Undue Influence: Presumption Rebutted

Undue Influence: Presumption Rebutted

Rebutting the Presumption of Undue Influence

Grosseth Estate v Grosseth 2017 BCSC 2055 was a claim for resulting trust and presumption of undue influence that was dismissed by the court that found that the presumption of undue influence had been rebutted.

The deceased died at age 96 without children, leaving his will to be divided equally amongst his 11 nephews and nieces.

Prior to his death he spent the last 10 years of his life living with the defendants, to whom he gave the lions share of his estate.

Various nieces and nephews contested these purported gifts and argued that the presumptions of resulting trust and undue influence applied, so that the purported gifted funds should be returned to the estate.

The court reviewed the evidence and found that both the presumptions of resulting trust and undue influence had been rebutted, primarily on the basis of an independent witness.

The evidence was that the deceased lived happily with the defendants for the last 10 years of his life in a self-contained suite in their home, and became a member of their family and a grandfather figure to their children.

The court found that the deceased on his own volition contributed approximately $157,000 towards the purchase of a commercial building with an asking price of $180,000. The defendant say that he did so on his own without any prompting from themselves.

There was approximately $60,000 left in his estate to the nieces and nephews.

The deceased lived largely rent-free in their basement for most of the 10 years.
The attitude of the deceased was that he would rather provide his money to the defendants, in honor of their years together as a family, rather than leave his estate to nieces and nephews who he barely knew and who had never shown much interest in him.

The court found that the nature of the relationship with the deceased and the defendants gave rise to the common law presumption of undue influence that seeks to assure that gratuitous transfers are free from the taint of manipulation or coercion.

The deceased was of advanced years when the transfers are made, and was living in a situation of some dependency on the defendants, that had they wished, they could have dominated him into acting to their advantage and to his own detriment (Geffen v Goodman (1991) 2 SCR 353 at 377.)

It is this potential for domination the triggers the presumption of undue influence, but the presumption of undue influence may be rebutted by evidence, director circumstantial, that establishes that the donor or entered into the transaction of his or her own full, free and informed thought ( Cowper –Smith v. Morgan 2016 BCCA 200 at p.49.)

Factors relevant to a finding of rebuttal of undue influence include:

  1. the lack of actual influence or opportunity to influence the donor ;
  2. receipt of or opportunity to obtain independent legal advice;
  3. the donor’s ability to resist any such influence;
  4. the donors knowledge and appreciation about what he or she was doing ( Stewart v McLean 2010 BCSC 64 at p.97)

The court was impressed by the evidence of an independent witness who recalled the deceased told her he was proud about having helped purchase the property, and that he had done so because the defendants had let them stay in their house and did not charge him for room and board.

The court specifically allowed hearsay evidence to be admissible on this point on the basis of prior authority such as Mondonese v Delac Estate 2011 BCSC 82, affirmed 2011 BCCA 501.

The court concluded that on the totality of the evidence, it was clear that the deceased was fully capable of managing his own affairs, and there was no evidence whatsoever to substantiate the claim that he was of diminished capacity due to age, dementia, or other causes.

As such, the court found that the transfers were gifts freely given by a man who was fully capable of making his own decisions uninfluenced by anyone.

Duress

The Threshold for Establishing Duress

Milionis v Rivas 2017 ONSC 5001 discussed the law of duress when an application was brought to seek a declaration that a $400,000 mortgage was invalid as it was purportedly signed under duress. The court disagreed as it is difficult to set aside an agreement based on duress.

