Administration Ad Colligenda Bona

Several years ago disinherited.com had an estate where the deceased had substantial assets that needed protection, while it took in excess of two years to locate his very distant next of kin in the far-off Ukraine. He had died intestate and no person came forward to be appointed administrator of the estate.

In these situations where there is a delay in the appointment of a general administrator and it is necessary for the protection of the estate that someone be empowered to protect the assets, then the court may well appoint an administrator ad colligenda bona.

This type of grant and is typically made when situations arise where either there is no one to be appointed administrator, or they cannot be located, or they have refused to accept a grant of administration.

 

The grant may even be made to a creditor or to a friend of the deceased, as the main purpose is to protect the assets until a proper administrator can be found and appointed.

 

The grant is usually limited to a particular purpose and time until the jungle until the general grant is made. It is for the administration only, the will is not proved her annexed, and bonding is generally required.

In Re Shalapay 3 BCLR 3d 217 the Court held that an Administratrix is entitled to reasonable remuneration for services performed as administratrix and as solicitor.

There is no statutory authority for the appointment of an administrator ad colligenda bona. However, the scope of the appointment is similar in nature to that of an administrator pendente lite. If the estate is large, a percentage fee as contemplated by s. 90 of the Trustee Act would be ridiculous. On the other hand, if the estate were small, a percentage fee might be insufficient.

An administratrix ad colligenda bona should be entitled to reasonable remuneration rather than a percentage of the estate for her work as administratrix and to her reasonable fees as solicitor. Her accounts as solicitor would be subject to review under the Legal Profession Act.

What Is Double Probate?

Executors frequently appoint more than one person as his or her personal representative, and on occasion not all parties who are entitled to apply for probate actually do. However at the same time they do not renounce their executor ship and reserve the right to apply at a later date.

If that executor does apply for probate at a later date, the new grant is called a double probate, that runs concurrently with the earlier grant, assuming one or more of the first executors to probate is still living.

 

The applicant for the double probate includes only the un- administered estate in his or her affidavit. The affidavit must also give particulars of the early grant of probate, and show that the power to him or her to apply was in fact reserved in the earlier grant.

 

The same notice of intention to apply for probate pursuant to section 112 of the Estate Administration act must be sent to all interested parties again, along with the appropriate supporting materials.

While textbook authors have stated that in theory one executor may apply for a grant of probate without notifying the other executors, in practice it is doubtful that a court would make such an order without notice, as it is important that the executors who are not appointed, reserve their right to apply at a later date, and that the right is specifically stated in the initial grant of probate.

Copy of Will Not Admitted to Probate, as No Proof Original Was Ever Signed

Re Whitehead Estate 2010 BCSC 348, the deceased was a founding member of a credit union and a retired bank manager. After his death, a “trued up” copy of will dated December 21, 1979 was found, but the original of that will was never located.

Under the will his sister was to receive $356,000, whereas on an intestacy, the sisters estate would receive 120,000. The sister had survived her brother, but subsequently died leaving two daughters.

The deceased was a meticulous record keeper who wrote letters to friends prior to his death that said she was getting her affairs in order, and did not want to leave loose ends for executors.

 

The deceased met with her financial advisors three times in the last month of her life. The financial advisor said that the deceased had plans to establish funds for various charities so as to reduce gifts to individuals and had placed $400,000 aside and guaranteed investment certificates.

 

The deceased solicitor had died and the original will was not found amongst his files.

 

The proposed administrator of the deceased estate made an application for a declaration that the deceased died intestate rated

 

The application was allowed.

 

No evidence was called to establish that the copy of will was properly executed in the first place, or was in fact a true copy of will.

There was no presumption that the will was destroyed, as there was no evidence that the deceased ever had possession of the original will.

