bank Holder Not Liable For Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Joint Bank Holder Not Liable For Breach of Fiduciary Duty

No specific terms of payment were ever agreed between the parties and the defendant was paid the sum of $37,850 over approximately 5 years.

No evidence of mental incapacity was led at trial, although the deceased estate did become incompetent at some point during those years.
The court dismissed the claim as it found there was a loose family agreement that monies  charged to manage to account and that the payments were reasonable under the circumstances.

The Court Reviewed the Law of Fiduciary Duty

[29] . Fiduciary duties can arise without formal appointment as attorney, executor or trustee.[1]

[30]  Fiduciary relationships may arise depending on the nature and evolution of the relationship and the tasks undertaken in furtherance of that relationship.[2] As noted by Justice Wilson of the Supreme Court of Canada in Frame v. Smith (1987) 2 SCR 99 at 136, the following indicia has been accepted as a “rough and ready” guide to assist with the determination of whether a fiduciary relationship exists:

i.           The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power;

ii.         The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests;

iii.        The beneficiary is vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.

[29]  Fiduciaries are burdened with responsibilities including the duty to act in the best interests of the person to whom they are bound to protect. Fiduciaries are required to vigilantly avoid any conflict between their own personal interests and their duties as fiduciaries.

[30]  At common law and in equity the general rule is that fiduciaries are not entitled to benefit from their appointment. ( Waters on Trusts)

However, this rule is not an absolute prohibition on activities that present a conflict of interest and duty. In the present case Annie had the right to request that Dawn provide care and companionship to her in exchange for compensation. Annie was entitled to organize her finances and personal services as she saw fit. The application of the rule of equity arises as follows: once the court has found a conflict between personal interest and duty the question arises as to whether there was consent to the activity. In this case the question is whether Annie or her attorney provided consent to the payments for personal services.

Chain of Executorship When Executor Dies

Chain of Executorship When Executor Dies

The chain of executorship when the executor dies before finishing his or her  duties  refers to where probate has been taken by an executor who survives the original testator, the right of such executor to a grant of probate does not cease and the representation to and the administration of the testator’s estate devolves to his executor. Re Aikins Estate (1963) 41 W.W.R. 226, at 227

4      Re Aikins Estate (1963) 41 W.W.R. 226, a decision of Friesen, Surr. Ct. J., where that learned judge gave a careful decision in a similar matter and refused the order. In his reasons, Friesen, Surr. Ct. J., at p. 227, quoted from Macdonell & Sheard’s Probate Practice at p. 113 as follows:

‘… if a sole executor, or the survivor of several executors, having proved the will, dies without having completed the administration of the estate, his executor when he proves the will becomes the executor of the original testator. It is only an executor who has proved the will who can transmit the executorship, and, therefore, if the executor named predeceases the testator or dies without having taken probate there must be an administration.’

One of the leading cases on the topic in British Columbia is O’Gorman Estates (1965)  51 WWR 762

Probate Revoked For Improper Service

Probate Revoked For Improper Service

Al- Sabah Estate 2016 BCSC 1781 both have a probate revoked and removed the administrator for both failing to disclose important information to the court as well as sending the required probate notice to her close relatives at addresses that were mostly incorrect and could have easily been corrected.

The court held that   equity favoured the revocation of grant of letters of administration and followed the decision of Desbiens v Smith Estate 2010 BCCA 394 where a grant of probate was set aside in order to allow a wills variation action brought” out of time”, but the defendants had not received notice of the probate application due to an incorrect address used by the executor who should have been more diligent.

40      Moreover, I am satisfied that, at the time she applied for the grant of letters of administration of the estate, Sheikha Salem failed to disclose to the court pertinent information that ought to have been disclosed.