The Court stated:

Given that the law does not lightly set aside an agreement, the threshold for establishing duress is high. In Barton v. Armstrong, [1976] A.C. 104, at 121 (J.C.P.C.), Lord Wilberforce (dissenting in the result) stated:

The action is one to set aside an apparently complete and valid agreement on the ground of duress. The basis of the plaintiff’s claim is, thus, that though there was apparent consent there was no true consent to the agreement; that the agreement was not voluntary. This involves consideration of what the law regards as voluntary, or its opposite; for in life, including the life of commerce and finance, many acts are done under pressure, sometimes overwhelming pressure, so that one can say that the actor had no choice but to act. Absence of choice in this sense does not negate consent in law: for this the pressure must be one of a kind which the law does not regard as legitimate. Thus, out of the various means by which consent may be obtained — advice, persuasion, influence, inducement, representation, commercial pressure — the law has come to select some which it will not accept as a reason for voluntary action: fraud, abuse of relation of confidence, undue influence, duress or coercion. In this the law, under the influence of equity, has developed from the old common law conception of duress — threat to life and limb — and it has arrived at the modern generalisation expressed by Holmes J. — ” subjected to an improper motive for action ” (Fairbanks v. Snow 13 Northeastern Reporter 596, 598). [Emphasis added]

65 Duress requires proof of pressure that:

(1) the law regards as illegitimate, such as threat of any form of illegal action; and

(2) is applied to such a degree as to amount to a “coercion of the will” of the party relying on this defence.

The following considerations apply in determining whether there is a “coercion of the will”:

(1) did the party relying on this defence protest?

(2) was there an alternative course open to him or her? (3) was he or she was independently advised? (4) after entering the agreement did he or she take steps to avoid the agreement after entering it? See A.A. v. A.G, 2017 ONCA 243, paras. 26-27; Gordon v. Roebuck (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), at para. 3.

66 An agreement obtained through duress is voidable at the instance of the party subjected to the duress unless by another agreement or through conduct, either express or implied, he affirms the impugned agreement at a time when he is no longer the victim of duress: Stott v. Merit Investment Corporation (1998), 63 O.R. (2d) 545 (C.A.), at para. 49.

Pleading Particulars of Undue Influence

Pleading Particulars of Undue Influence

Harder v Harder Estate 2017 BCSC 425 discusses the necessity of pleading particulars of allegations of undue influence  so that the defendant can meet the claim and not be taken by surprise at trial.

Particulars of Undue Influence

[15]        SCCR 3-7 (18) requires that full particulars of undue influence, with dates and items if applicable, must be stated in the pleading. The particulars are required to inform the other side of the nature of the case to be met, prevent the other side from being taken by surprise at trial, enable the other side to know what evidence they ought to prepare for trial, to limit the generality of the pleadings, and to tie the hands of the plaintiffs: Cansulex Ltd. v. Perry, [1982] B.C.J. No. 369 at para. 15. The particulars to be pled in a claim alleging undue influence have been discussed in Hopper v. Dunsmuir (No. 3), [1903] B.C.J. No. 55, Winn v. McKercher, [1956] B.C.J. No. 25, and more recently in Harrison v. Apperloo, 2016 BCSC 1129.

[16]        The defendants’ main complaint about the undue influence claim is that the plea covers a period of several years if not decades, and does not identify specific instances or even narrow time frames in which the influence occurred.

[17]        Having now had the opportunity to fully review the NOCC, I find that the plaintiffs have provided sufficient particulars of the allegations of undue influence in order to delineate the issues between the parties and allow the defendants to prepare for examinations for discovery and trial. The allegation of undue influence as pled does indeed cover a lengthy period, but the circumstances of that influence and even the acts themselves are described in the pleading. I note, furthermore, that the defendants have been able to deliver their response to the NOCC without having further particulars. The defendants have not demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that there is non-compliance with SCCR 3-7 (18).

Harrison v Aperloo 2016 BCSC 1129 stated in part:

[12]         The remaining purported pleas of undue influence are at least deficient. The language used indeed connotes legal conclusions rather than material facts upon proof of which a legal conclusion could be made. An example of a particularized plea of undue influence is disclosed in Longmuir v. Holland, 2000 BCCA 538 at para. 28:

[28]  …

10. The Plaintiff says that the 1991 Will is invalid for the following reasons:

(b)  and, or in the alternative, the execution of the will was procured by the undue influence of the Defendant Margaret Alice Holland. Particulars are as follows:

(i)  The Defendant Margaret Alice Holland was living with the Deceased in her home and had complete control over the Deceased’s person including her physical care and basic needs prior to and at the time of the execution of the 1991 Will;

(ii)  The weak physical and mental condition of the Deceased, her vulnerability and dependency upon Margaret Alice Holland prior to and at the time of the execution of the will rendered her susceptible to undue influence, which was in fact exercised;

[13]         The plaintiff says that the details or particulars of the undue influence claim will be fleshed out from the defendants through the discovery process. Aside from the fact that the plaintiff ought not to make pleas that have no known factual basis, authorities were offered which allow the plaintiff’s obligations under Rule 3-7(18) to await completion of the discovery process. The plaintiff can later add to or elaborate on the initial particulars, following the examinations: Rule 3-7 (20). Nevertheless, in order to identify the actual issues between the parties as well as permit the defendant to comply with the discovery obligations and prepare herself for an examination, it is expected that purported facts of undue influence have more than a generic quality to them. Without intending to do the plaintiff’s job for her, some particulars that might be offered are: How was the testator under the direction and control of the plaintiff? What position of trust and confidence did the defendant hold over the testator? When or how did the defendant coerce the testator? Guidance on the material facts to be pled and proven may also be found in Geffen v. Goodman Estate, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 353, an authority cited by the plaintiff.

Suspicious Circumstances

Suspicious Circumstances

Arauju v Neto 2001 BCSC 935 is an undue influence lack of capacity case that discusses suspicious circumstances.

The court found that due to suspicious circumstances the will maker was not allowed to rely upon the presumption that he was mentally capable when the will was executed.

Ordinarily where the propounder of a will shows that it was duly executed with the requisite formalities and after having been read over to a testator who appeared to understand it, it is presumed that the testator knew and approved of the contents and had the necessary testamentary capacity or disposing mind and memory.

[122] However, I do not think that the plaintiff is entitled to that presumption. Because of the evidence of suspicious circumstances, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing on the evidence that Mr. De Araujo knew and approved of the contents and had testamentary capacity with respect to both of the 1995 and 1996 wills.

[123] The suspicious circumstances in the case of the 1995 will include:

1.the poor health of the aged testator;

2. the removal of the testator from a home where he had lived for a lengthy period;

3. the fact that the testator was taken almost directly from his place of residence to a lawyer to give instructions;

4. the lengthy period of separation from Carlos;

5. the person directly benefiting from the will; the dramatic change from the previous will;

6. the fact that the testator had a substantial amount of cash on him;

7.and significantly the fact that his proposed beneficiary (a person from whom he was estranged for over five years) gave the relevant instructions to the lawyer.

Independent Legal Advice and Undue Influence

Independent Legal Advice and Undue Influence

Under normal circumstances independent legal advice, if properly given should be sufficient to rebut any presumption of undue influence, but that was not the case in Cowper-Smith v Morgan 2016 BCCA 200 where the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge in finding inter alia , that the independent legal advice provided was inadequate to rebut the presumption of undue influence.

The case should stand as a wake-up call to any practitioners dispensing independent legal advice that it must be thorough and relevant to the assessment of the question or issue before them, and to take the time and charge accordingly.

Failing to do so may expose professional liability by disappointed beneficiaries.

The Appeal Court stated as follows re the law of Independent Legal Advice:

51      The following considerations have also been identified as relevant to the assessment of the legal advice provided to the donor (Fowler Estate v. Barnes (1996), 142 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 223 (Nfld. T.D.), Green J., adopted in Coish v. Walsh, 2001 NFCA 41 (Nfld. C.A.) at para. 23):

  1. Whether the party benefiting from the transaction is also present at the time the advice is given and/or at the time the documents are executed;
  2. Whether, though technically acting for the grantor, the lawyer was engaged by and took instructions from the person alleged to be exercising the influence;
  3. In a situation where the proposed transaction involves the transfer of all or substantially all of a person’s assets, whether the lawyer was aware of that fact and discussed the financial implications with the grantor;
  4. Whether the lawyer enquired as to whether the donor discussed the proposed transaction with other family members who might otherwise have benefited if the transaction did not take place; and
  5. Whether the solicitor discussed other options whereby she could achieve her objective with less risk to her.