 

20 The test for proving a lost will requires proof of the due execution of the will; particulars tracing possession of the will to the date of death, and afterwards if the will was lost after death; rebuttal of the presumption that the will was destroyed by the testator with the intention of revoking it; and proof of the contents of the lost will: Sorkos v. Cowderoy, [2006] O.J. No. 3652(Ont. C.A.).

 

21 Similarly, in O’Donovan v. O’Donovan, [2009] O.J. No. 5020(Ont. S.C.J.) the court noted that:

 

As previously stated, the original wills have not been located. Sheila found signed copies in the residence. Proving a lost will can be accomplished; that is proof as to its contents, due execution and testator’s capacity: see Oosterhoff on Wills and Succession, 5th edition, Carswell 2001 at p. 355. Professor Oosterhoff adds the propounder of the will “… must usually also overcome the presumption of destruction “animo revocandi” … if the will was last known to be in the deceased’s possession”: see, also, Lefebvre v. Major, [1930] S.C.R. 252(S.C.C.); and Sorkos v. Cowderoy (2006), E.T.R. (3d) 108 (Ont. C.A.). This concept follows the English authorities: see Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards(1876), 1 P.D. 154(C.A.).

 

There is no issue arising in this case as to the deceased’s testamentary capacity.

 

22 The applicant referred to Goudge, Re, [1978] N.B.J. No. 337(N.B. Prob. Ct.). In that case one of the issues was whether or not there was a properly executed will. The solicitor who had drawn the will testified that he was one of the witnesses to the execution of the will by the testatrix. He also said the second witness was present at the time the will was executed. On that evidence the will was proven to be a copy of a properly executed will.

 

23 The applicant says that kind of evidence is missing in this case. Not only has the solicitor who drew the will died, but also there is no one available who can identify the witnesses to the will whose names appear in the “trued up” copy. While the will has all of the appearances of a copy of a properly executed will, the applicant says that it cannot be presumed to be properly executed by appearance only and requires evidence from someone who can swear that it is a true copy of will and that it was properly executed.

 

24 In Goudge’s Estate, supra., and other cases such as Green Estate, Re, 2001 ABQB 835(Alta. Q.B.), and Flaman Estate, Re, [1997] S.J. No. 442(Sask. Q.B.) evidence was presented by a witness who was able to testify to the proper execution of the will and that it was a true copy of the original.

 

25 In Flaman, the court held that the two main requirements to admit a copy of will to probate are that there be proof of execution of the original and proof of the contents. The court held that there was no proof of execution of the will and it was not admitted to probate. Instead, a direction was given that proper proof of execution was required. The court referred to Williams on Wills, 5th ed., Vol. 1 (London, Butterworths, 1980) at p. 96 where it was stated:

 

… Where a testamentary document has been lost or destroyed in such a way as not to effect a revocation probate may be granted of the contents thereof upon proof of such contents and due execution and attestation of the instrument. Where the person setting up an alleged will cannot produce any copy or draft or any written evidence of its contents, he must prove all these matters so as to remove all reasonable (but not all possible) doubt on these points

 

. . . . .

 

9 As well, R.B. Rowe, E. Heward & G.F. Dawe, eds, Tristam and Coote’s Probate Practice, 25th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1978) sets out at p. 561 what an affidavit should show if, as in this case, no copy or draft of the will is available. First of all, “[i]f the original will was not forthcoming at the death of the testator, the full circumstances in which it was last known to be in existence but failed to be forthcoming at the death.” Secondly, “[d]ue execution of the original will, which should, whenever possible, be proved by one of the attesting witnesses.” Thirdly, the affidavit must also show “[w]ho are the persons prejudiced by the admission of the document sought to be established … and whether they are all sui juris.” Is there anyone who would take a greater interest under an intestacy or under an earlier will? Fourthly, the affidavit should “depose to the contents of the will as set out in a reconstruction, which should be in the form of a separate document exhibited to the affidavit.”

