Profanity Doesn’t Terminate Marriage Like Relationship

Profanity Doesn't Terminate Marriage Like Relationship

Re Landriault Estate 2019 BCSC 1089 held that one party calling the other a profanity was insufficient to terminate a long-standing marriage like relationship.

The deceased died intestate and three adult children contested a claim of a spouse asserting a long time marriage like relationship with the deceased.

The court determined the case by way of a summary trial based on affidavits.

The children alleged that the surviving spouse terminated the marriage like relationship in or about 2011, but had scant evidence of any such termination.

The court reviewed the Court of Appeal decision in Robledano v Queano 2019 BCCA 150 that stated that section 2 (2) (b) WESA dealing with a person ceasing to be a spouse under the act when one or both persons terminate the marriage like relationship.

The court stated:

“The question of whether a person has terminated the relationship requires a judge to consider the expressed and implicit intentions of each spouse, as well as the objective evidence concerning the subsistence of the relationship. The determination is a judgment call for the trial judge – the application of a broad legal standard to the factual circumstances of an individual case. It is a question of mixed law and fact.”

The court reviewed the various series of factors from Molodowich v Pentinnen ( 1980) RFL 376 , which are often applied by the courts to determine whether a marriage like relationship exists.
One of the first of several questions is did the parties live under the same roof and what were the  sleeping arrangements. The court found that they did not live under the same roof due to her medical needs, when she was moved into a care home in or about 2011.

With respect to the question of sexual relations the court found that the parties had not had sexual relations since 1997 when the deceased was injured in a motor vehicle accident. The spouse however, spent virtually all day every day with her and ate meals with her and weathered her outbursts.

The court concluded that the only objective evidence that the deceased terminated the spousal or marriage like relationship with the spouse was that she referred to him and derogatory terms, called him profane names, ordered him out of her room and exhibited other outbursts of temper in his general direction.

The deceased, however, was known for such outbursts and was also rude to staff.

The judge specifically stated at paragraph 70 “ I find that calling someone asshole, particularly when the utterer is prone to outbursts, was insufficient to terminate this long-standing marriage like relationship. So are comments like not wanting to see his face , nor caring where he was.”

The court concluded that the marriage like relationship had not been terminated, and the spouse was awarded the estate in accordance with the intestate provisions set out in section 21 of WESA.

“Marriage-Like” Relationship Criteria

“Marriage-Like" Relationship Criteria

DN V MR 2019 BCSC 53 is another decision that explores the various criteria a court will examine in determining whether a couple has lived in a marriage like relationship for at least two years as is required by WESA in order to be found to be spouses under the act.

The question of whether parties are living in a marriage-like relationship is largely fact-driven and depends on the individual circumstances of each case.

In Dey v. Blackett, 2018 BCSC 244, citing Austin v. Goerz, 2007 BCCA 586, the court held that the “determination of whether a relationship was marriage-like requires a ‘holistic approach’, in which all of the relevant factors are considered and weighed, but none of them are treated as being determinative of the question”: at para. 192.

Parties can continue to “live together in a marriage-like relationship” even though they do not actually reside under the same roof: Thompson v. Floyd, 2001 BCCA 78 at para. 34.

In Roach v. Dutra, 2010 BCCA 264, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the parties were spouses under the Family Law Act, even though they began living in separate residences, but with a view to preserving their relationship.

A marriage-like relationship can be found in the absence of cohabitation where there is evidence that supports that a couple were is a loving and intimate relationship for many years. An example is found in Connor Estate, 2017 BCSC 978, where the court found at paras. 48–51 that even though the parties in question did not live together (they were unable to do so because of illness), they were in a “marriage-like relationship” for the purposes of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c. 13.

The evidence was that they had a “loving and intimate relationship” and that it they supported each other emotionally, “loved each other, were faithful to each other, communicated with each other almost every day when they were not together, considered themselves to be (and presented themselves to be) “husband and wife” and were accepted by all who knew them as a couple”: at para. 50.

A determination as to whether or not parties are “spouses” or in a “marriage-like relationship” is a question of mixed fact and law: Austin v. Goerz, 2007 BCCA 586; see also Weber v. Leclerc, 2015 BCCA 492 at para. 22, leave to appeal ref’d [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 19.