[The “Coish” factors; citations omitted.]

52      The respondents also rely on jurisprudence that identifies two branches for assessing the adequacy of the independent legal advice given where an allegation of undue influence is raised: (i) advice as to understanding and voluntariness (attendance on execution); and (ii) advice as to the merits of a transaction (the wisdom of entering into the transaction). The first branch of the test requires that the independent advisor is satisfied the donor understands the transaction and enters into it freely and voluntarily. The second branch of the test requires something more than the independent advisor being satisfied that the donor understands the effect of the transaction and wishes to make the gift; it also requires that the independent advisor is satisfied that “the gift is one that is right and proper in all the circumstances of the case, and if he cannot so satisfy himself he should advise his client not to proceed.” See Cope v. Hill, 2005 ABQB 625 (Alta. Q.B.), aff’d 2007 ABCA 32 (Alta. C.A.) at paras. 210-212, citing Gold v. Rosenberg, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 767 (S.C.C.), Corbeil v. Bebris (1993), 141 A.R. 215 (Alta. C.A.), and Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol 18, 4th ed. at 157, para. 343.

53      Assessing the adequacy of the legal advice given is a fact-specific inquiry. It does not reduce to any precise test. In some circumstances, it may require advice on only the nature and consequences of the transaction. However, where concerns or allegations of undue influence arise, generally there will be a need to give “informed advice” on the merits of the transaction. See Cope at paras. 213-215, citing Brosseau v. Brosseau, 1989 ABCA 241 (Alta. C.A.) at paras. 22-23, Coomber v. Coomber, [1911] 1 Ch. [723] and Wright v. Carter, [1903] 1 Ch. 27 (Eng. C.A.) at 57-58.

Did the judge err in finding the presumption of undue influence and the presumption of resulting trust had not been rebutted?

54      It is common ground that findings with respect to undue influence and the intention of a party to gratuitously transfer property to another are subject to a deferential standard of review. See Boda Estate v. Boda, 2014 BCCA 354 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 72. An appellate court may not interfere with the findings and inferences of fact by a trial judge absent palpable and overriding error (see Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 (S.C.C.) at para. 10). Palpable error is one that is readily or plainly seen (Housen at para. 5); overriding error is one that must have or may have altered the result (see Van Mol (Guardian ad litem of) v. Ashmore, 1999 BCCA 6 (B.C. C.A.) at paras. 11-12).

55      The application of a legal standard to findings or inferences of fact raises a question of mixed fact and law. Where an alleged error of mixed fact and law can be attributed to the application of the wrong legal standard, element of the legal test, or error in principle, the error may be characterized as an error of law and is subject to the standard of correctness. However, if the legal principle is not readily extricable from the findings or inferences of fact, then the judge’s conclusions should not be overturned absent palpable and overriding error (Housen at paras. 26-36).

56      All three standards of review are engaged in this appeal. The appellant contends the judge erred in law by adopting a flawed approach in her assessment of the evidence of Ms. Iverson and Mr. Easdon, in order to determine whether the presumption of undue influence was rebutted. The appellant further alleges that in applying the legal test for rebutting the presumption of undue influence, the judge made a palpable and overriding factual error based on an erroneous inference that Elizabeth did not intend to execute the June 22, 2001 documents because she did not understand the nature and consequences of those documents. This error, the appellant submits, was material to her conclusion that the presumption of undue influence was not rebutted.

S. 52 WESA: Undue Influence Presumption re Dependence

S. 52 WESA: Undue Influence Presumption re Dependence

Positions of dependence or domination are frequently involved in estate litigation and typically relate to caregiving or predator type behavior that ultimately takes advantage of  feeble mind.

Elder Estate v Bradshaw 2015 BCSC 1266 involved a contested court action re  the validity of the deceased’s will as a result of allegations of lack of mental capacity and undue influence.