 

10 T.G. Feeney in The Canadian Law of Wills, states at p. 99 that:

 

… [P]robate may be granted of the contents of the lost will, after proof of due execution, on such secondary evidence as a copy or a draft or solicitor’s notes or any other written evidence; and indeed, if it is sufficiently clear, even oral testimony may be probated.

 

And the 35 C.E.D. (West. 3rd), Vol. 35, states at p. 155-162, s. 179 that:

 

S. 179 Should the presumption be rebutted, the lost will may be admitted to probate upon proof of due execution, and evidence of its contents may be adduced by way of a copy or a draft, solicitor’s notes or other writings, or even by oral testimony.

 

[Emphasis added]

 

26 In this case, there is no evidence to identify the witnesses to the execution of the will nor is there any evidence to show that the will is a true copy of the original will. While the copy presented has all of the characteristics of a legitimate copy of an original will, on the authorities it cannot be presumed that the original was properly executed or that the copy presented is a true copy. The authorities require proof of both.

 

27 It may be that the necessary proof can be presented through means other than a witness to the execution of the will. For example, proof of the usual practice followed by a solicitor or legal assistant that a will was only “trued up” once it had been properly executed and compared to the original may be sufficient to show that it is in fact a true copy. But some evidence is necessary to establish the necessary facts and here there is none. There is no witness available or even identified to say that the will was properly executed nor is there anyone to attest to any other evidence to establish that the copy of will is a true copy as that term is understood in law. Even if the standard of proof is lower than a balance of probabilities there is an absolute absence of any evidence whatsoever in this case.

 

28 The applicant is therefore entitled to succeed on the ground that there is no evidence upon which the court can conclude that the will of the deceased was properly executed or that it is a true copy of the original will.

 

29 If that conclusion is incorrect and the will is in fact properly executed and a true copy of the original, the next issue is whether the original will can be traced to the possession of the deceased. If it can be traced to her possession then on a finding that the original has been lost, the presumption arises that it has been destroyed with the intention of revoking the will. Feeney in The Canadian Law of Wills, 3rd edition, vol. 1 at pp. 134-135 states:

 

The same presumption, that of destruction animo revocandi, that arises when a destroyed or mutilated will is found among the testator’s papers on his death, arises also when it is shown that the testator’s will was last traced to his possession but cannot be found on his death. The presumption is well recognized in Canadian case law, but the fullest inquiries for the lost will must be shown to have been made for a court to apply the presumption in the first place. The presumption is often rebutted either by the circumstances tending to show a contrary conclusion or by declarations made by the testator showing that he regarded the lost will as valid and subsisting. However, strong evidence is usually needed to rebut the presumption.

 

30 The beneficiaries under the will submit that there is no evidence to suggest that the deceased was in possession of the will. No one has said that the original will was ever known to be in her possession nor is there any reference in the affidavit material to a comment of the deceased that she had at any time had the original of her will in her possession. The deceased named her solicitor as the sole executor of her estate without any alternates and it is likely that the original at least initially remained in his possession. The beneficiaries also say that if the deceased was in possession of her original will, there was no need for her to keep a copy in a briefcase containing other important papers. See Haider v. Kalugin, 2008 BCSC 930(B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]), at para. 22.

 

31 On the evidence presented in this case, I am not able to find that the deceased ever had possession of the original will and therefore the presumption that the will has been destroyed with the intention that it be revoked does not apply.

 

Conclusion

32 On the evidence the applicant is entitled to a declaration that the deceased died intestate as there is no evidence that the copy of will presented in evidence was ever properly executed by the deceased or that it is in fact a true copy of will.

Court Declines to Remove Trustee – Orders Construction of Trust

Court Declines to Remove Trustee

Winkler v Winkler 2012 BCSC 1949 involves an application by the surviving widow of the deceased, in her capacity as comity of the person and estate of the deceased, sought an order that her stepson be removed as a trustee of her late husband’s alter ego trust number three, and that his longtime accountant be appointed in his place. Remove trustee.