There are a myriad of factors that can be taken into account some of which include the questions listed in Molodowich v. Penttinen, (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), which the Court of Appeal noted in Weber at para. 25 “are helpful as indicators of the sorts of behaviour that society, at a given point in time, associates with a marital relationship”. That said, the Court of Appeal also emphasized that these factors should not be approached as a checklist, and that the circumstances should be addressed holistically. The approach in Molodowich is as follows:

(1)        SHELTER:

(a)        Did the parties live under the same roof?
(b)        What were the sleeping arrangements?
(c)        Did anyone else occupy or share the available accommodation?

(2)        SEXUAL AND PERSONAL BEHAVIOUR:

(a)        Did the parties have sexual relations? If not, why not?
(b)        Did they maintain an attitude of fidelity to each other?
(c)        What were their feelings toward each other?
(d)        Did they communicate on a personal level?
(e)        Did they eat their meals together?
(f)         What, if anything, did they do to assist each other with problems or during illness?
(g)        Did they buy gifts for each other on special occasions?

(3)        SERVICES:

What was the conduct and habit of the parties in relation to:
(a)        Preparation of meals,
(b)        Washing and mending clothes,
(c)        Shopping,
(d)        Household maintenance,
(e)        Any other domestic services?

(4)        SOCIAL:

(a)        Did they participate together or separately in neighbourhood and community activities?
(b)        What was the relationship and conduct of each of them towards members of their respective families and how did such families behave towards the parties?

(5)        SOCIETAL:

What was the attitude and conduct of the community towards each of them and as a couple?

(6)        SUPPORT (ECONOMIC):

(a)        What were the financial arrangements between the parties regarding the provision of or contribution towards the necessaries of life (food, clothing, shelter, recreation, etc.)?
(b)        What were the arrangements concerning the acquisition and ownership of property?
(c)        Was there any special financial arrangement between them which both agreed would be determinant of their overall relationship?

(7)        CHILDREN:

What was the attitude and conduct of the parties concerning children?

[34]         To the foregoing must be applied the following caveat of Justice Blair in the Warwick v. Ontario (Minister of Community & Social Services) (1978), 91 D.L.R. (3d) 131:

The extent to which the different elements of the marriage relationship will be taken into account must vary with the circumstances of each case.

Termination of a Marriage-Like Relationship

Termination of a Marriage-Like Relationship

The BC Court of Appeal in Robeldano v Queano 2019 BCCA 150 reviewed the law as to when a person in a marriage like relationship ceases to be when either or both of them “terminate the marriage like relationship” under Section 2(2) (b) WESA.

Separation may lead a judge to infer that one or both of them has terminated the marriage like relationship, but separation per se, is not the test for termination of a marriage like relationship.

The court pointed out that there is an anomaly in that under WESA there is a different test for when person cease to be spouses when married as opposed to ling in a marriage like relationship.

The court declared that section 2(2)(b) of WESA is a rather imprecise and flexible legal standard.

The question of whether a person has terminated the relationship requires a judge to consider the expressed an implicit intentions of each spouse, as well as the objective evidence concerning the substance of the relationship.

The determination is a judgment call for the trial judge- the application of a broad legal standard to the factual circumstances of an individual case.

It is a question of mixed law and fact.

Where trial judges correctly identified the standard, and is not made any palpable and overriding error in applying it, deference to the trial judge’s decision is required. Housen v Nikolaisen 2002 SCC 33.

The test for a married couple on the other hand, under section 2(2)(a) is that if the parties live separate and apart for at least two years with one or both of them having the intention, formed before or during that time , to live separate and apart permanently, or an event occurs that causes an interesting family assets to arise, then their relationship as spouses is terminated.

The Court of Appeal in Robledano has not particularly offered guidance as to when a marriage like relationship is terminated, other than to state it is a rather imprecise and flexible legal standard, involving mixed law and fact.

Because the trial judge found as a fact that the spousal relationship never ceased to exist, the court found it unnecessary to consider whether the statute (WESA)  considers revival of a spousal status if former spouses reconcile and resume living in a marriage like relationship.

Marriage-Like Relationships: Are You a Spouse?

Marriage-Like Relationships: Are You Considered Their Spouse?

Robledano v Queano 2019 BCCA 150 clarified the law with respect to the definition of spouse after two years living together in a marriage like relationship by stating that there was no necessity for the two years living together need be immediately preceding the deceased’s death.

The appeal court rejected the argument that an unmarried person can only be a spouse of a deceased person if they were living together at the time of death, and for at least two years immediately preceding.