The deceased left his entire estate to a 26 year younger housekeeper who gradually became his caregiver. The will was challenged by his three nephews who were his next of kin on an intestacy.

The decision is a good source of law relating to both the legal framework for proving the validity of a will in solemn form, as well as a review of undue influence, both with respect to a bequest left in the will and monies advanced to a joint bank account.

The court examined the evidence of several witnesses and concluded that there was no undue influence on the part of the caregiver with either the will or the joint bank account.

The deceased was elderly, had no next of kin and was almost reclusive. The relationship between the parties was over several years and the witnesses testified that their relationship was not suspicious in any manner. The evidence supported the caregiver’s position that she was his main source of emotional and physical support for many years, and he stated that he did not know what he would do without her.

It is somewhat surprising that the court does not adopt  s. 52 WESA in its reasons for judgment relating to the issue of the shifting onus of proof re undue influence other than to say that the legal framework to prove the will in solemn form is still the law relating to the shifting burden of proof, despite the wording of s.  52.

It is almost impossible to separate the two issues of lack of mental capacity and undue influence as they are invariably intertwined in the facts. Probably the only undue influence case that might occur without there being lack of mental capacity is the situation of a cult were on person controls the minds of many.

 

THE  LAW

[10]         In Leung v. Chang, 2013 BCSC 976, Dardi J. summarized the pertinent authorities and legal framework for analyzing a proof in solemn form claim where issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence are raised:

Legal Framework of Proving a Will Valid In Solemn Form

[25]      The Supreme Court of Canada in Vout v. Hay, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 876 clarified the principles with respect to the burden of proof in litigation regarding contested wills. The Court articulated the considerations which govern the interrelation of the doctrine of suspicious circumstances and the issues of testamentary capacity, knowledge and approval, undue influence and fraud.

[26]      In an action for proof of will in solemn form, the party propounding the will must prove on a balance of probabilities that the will was executed in compliance with the statutory formalities, that the will-maker knew and approved of the contents of the will and that the will-maker had testamentary capacity: Vout at paras. 19-20.

[27]      In order to make a valid will, the will-maker must have a “baseline level of mental acuity” or a “disposing mind and memory”, sufficient to appreciate and comprehend the nature and effect of the essential elements of the testamentary act. This encompasses an appreciation of the claims of the persons who are the natural objects of her estate and the extent of her property of which she is disposing: Laszlo v. Lawton, 2013 BCSC 305 at para. 185; Banks v. Goodfellow (1870), L.R. 5 Q.B. 549; Leger v. Poirier, [1944] S.C.R. 152 at 161. The assessment of whether a will-maker possesses testamentary capacity is a highly individualized inquiry and is a question of fact to be determined in all the circumstances: James v. Field, 2001 BCCA 267 at para. 51; Laszlo at para. 197.

[28]      In certain circumstances, the propounder of the will, in discharging the burden of proof, is aided by a rebuttable presumption of validity. If the will was duly executed in accordance with the requisite statutory formalities after being read over to or by a testator who appeared to understand it, it is presumed the testator possessed the requisite testamentary capacity and knew and approved of its contents: Vout at para. 26.

[29]      This presumption may be rebutted by evidence of “well-grounded suspicions”, referred to in the jurisprudence as “suspicious circumstances”, relating to one or more of the following circumstances:

(i)         surrounding the preparation of the will;

(ii)        tending to call into question the capacity of the will-maker; or

(iii)       tending to show that the free will of the will-maker was overborne by acts of coercion or fraud: Vout at para. 25.

[30]      If suspicious circumstances are established, then the presumption is spent and the legal burden of proof reverts to the propounder of the will. The propounder of the will then reassumes the legal burden of proving knowledge and approval, as well as proving testamentary capacity, if the suspicious circumstances reflect on the mental capacity of the will-maker to make a will: Woodward v. Grant, 2007 BCSC 1192 at para. 108. In order to discharge the burden, the propounder of the will is required to dispel the suspicious circumstances that have been raised: Ostrander v. Black (1996), 12 E.T.R. (2d) 219 at para. 30 (Gen. Div.).