41      Where the evidence discloses that the person who is obliged to give notice failed to exercise sufficient diligence to ascertain the correct address to which the notice was to be mailed, the notice requirements of the Act are not complied with, and the court has a general discretion to revoke a grant of letters of administration: Desbiens v. Smith Estate 2010 BCCA 394 (B.C. C.A.) at paras. 21 to 35 inclusive. I do note that that decision dealt with the Act’s predecessor, the now-repealed Estate Administration Act, which was replaced by the Act. However, the general principles of law remain applicable.

42      When it is alleged that an administrator should be removed because he or she is not acting in the best interests of the estate, the main factor to be considered is the welfare of the beneficiaries: Veitch v. Veitch Estate, 2007 BCSC 952 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 22

Fraudulent Misrepresentation

Fraudulent Misrepresentation

Jasmur Holdings Ltd v Taynton Developments Inc. 2016 BCSC 1902 reviewed inter alia the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation.

116.       The tort of fraudulent misrepresentation has four elements. They were recently summarized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch 2014 SCC 8 (S.C.C.), at paragraph 21:

[21] From this jurisprudential history, I summarize the following four elements of the tort of civil fraud:

(1) a false representation made by the defendant;

(2) some level of knowledge of the falsehood of the representation on the part of the defendant (whether through knowledge or recklessness);

(3) the false representation caused the plaintiff to act;

and (4) the plaintiff’s actions resulted in a loss.

117      With respect to negligent misrepresentation, the elements were described in Queen v. Cognos Inc. [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87 (S.C.C.) at 110:

. . . (1) there must be a duty of care based on a “special relationship” between the representor and the representee; (2) the representation in question must be untrue, inaccurate, or misleading; (3) the representor must have acted negligently in making said misrepresentation; (4) the representee must have relied, in a reasonable manner, on said negligent misrepresentation; and (5) the reliance must have been detrimental to the representee in the sense that damages resulted. . . .

118      As Kirkpatrick J. said in PD Management Ltd. v. Chemposite Inc. 2006 BCCA 489 (B.C. C.A.), at paragraph 14:

[14] It is settled law that an alleged misrepresentation must pertain to a matter of fact. In MacMillan v. Kaiser Equipment Ltd., 2003 BCSC 672, aff’d 2004 BCCA 470, this Court dismissed the claims for damages for misrepresentation because “it is clear that each of the alleged representations relate to a future occurrence, and not to an existing state of events. A future offer . . . is not an actionable representation” (para. 85). 

137      The plaintiffs rely on D. Debenham, The Law of Fraud and the Forensic Investigator, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at page 14 with respect to their claim of constructive fraud:

Constructive fraud does not require a proof of design to mislead or deceive another, but of some failure to perform an obligation in good faith, or in accordance with the intention of the parties, often out of self-interest. It is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but it is more – a failure to properly respect the rights of one who is vulnerable to the power of another. That vulnerability may be as a result of a preceding contractual obligation which has left one person at the mercy of another, or it may be as a result of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Constructive fraud does not imply fault, in the sense of intentional misconduct, like actual fraud does. The standard for constructive fraud is objective, while actual fraud (also known as “fraud at law”) requires a subjective dishonest intention. Thus, in cases like Boardman v. Fhips and Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, the courts have found constructive fraud where the defendants thought they were acting entirely properly, because the court found that their conduct did not comport the legal standard required of someone who had power over the affairs of another.

Tracing Converted Assets

Tracing Converted Assets

Converted assets can be traced and reclaimed under certain circumstances if they can be identified.

For example a bank account of cash can be converted into a stock portfolio which in turn is used to buy a house that is subsequently sold and put into bonds. As long as the funds can be identified , they can be traced and accounted for and where appropriate by the court, re transferred into the name of the rightful owner.

The law on tracing funds was discussed inter alia in Jasmur Holdings Ltd.v Taynton Developments Inc. 2016 BCSC 1902.