 

The court referred to the definition of spouse under WESA:

2(1) unless subsection 2 applies, to persons or espouses of each other for the purposes of this act if they were both alive immediately before relevant time and:

a) they were married to each other, or

b) They had lived with each other in a marriage like relationship for at least two years.

(2) to person B been spouses of each other for the purposes of this act if:

A) In the case of a marriage, an event occurs that causes an interest in family property, as defined in part five of the family law act to arise, or

B) in the case of a marriage like relationship, one or both persons terminate the relationship.

To amplify the court’s reasoning as to the meaning of paragraph 2(1) (B) of WESA, the court examined the history of the British Columbia Law Institute, commenced in 2003, known as the Succession Law Reform Project. That project culminated in June 2006, entitled Wills, Estates and Succession: a Modern Legal Framework which was the draft of WESA.

 

The draft provision for which subsection two derived was in the following terms:

1.(2) for the purposes of this act, to persons or espouses of each other at a relevant time if, immediately before the relevant time, they

a) were married to each other, or have lived and cohabited with each other at anytime for a period of at least two years in a marriage like relationship.

The court seized on the word anytime and stated that there was no reason to believe that any change in the substance of this provision was intended when the draft attached to the institutes report was transformed into a bill.

The court also interpreted the words “had lived together” to be in the past perfect tense rather than the continuous tense  “were living together”. The statue was professionally drafted and the use of the different tenses should be presumed to be deliberate.

Common Law Spouse Expanded

Common Law Spouse Expanded

Connor estate 2017 BCSC 978 could be a bit of a game changer for common law WESA spouses in the sense that the court finding that the parties were spouses could be an “expansion” of the concept of common law spouse.

Kent J found a long time couple to be common law spouses despite:

  • the parties maintained two entirely separate residences and did not live under the same roof;
  • each undertook their own separate domestic tasks such as meal preparation, shopping, tending to clothing and household maintenance;
  • no mingling of finances occurred;
  • sexual relations between them in their respective households were significantly reduced in the last two years;
  • Ms. Connor’s hospital records identified her marital status as single and indicated Mr. Chambers as an alternative contact identifying him as a “friend”;
  • Ms. Connor identified herself as “single” on her tax returns and Mr. Chambers identified himself as “separated” after 2012;
  • Mr. Chambers identified his wife as his “current spouse” in the spousal declaration for his municipal pension plan application in September 2011, a designation that was never changed;
  • in August 2013 Mr. Chambers declared for the purposes of his group benefits with Manulife Financial that he had no common-law spouse and he did not declare Ms. Connor as a beneficiary;
  • Mr. Chambers’ children had no involvement in the life of Ms. Connor and indeed the son was never even introduced to her; and
  • neither Mr. Chambers nor Ms. Connor displayed photographs of each other in their respective residences.

The application to determine if  Chambers was a common law spouse was opposed by her five half siblings whom she did not know.

For much of the long time relationship the male partner Chambers  lived with his wife and family and saw the female Connor when he could.

The Judge found that they never lived together under the same roof as a result of Connor being a hoarder and there was no room for her partner Chambers to reside in her residence.

She had left him her $410,000 RRSP and the Judge found it likely that while she died intestate, that she had prepared a will that had left  him a substantial bequest, but the will could not be found.

Molodov/lch v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), which was also relied on in the case referred to above, was invoked in a recent WESA decision to identify generally accepted characteristics of a “marriage-like relationship”, Richardson Estate (Re), 2014 BCSC 2162:

[22]  A leading authority with respect to the meaning of “marriage-like relationship” (sometimes also referred to as “cohabitation”, Campbell v. Campbell. 2011 BCSC 1491 at para. 80) is Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 RFL (2d) 376 (ONDC):

[16] I propose to consolidate the statements just quoted by considering the facts and circumstances of this case with the guidance of a series of questions listed under the seven descriptive components involved, to varying degrees and combinations, in the complex group of human inter­relationships broadly described by the words “cohabitation” and “consortium”

7 Guidelines to Common Law Relationships

(1) SHELTER:

(a) Did the parties live under the same roof?

(b) What vie re the sleeping arrangements?

(c) Did anyone else occupy or share the available accommodation?

 

(2) SEXUAL AND PERSONAL BEHAVIOUR:

(a) Did the parties have sexual relations? If not, why not?