[31]      In Vout, the Court affirmed that if a court determines that suspicious circumstances exist, the applicable standard of proof is a balance of probabilities. However, the evidence must be scrutinized in accordance with the gravity of the suspicion raised in any particular case.

[32]      In order to rebut the presumption of validity, those attacking the will must meet the threshold of demonstrating that there is some evidence “which, if accepted, would tend to negative knowledge and approval or testamentary capacity”: Vout at para. 27; Maddess v. Racz, 2009 BCCA 539 at para. 31. The court in Scott v. Cousins (2001), 37 E.T.R. (2d) 113 (Ont. S.C.J.) describes the requisite evidence as that which “excites the suspicion of the court”. A “general miasma of suspicion that something unsavoury may have occurred” is insufficient to rebut the presumption of validity; the evidence must raise a “specific and focused suspicion”: Clark v. Nash (1989), 61 D.L.R. (4th) 409 at 425 (B.C.C.A.).

[33]      The court in Laszlo provides the following instructive observations regarding the doctrine of suspicious circumstances at para. 207:

Suspicious circumstances have been found to exist in a wide array of situations and are not necessarily sinister in nature. There is no checklist of circumstantial factors that will invariably fit the classification. Commonly occurring themes include where a beneficiary is instrumental in the preparation of the will (especially where the beneficiary stands in a fiduciary position to the testator), or where the will favours “someone who has not previously been the object of [the testator’s] bounty and does not fall within the class of persons testators usually remember in their wills, that is to say their next of kin.

Undue Influence

[34]      When undue influence or fraud is alleged, the party opposing probate always bears the legal burden of proving on a balance of probabilities the affirmative defence of undue influence: Vout at para. 28. It is important to appreciate that in these circumstances, the doctrine of suspicious circumstances and the shifting of the burden of proof has no application.

[35]      In order to invalidate a will on the grounds of undue influence, the asserting party must prove that the influence exerted against the will-maker amounted to coercion, such that the will did not reflect the true intentions of a free will-maker and was not the product of the will-maker’s own act. The undue influence must constitute coercion which could not be resisted by the will-maker and which destroyed his or her free agency. It is well-established on the authorities that if the will-maker remains able to act freely, the exercise of significant advice or persuasion on the will-maker or an attempt to appeal to the will-maker or the mere desire of the will-maker to gratify the wishes of another, will not amount to undue influence: Maddess v. Racz, 2008 BCSC 1550 at para. 324 aff’d 2009 BCCA 539; Freeman v. Freeman (1889), 19 O.R. 141 at 155 (C.A.); Scott at para. 112.

[11]         I adopt this summary as accurate and applicable in respect of the issues regarding the validity of the 2011 Will in the present case. Paragraphs 34-35 of the quoted passage are no longer applicable to wills to which s. 52 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c. 13 [WESA] applies, that is, where the will-maker died after March 31, 2014.

Rebutting the Presumption of Undue Influence

Rebutting the PresumptionThorsteinson v Olson 2014 SKQB 237 , a Saskatchewen decision discusses how independent legal advice will generally result in rebutting the presumption of undue influence.

80 The most obvious way to rebut the presumption of undue influence is
to establish that the gift was made after the nature and effect of the
transaction was fully explained to the donee by an independent qualified
person (i.e. a lawyer) so completely as to satisfy the court that the donor
was acting independently of any influence from the donee and with full
appreciation of what he or she was doing. (Halsbury’s Laws of Canada,
Food/Gifts, p. 307) Independent legal advice is not the only way, however,
to rebut the presumption of advancement.

If other circumstances are sufficient to establish that the gift was the
spontaneous act of the donor, exercising an independent will, there is no
reason to disregard those circumstances merely because they do not include
independent legal advice from a lawyer.