The proceeding arose as a result of the breakdown of the relationship between the trustee and the widow.

 

The property consisted of three port Moody properties valued at between eight and $10 million.

The beneficiary of the trust was the wife and for other persons after his death, including his son the trustee, Andrea his remaining children.

The court dismissed the petition to remove trustee and appointment accountant, with leave to amend to obtain construction of the trust instrument. The relationship of the trustee as residual beneficiary was not sufficient to disqualify him from being trustee. His actions were, while lacking transparency from the wife’s perspective, did not indicate imprudence or any violation of the trust.

 

Disagreements concerning the proper construction of the trust is related to what trust property was an advances on capital is a related to the wife’s maintenance, were subject to a further application to construe the trust.

 

The general principles concerning the removal of trustees are set out in cases such as Conroy v. Stokes, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 124 (B.C.C.A.), and Letterstedt v. Broers, [1884] 9 A.C. 371 at 385-387. The jurisdiction to remove trustee is a “delicate” one, and in each case the main guide must be the welfare of the beneficiaries.

[7] The power to remove a trustee is ancillary to the Court’s principal duty of ensuring that the trusts are properly executed. The question in each case is whether the circumstances are such that the continuance in office of the trustee would be detrimental to the trust: Dicks v. Dicks Estate, 2010 NLCA 35 at para. 50, 298 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1.

[8] In Rose v. Rose (2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 349, 24 E.T.R. (3d) 217 at para. 70, (Ont. S.C.J.), Lissaman J. enumerated some actions, failures to act, and conditions that render remove trustee, including misconduct, lack of bona fides, an inability or unwillingness to carry out the terms of the trust, incapacity, personally benefiting from the trust, and acting to the detriment of the beneficiaries.

13] In my view, the respondent’s discontinuance of payments in light of the changed circumstances of the children is properly explained. Of course, Louis Winkler also supported his wife of many years from the income from the trust assets, which is entirely appropriate. In light of my disposition of this matter, the court will have to consider whether the respondent’s actions are consistent with his interpretation of the trust. I do not think that a mere potential for a conflict of interest is sufficient reason to interfere with a trustee’s appointment: Re: Estate of Andre Jacques Blitz, Deceased , 2000 BCSC 1596 at para. 25, 35 E.T.R. (2d) 172.

When Can a Will Draftman’s Notes Be Admissible to Interpret a Will Meaning?

Re Hoedl Estate 2012 ONSC 6857 involves the issue of whether the drafting solicitors notes are admissible at a hearing to interpret a will meaning.

The executor of the deceased estate was also the solicitor who drafted the will.

The executor initially advised of one proposed distribution of the residue, and then subsequently advised of the second proposal after checking his notes made at the time of drafting the will.

The executor brought a court application for interpretation of the will in order to resolve the confusion created by the two conflicting proposed distributions of the residue.

One of the residual beneficiaries brought a motion for an order that the lawyer’s notes made at the time of the drafting of the will should not be admitted at the hearing.

That motion was dismissed and the notes were admissible at the hearing.

The court found that the wills meaning was clear and that his words were supported by the contemporaneous notes. The notes would not have been admissible to contradict clear words of the will.

However here if the will was ambiguous and could be read in two ways, and the notes would be admissible as extrinsic evidence to clarify the testator’s intention.

12 In Robinson Estate v. Robinson, 2011 ONCA 493(Ont. C.A.) (CanLII), the court reaffirmed the general principal that extrinsic evidence of a testator’s intention is not admissible in the face of an unambiguous will. However, Juriansz, J.A., speaking for the court, said the following, at para. 24:

Of course, it is always possible that the testator’s expression of her testamentary intentions may be imperfect. When a will takes effect and is being interpreted, the testator is no longer available to clarify her intentions. Extrinsic evidence is admissible to aid the construction of the will. The trend in Canadian jurisprudence is that extrinsic evidence of the testator’s circumstances and those surrounding the making of the will may be considered, even if the language of the will appears clear and unambiguous on first reading. Indeed, it may be that the existence of an ambiguity is only apparent in the light of the surrounding circumstances.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Breach of Fiduciary dutyBreach of Fiduciary Duty

In Elder Advocates of Alberta Society v. Alberta, 2011 SCC 24, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 261(S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada concisely described the nature of a fiduciary relationship.