(b) Did they maintain an attitude of fidelity to each other?

(c) What were their feelings toward each other?

(d) Did they communicate on a personal level?

(e) Did they eat their meals together?

(f) What, if anything, did they do to assist each other with problems or during illness?

(g) Did they buy gifts for each other on special occasions?

 

(3) SERVICES:

What was the conduct and habit of the parties in relation to:

(a) Preparation of meals,

(b) Washing and mending clothes,

(c)  Shopping,

(d) Household maintenance,

(e)  Any other domestic services?

 

(4) SOCIAL:

(a) Did they participate together or separately in neighbourhood and community activities?

(b) What was the relationship and conduct of each of them towards members of their

respective families and how did such families behave towards the parties?

 

(5) SOCIETAL:

What was the attitude and conduct of the community towards each of them and as a couple?

 

(6) SUPPORT (ECONOMIC):

a) What were the financial arrangements between the parties regarding the provision of or contribution towards the necessaries of life (food, clothing, shelter, recreation, etc.)?

(b) What were the arrangements concerning the acquisition and ownership of property?

(c) Was there any special financial arrangement between them which both agreed would be determinant of their overall relationship?

 

(7) CHILDREN:

What was the attitude and conduct of the parties concerning children?

[23] Other authorities have emphasized that this is not a checklist and “these elements may be present in varying degrees and not are all necessary for the relationship to be found conjugal” (M. v. H. [1999] 2 S C R. Sat para. 59; cited in Austin v. Goerz 2007 BCCA 586at para. 57: the Court of Appeal equated “conjugal” with “marriage-like” in the same paragraph).

8    In Weber v. Leclerc 2015 BCCA 492, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2016] S.C.C A No 19, the Court again reviewed the case law respecting “marriage-like relationships”, noting:

[23]     The parties’ intentions — particularly the expectation that the relationship will be of lengthy, indeterminate duration — may be of importance in determining whether a relationship is “marriage-like”. While the court will consider the evidence expressly describing the parties’ intentions during the relationship, it will also test that evidence by considering whether the objective evidence is consonant with those intentions.

[24]     The question of whether a relationship is “marriage-like” will also typically depend on more than just their intentions. Objective evidence of the parties’ lifestyle and interactions will also provide direct guidance on the question of whether the relationship was “marriage-like”.

Do You Live in a Common Law Marriage or Not?

This video is about whether or not you live in a common law relationship. As you know, many couples have for some time now lived in common law relationships without the sanctity of a marriage certificate. For many of those years, they were legally unprotected but in recent years, that has changed. Now, generally speaking, if a party—if parties, I should say, lived together for two years, they’re generally considered in British Columbia for most of our statutes to be a common law couple. Thus, they have claims under the Wills Variation Act. They can inherit on an intestacy and they have claims under statutes such as the Family Compensation Act with respect to wrongful deaths.

There are many criteria as to whether a couple lives in a common law relationship because just as many possibilities of various relationships exist today as one could possibly imagine. So the courts will look at such things as whether you in fact even live under the same roof or do you hold yourself up to the community at large as a married couple, whether you share expenses, whether you share assets and just what type of lifestyle you have. But none of them themselves are necessarily conclusive. This is an evolving area of law. Many people have come out of the closet in recent years and have talked about long time relationships which no one knew about. This area will continue to grow and typically the rights of common law spouses will be increasingly protected.

Secret Trusts: Is It An Overlooked Plaintiff’s Remedy?

This video is about secret trust. It firstly explains what a trust is and talks about the three necessities that are required to have valid trust. But it deals with what is called secret trust.

I was counsel on the appeal of a decision called glass pool a few years ago. And what had happened and the facts of that matter was that granny called her son into the kitchen and said, “Son, I’m going to give you my oil rights to mineral rights and that upon your death, you’re going to give them to your son.” This was said in the presence of a witness.

25 years passed and the son was dying and he drew up a will leaving all of his assets to his common law wife of eight years. The only asset he owned were these mineral rights. His son that he hadn’t seen in 25 years came along and challenged that and won at trial and it was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

So even though there was nothing in writing and even though it went outside of the will, the court simply said, she wanted the oil rights to go his son. What could be more clearer than that? And that is a very good example of what a secret trust is. I’ve entitled this video “Is It An Overlooked Plaintiff’s Remedy?” because many people have similar types of stories that they really should discuss with their lawyer.