(Halsbury’s, Food/Gifts, supra, p. 307)

81 The advice given must be competent and provided by an honest advisor
acting solely in the interest of the donor. (Brandon v. Brandon  2001] O.J. No. 2986 (QL) (Ont.Sup.Ct.))

86 That said, lack of adequate, independent legal advice is not a
ground unto itself to justify overturning a gift. As previously noted, the
presence or absence of independent legal advice is but one way in which to
rebut the presumption of undue influence. Other circumstances may be
considered.

The nature of their relationship at the relevant time, even
though one of elderly parent and child, does not in the circumstances raise
a presumption of undue influence, and even if it did, I find the presumption
has been rebutted.

Shifting the Burden of Proof In Undue Influence

Shifting the Burden of Proof

Shifting the Burden of Proof

Where an allegation of undue influence is founded on a dominant relationship and the evidence establishes such a relationship, the burden shifts to the party in the dominant position to show that this position was not abused in bringing about the transaction, whether by gift or by will

 

Verwoord v Goss et al 2014 BCSC 2122  summarizes of the law relating to undue influence.

 

The facts are sadly familiar. The deceased did several wills in the last years of his life, and just prior to his death transferred his family home the joint tenancy with his daughter who had been estranged from the family for 30 years. He purchased another condominium which was also put in joint tenancy with the same daughter.

The other children brought an action to have the will declared invalid and the property transfers set aside, and the court agreed.

The court found that the deceased lacked mental capacity, and as well was under the undue influence of his daughter when he made the will, and did the transfers of land.

Expert witnesses concluded that the deceased was suffering from dementia.

Undue Influence
206      It is also my view that the 2009 Will and subsequent inter vivos gifts were made in circumstances which support a finding of undue influence by Dennis and Thea.
207      Following Ogilvie v. Ogilvie Estate, [1996] B.C.J. No. 1506 (B.C. S.C.) (“Ogilvie“), aff’d [1998] B.C.J. No. 722 (B.C. C.A.), the overarching question raised by an allegation of undue influence is whether a disposition can be properly construed as “that of one free to determine what should be done with [the] property” (para. 34).
208      Undue influence arises in two forms: a) where the disposition was the result of influence wielded for the purpose of bringing about that end, or b) where there is a relationship between the a party and the testator (or donee) in which the potential for influence existed: Ogilvie (para. 34), and Brydon (para. 232). Respecting the former, the burden lies with the party raising the allegation of undue influence on a balance of the probabilities, and requires proof that the testator or donor was “influenced by another person to such a degree that the testator was coerced into doing what that other person wanted, against the will of the testator,” as held in Brydon (para. 232).
209      On the other hand, where an allegation of undue influence is founded on a dominant relationship, and there is evidence establishing that such a relationship existed, the burden shifts to the party in the dominant position with respect to the testator (or donee) to show that this position was not abused in bringing about the transaction: Ogilvie (para. 39), and Brydon (paras. 231-232). In other words, that party must prove that the relationship with the testator or donor was not abused so as to bring about the disposition in question, as provided in Ogilvie (para. 35).
210      This shifted burden effectively amounts to a rebuttable presumption of undue influence (Ogilvie, para. 36). The presumption is properly raised where the disposition is of “sufficient magnitude,” and “the potential for domination inheres in the nature of the relationship itself,” such as “solicitor and client” and “guardian and ward” (para. 37). Ultimately, the question is whether the relationship is one which “provides an opportunity for one person to dominate the will of the other” (Brydon, para. 236).
211      Turning to the facts of this case, there is some evidence to suggest that Bart was influenced by the defendants, and particularly the pressure exerted by Dennis’ forceful personality, to make the 2009 Will and subsequent inter vivos dispositions. However, in my view, this is a case which is better determined under the dominant relationship branch of undue influence. That is so, because the 2009 Will and inter vivos gifts here at issue are of a considerable magnitude, and because the plaintiffs have satisfied me that Bart’s relationship with Dennis and Thea was one of dependency.
212      The evidence robustly supports that Bart’s relationship with Dennis and Thea following Anna’s death was one of dominance and dependency on Bart’s part. He was in a state of diminished mental capacity, and requested help with the arrangement of his affairs so as to avoid what he perceived as Caroline’s designs on his estate. As noted, this help was provided, and extended to Dennis managing Bart’s relationship with his lawyer, Lynda Cassels. Dennis became Bart’s Power of Attorney, and Thea his representative under the Representation Agreement. Further, given Dennis’ legal training, and the fact that Thea had taken on a role in supporting her father in his time of need, I am left with no doubt that a “special” or dominant relationship, as contemplated in Ogilvie and Brydon, existed between Bart, Dennis and Thea following his request for help in May, 2009. There can be no doubt that they “managed his affairs or gave him advice” (Ogilvie, para. 41).
213      The burden is accordingly moved to the defendants, who must prove that the 2009 Will and inter vivos gifts were the result of Bart’s own will, informed and exercised freely. The defendants may discharge their burden by showing that Bart acted pursuant to independent advice, or by establishing that no actual influence was deployed respecting the transactions at issue (Ogilvie, para. 39).