169      With respect to tracing funds , In Tracy (Guardian ad litem of) v. Instaloans Financial Solution Centres (B.C.) Ltd., 2010 BCCA 357 (B.C. C.A.), the Court of Appeal stated

[41] . . . Although tracing is available both at law and in Equity (see Maddaugh and McCamus, supra, at chapters 6 and 7), the right which the plaintiffs are entitled to trace in this case is the constructive trust, an equitable property right. I agree with Professor Lionel Smith (The Law of Tracing (1997)) that the establishment of this proprietary right, which he refers to as the “proprietary base”, is sufficient to establish an entitlement to trace. It is not necessary, as was once argued, to demonstrate a pre-existing fiduciary relationship: see Citadel General Assurance Co. v. Lloyds Bank Canada, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 805 at para. 57.

[42] Of course, it may be difficult to identify the funds or other property into which the claimed Charges have been transformed or with which they have been mingled; and the process will come to a halt in certain conditions, including where the balance in an account has fallen below the amount being traced. (See generally Maddaugh and McCamus, supra, at Chapter 7, and Smith, supra, at Chapter 8.) As the Court stated in McTaggart v. Boffo (1975) 64 D.L.R. (3d) 441 (Ont. H.C.J.):

Tracing is only possible so long as the funds can be followed in a true sense, i.e., so long as, whether mixed or unmixed, it can be located and identified. It presupposes the continued existence of the money either as a separate fund or as part of a mixed fund or as latent in property acquired by the means of such a fund.

Two things will absolutely prevent the tracing of trust monies:

  1. If, on the fact of any individual case, such continued existence of the identifiable trust fund is not established, equity is helpless to trace it;
  2. the chain for tracing is also broken where the trust fund either in its initial form or a converted

Adding Defendants

Adding Defendants

Stewart v. Stewart  2016 BCSC 1576 was a contested application for adding defendants to a court action commenced by one of four children to wind up a trust.

The application to add the remaining three children as defendants was opposed on the basis that the trustee could and would represent the interests of the other three children.

The court allowed the three defendants to be added as parties as there was a different legal position being put forward between the -plaintiff as a beneficiary and the applicants to be added as defendants as beneficiaries.

A: RULE 6-2(7)(b)

[34]         This subrule provides two alternate tests:

  • whether the person ought to have been joined as a party, or
  • whether that person’s participation in the proceeding is necessary to ensure that all matters in the proceeding may be effectually adjudicated on.

[35]         The Applicants, relying on Kitimat (District) v. Alcan Inc., 2006 BCCA 562 at para. 28, submit that if either of the circumstances referred to in paragraph 34 above arise, then the person should be added as a party.

[36]         They argue it is necessary to join the Applicants as defendants since their direct interests might be affected by the granting of the relief sought in the NOCC.

[37]         Kitimat was considered and applied in Delta Sunshine Taxi (1972) Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), 2014 BCSC 2100 at para 14:

[14]      “Ought” is a broader concept than “necessary” and includes situations in which joining the person may be more than mere convenience but less than necessity (Kitimat at para. 29). Necessary parties are those whose direct interests might be affected by the relief sought (Canadian Labour Congress v. Bhindi (1985), 1985 CanLII 384 (BC CA), 61 B.C.L.R. 85 at 94 (C.A.) (Canadian Labour Congress), Kitimat at paras. 30-32). In Kitimat, the petitioners sought to quash a decision of the province that authorized Alcan Inc. (“Alcan”) to sell hydro power that it produced for use outside of Kitimat’s aluminum industry, without adding Alcan as a party. The Court found that Alcan ought to have been joined and that Alcan was a necessary party because a binding order would limit the instruments held by Alcan, without its participation. In other words, the effect of the petition could be to limit the ability of Alcan to sell the hydro power it produced, so affecting the value of the power and the financial interests of Alcan

[38]         Their arguments include:

  • as in Kitimat, the relief sought by the plaintiff in these proceedings will affect the Applicants’ rights and interests under the Trusts. If the plaintiff is successful, there will be a direct financial impact on the Applicants in that among other relief, the plaintiff seeks orders that QPPC and its subsidiaries, ABC and its subsidiaries, the Stewart Trust, and the Martin Trusts be liquidated, dissolved or wound up and the Trustees of the Stewart Trust and Martin Trusts distribute one-quarter of the assets held by the Trusts to each of the plaintiff, and the Applicants, adjusted for any unequal distributions;
  • accordingly, if the plaintiff’s claims were successful, the operations of QPPC, ABC, and their subsidiaries would be terminated prematurely. The Stewart Trust and the Martin Trusts would also be terminated, the Trust assets distributed, and the Applicants’ rights and interests as beneficiaries under those Trusts would be eliminated;
  • the Stewart Trust and the Martin Trusts are a major source of income for the Applicants. The plaintiff has stated that the Applicants and the plaintiff have received over $34 million in equal shares from the Stewart Trust alone since its settlement. The relief sought by the plaintiff in these proceedings would terminate this ongoing income source;
  • it is no answer for the plaintiff  to say that the interests of the Applicants are not directly affected because they would be entitled to a distribution of an approximately equal share of the trust property should the relief be granted. The plaintiff has pled that the purpose of the Trusts was to allow the Deceased’s assets to grow in a consolidated and diversified manner for the benefit of the Deceased’s children and their issue.
  • this is not one of those situations where the beneficiaries’ input is necessary or helpful;
  • to the extent that any of the interests of the beneficiaries of the family trusts are affected by the claims brought in the within proceeding, their interests ought to and can be protected by the defendant trustees of the family trusts. The Applicants have not asserted any argument or defence that would be available to them as trust beneficiaries that is not available to be advanced, or has not been advanced, by the defendant Trustees of the family trusts.

[41]         I have concluded that the application should be granted. While I accept that the Applicants do not currently have a position adverse in interest to the trustees, that is not, in my view, the proper test to be applied.

What is a Discretionary Trust?

What is a Discretionary Trust?

The BC Court of Appeal in Putzki v Saunders 2016 BCCA 344 examined the nature of a family property trust and discussed what is a discretionary trust.

A discretionary trust is commonly used in estate planning often  when dealing with infants, disabled people on a government pension, spendthrifts and mentally challenged people of all sorts. The simple idea is that someone else who is neutral and competent manages the assets/ monies held in the trust for the benefit of the beneficiary, typically by paying the interest and some capital from time to time when necessary.

Underhill and Hayton: Law of Trusts and Trustees, 18th ed. (London: LexisNexis, 2010) at 98, describe the nature of a discretionary trust as follows:

Where a beneficiary has no such absolute current right to direct the trustees to pay him an ascertainable part of the net income or capital he has ‘no interest in possession’, only being interested under a discretionary trust. Typically, this is the case where a beneficiary will receive income only if the trustees positively decide to carry out their duty to distribute income by favouring him rather than another member of the class of potential beneficiaries. There is also the atypical case where a beneficiary must receive the income unless the trustees exercise distributive (or dispositive) powers to divert the income elsewhere … or to withhold it …: the discretion-conferring distributive powers prevent an interest in possession arising (eg where B is a life tenant subject to dispositive powers).
66      A discretionary trust is distinct from a fixed trust. The authors of Underhill and Hayton at 98, describe a fixed trust as follows:
Where a beneficiary has a current fixed entitlement to an ascertainable part of the net income or net capital, if any, of the trust fund after deduction of sums paid by the trustees in the exercise of their administrative powers of management, the beneficiary has a fixed interest which ranks as ‘an interest in possession’ under the trust.
67      Unlike a fixed trust, the beneficiaries of a fully discretionary trust and their entitlements (distinct from the potential beneficiaries and their potential entitlements) cannot be ascertained at the time of settlement. A discretionary trust may also come in a variety of forms. Under an “exhaustive” discretionary trust, the trustee must distribute the whole of the income or capital, or both, but retains the power to choose who among the potential beneficiaries should receive distributions, and in what amount. Under a “non-exhaustive” discretionary trust, the trustee has the added power to choose whether or not to make any distribution at all.