At para. 22, the Court observed that the doctrine relating to fiduciary duty arises out of trust principles. It requires the fiduciary to act with absolute loyalty toward the beneficiary in managing the beneficiary’s affairs.

In general terms, a fiduciary relationship comprises the following characteristics:

 

1. The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power;

 

2. The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests;

 

3. The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power: see Elder Advocates of Alberta Societyat para. 27.

 

An estate trustee, such as the defendant, is in a fiduciary relationship with the beneficiaries of the estate. By the terms of the will, the testator creates a trust and places the executor as trustee with authority over that trust. The trustee has the freedom to refuse the appointment; however, when he accepts the appointment he is bound by his fiduciary obligations. Accordingly, he must forsake the interests of all others in relation to the legal interest at stake in favour of the beneficiaries of the trust: Elder Advocates of Alberta Societyat paras. 30 – 31.

Punitive Damages Awarded For Trustee’s Egregious Conduct

Punitive Damages Awarded For Trustee's Egregious Conduct

A trustee’s Egregious Conduct lead to an award of punitive damages of $100,000 against the trustee personally.

Walling v Walling 2012 ONSC 6580 involves a decision where the Ontario Supreme Court awarded $100,000 punitive damages against the trustee of an estate for extremely egregious conduct examples of breach of fiduciary duty. The court in fact awarded twice the amount that was claimed. The testator and his wife divorced prior to his death in 1999. The testator died when his two children were 16 and 12. His estate was to be divided equally between the children when the youngest term of 21, which occurred in 2007.

The testator’s brother, the children’s uncle, was the sole executor and trustee of the estate. The court found several examples of reprehensible conduct in the failure of the trustee to properly administer the estate. In addition to denying the children their rightful inheritance from the estate, the trustee in addition prevented them from attending funeral celebrations and refused their requests for meaningful mementos. The trustees conduct in relation to the estate limited the children’s postsecondary opportunities. The trustee not only grossly mismanaged the estate but also completely ignored court orders.

32 The Supreme Court of Canada commented on the purpose for punitive damages in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595(S.C.C.). The court reflected that “retribution, denunciation and deterrence are the recognized justification for punitive damages” (at para. 111). The Court observed that an award of punitive damages must be:

1. proportionate to the blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct;

2. proportionate to the vulnerability of the plaintiff;

3. proportionate to the harm or potential harm directed specifically at the plaintiff;

4. proportionate to the need for deterrence; and

5. proportionate to the advantage wrongfully gained by the defendant from the misconduct: see paras. 111-125.

33 In my view, punitive damages are called for in this case. The defendant was completely derelict in his duties to the estate, and therefore to the plaintiffs who are beneficiaries of the estate. The plaintiffs were children when the defendant became the trustee of their father’s estate. Their vulnerability is obvious. The defendant’s sin is compounded by the fact he was an uncle to the plaintiffs, an adult whom they should have been able to trust. Instead, he squandered their inheritance.

34 The defendant’s defaults include failing to offer the children any meaningful mementos of their late father; permitting others to take items from the estate; selling chattels from the estate under value; failing to preserve or properly account for the estate; and failing to distribute the estate. The only reasonable conclusion appropriate is that the defendant converted the funds in the estate to his own use.

35 The defendant also failed to include the children in any funeral ceremonies for their late father and was completely indifferent to their feelings, causing them great distress. One of the children required psychiatric care as a result of this callous treatment.

36 The misconduct of the defendant led to a frustration of the children’s post-secondary education for lack of funds. The enormity of the defaults is quite shocking.

37 The harm is compounded when one looks at the systematic failure of the defendant to comply with any of the court orders issued to secure the defendant’s compliance with the terms of the will and his wanton failure to pay costs as ordered. He embarked on a course of conduct that increased the cost to the plaintiffs of attempting to secure their rights, and delayed any redress.

38 In sum, the defendant’s conduct has been outrageous.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty In Widow’s Reliance On Family

Breach of trust 2

A breach of fiduciary duty was found when following her husband’s death, a widow relied upon  family members  to enter into improvident land transfers based on assertions that the widow relied upon.

It is a fact that families financially abuse each other and often in the nature of a breach of fiduciary duty, such as a power of attorney

Buccilli v Pillitteri 2012 ONSC 6624, involved a family estate dispute after a tragic death where all the parties had a one third interest in a family business.

After the deceased’s death, his surviving widow, on the advice of her brothers-in-law, signed transfers of all her interest in the deceased estate, including the interest in the family business and real property, to one of the defendants in trust, in exchange for receiving a condominium.

Eventually the widow brought court action to set aside the transfer agreement, and the action was allowed on the grounds of undue influence, and other reasons including MISREPRESENTATION. In a nutshell, the court found that there was an inequality of positions of the parties, and the widow relied upon her brother-in-law’s for advice and was misrepresentented to enter into the contract.. The transfer agreement was an improvident bargain whereby the widow gave up her interest in the deceased’s estate, which was worth a very substantial amount, in exchange for a condominium worth only $610,000.Patricia also asks that the Transfer Agreement be set aside on the basis that the widow relied upon the sons in law and they breached the fidciary duty that they owed to her.

FIDUCIARY DUTY 179 Elder Advocates of Alberta Society v. Alberta, [2011) 2 S.C.R. 261 (S.C.C.) is the latest S.C.C. case dealing with the tests for recognition of a fiduciary duty. In Frame v. Smith. \ 19871 2 S.C.R. 99 (S.C.C.) Wilson J. stated her view of when a fiduciary duty has been recognized. Her words have been adopted by the Supreme Court and other courts for many years.

 

Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation has been imposed seem to possess three general characteristics:

 

(1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power.

2012 ONSC 6624, 84 E.T.R. (3d) 208,225 A.C.W.S. (3d) 115

The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests.
The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.

In Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, however, McLachlin C.J. stated that as useful as the three “hallmarks” referred to in Frame are in explaining the source fiduciary duties, they are not a complete code for identifying fiduciary duties. She laid down three tests to be applied.
First, the evidence must show that the alleged fiduciary gave an undertaking of responsibility to act in the best interests of a beneficiary. What is required in all cases is an undertaking by the fiduciary, express or implied, to act in accordance with the duty of loyalty reposed on him or her. The existence and character of the undertaking is informed by the norms relating to the particular relationship. The party asserting the duty must be able to point to a forsaking by the alleged fiduciary of the interests of all others in favour of those of the beneficiary, in relation to the specific legal interest at stake. The undertaking may be found in the relationship between the parties, in an imposition of responsibility by statute, or under an express agreement to act as trustee of the beneficiary’s interests.
Second, the duty must be owed to a defined person or class of persons who must be vulnerable to the fiduciary in the sense that the fiduciary has a discretionary power over them. Fiduciary duties do not exist at large. They are confined to specific relationships between particular parties. Historically recognized per se fiduciary relationships exist as a matter of course within the traditional categories of tmstee-cestui que trust, executor-beneficiary, solicitorciient, agent-principal, director-corporation, and guardian-ward or parent-child. By contrast, ad hoc fiduciary relationships must be established on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, to establish a fiduciary duty, the claimant must show that the alleged fiduciary’s power may affect the legal or substantial practical interests of the beneficiary. In the traditional categories of fiduciary relationship, the nature of the rela­tionship itself defines the interest at stake. However, a party seeking to establish an ad hoc duty must be able to point to an identifiable legal or vital practical interest that is at stake. The most obvious example is an interest in property, although other interests recognized by law may also be protected.
.

The remedy for breach of fiduciary duty is discretionary. The only realistic remedy to make Patricia whole from the breach is that the Transfer Agreement should be set aside and an accounting of profits of the defendants from the lands and developments that were the subject of the Transfer Agreement should be taken and one-third should be paid to Patricia.

Executor Must Renounce In Order to Contest the Estate

Executors fees

Executor Must Renounce to contest the will

It is fairly common in estate disputes that the executor of the will is also dissatisfied with the same will that the executor is by office bound to carry out and enforce. Since in estate claims it is necessary to sue all parties who have an interest in the estate, it then follows that the executor must be named as a defendant in any estate proceeding, and it is a rule of law that an executor cannot also be a plaintiff in his or her personal capacity. This follows from the legal concept that a party cannot be a plaintiff and the defendant in the same court action – one cannot sue oneself.

Further authority for this is Harrison v Harrison ( 1982) 12 ETR 246
It is established that a person cannot sue himself, even in a different capacity. In Pub. Trustee v. Guar. Trust Co., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 931, 19 C.P.C. 157, 7 E.T.R. 287, 115 D.L.R. (3d) 513, (sub nom. Guar. Trust Co. of Can. v. Berry Estate) 33 N.R. 271, it was held that this principle does not mean that a writ issued by an executor against himself is a nullity; rather it only means that he cannot recover judgment against himself. The majority of the Supreme Court, per Estey J., held that the writ in that case was a mere irregularity which was capable of being corrected by substitution of the Public Trustee for the executor as plaintiff. But it was agreed by counsel and accepted by the court that the matter could not have proceeded to trial and judgment had the executor remained on record as both plaintiff and defendant.

The Reverse Onus of Proof When Suing a Fiduciary

Suing a Fiduciary and Reverse Onus Is Important

The duty of loyalty of a fiduciary is protected through onuses. Fiduciaries are held to an irregularly high standard of behavior in civil law due to the nature of their duties. It is the peculiarly unequal position of the parties that results in the reversal of onus onto the fiduciary in most fiduciary relationships. Fiduciary- reverse onus

Typically, the reverse onus works as follows: in asserting a breach of fiduciary duty claim, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie inference of the fiduciary obligations and the breach. The fiduciary concept then imposes a reverse onus that shifts the burden of proof onto the fiduciaries to disprove the beneficiaries’ allegations.

The reverse onus burden of proof was applied more recently by Satanove J. in Lee Estate v. Royal Pacific Realty Corp., (2003) BCSC 911, where she held that certain relationships and specific categories of actors are presumed by law to be of a fiduciary nature. When such a presumption arises, the onus is on the defendants to rebut that presumption. She explains that even in the case of a real estate agent and a buyer, the court should look at the evidentiary factors which support or contradict the existence of a fiduciary relationship between them, recognizing that the burden of proof will be on the defendants.

Lasky v. ProwaX (1993), 7 ET.R (2nd) 70 (B.C.S.C) is another case where a reverse onus of burden was applied. This case involved the undue influence of a niece over a mentally compromised and hospitalized patient. The niece was able to get the patient to sign over sole possession of the house and cash into her name, in direct contravention of a will executed a month prior. The defence bore the onus of rebutting the presumption in s. 20 of the Patients Property Act (B.C.) that a gift made by a patient is to be deemed fraudulent and void as against the committee if the gift is not made for full and valuable consideration or the donee has notice at the time of the gift of the mental condition of the patient. Although the niece herself was not committee, the dangerous position of the patient and the importance of a protective and accountable fiduciary duty was evident to the judge. The BC Court of Appeal recently approved these cases in their decision Easingwood v Cockroft 2013 BCCA 182.