 

Rebutting a Presumption of Undue Influence

Rebutting presumption undue influenceCowper- Smith v Cowper Smith estate 2015 BCSC 1170 discusses the evidence and legal criteria required to set aside a transfer of land and a declaration of trust on the basis of undue influence, where such presumption may arise such as with a caregiver.

 

The plaintiffs say that there are two classes of transactions that may be set aside on grounds of undue influence. The first is where the court is satisfied that the gift was the result of undue influence. The second is where the relations between the donor and donee have at the time of or shortly before the execution of the gift been such as to raise a presumption that the donee had influence over the donor.

[71]         The plaintiffs say that to trigger a presumption of undue influence, the court must first consider whether the potential for domination is inherent in the nature of the relationship itself. The plaintiffs say that, while the presumption does not automatically apply as a result of familial relationship, it may apply if the relationship between elderly parent and child is characterized by dependency.

[72]         The plaintiffs say that there are number of facts relevant to the question of whether the potential for domination existed in the relationship between Gloria and Elizabeth:

(a)      While Arthur was alive, Elizabeth relied on him to manage their financial affairs;

(b)      After Arthur’s death, Gloria began assisting her mother with the same sort of things, looking after investments, doing her tax returns;

(c)      After Arthur’s death, Elizabeth relied on Gloria for advice and information;

(d)      In the spring of 2001, Elizabeth was spending a significant amount of time with Gloria;

(e)      Elizabeth told Ms. Iverson that Gloria was always there to help her;

(f)       Ms. Chelle observed that Elizabeth admired her daughter and relied on her daughter’s judgment and opinion;

(g)      Elizabeth brought letters she had written to Max and Nathan to Gloria to see how she felt about them;

(h)      Nathan testified that when Elizabeth returned from visiting Gloria she was upset about things between herself and Nathan;

(i)       Gloria says that in the spring of 2001 she was concerned about her mother and her mother’s best interests. At this time, Gloria became:

(i)       Initially the primary (and possibly only) beneficiary under her mother’s February 9, 2001 will;

(ii)      Later, a joint owner of her mother’s home, with the home being gifted to her on her mother’s death; and

(iii)      A possible joint owner on all of her mother’s investments, with the investments being gifted to her on her mother’s death.

[73]         The plaintiffs submit that these factors show a relationship between Gloria and Elizabeth that gives rise to a presumption of undue influence. They say that once the circumstances trigger the presumption, the donee must show that the donor entered into the transaction as a result of her own full, free, and informed thought. Legal advice alone may not be adequate to successfully rebut the presumption. It is not enough for an independent solicitor to carry out the proposal which had been previously settled. There must be some objective advice on the merits and prudence of the transaction. The plaintiffs say that Mr. Easdon’s advice did not meet this requirement. They say that the presumption has not been rebutted.

[74]         The defendant does not concede that the circumstances of this case raise a presumption of undue influence. In the alternative, the defendant says that the presumption has been rebutted. The presumption need only be rebutted on a balance of probabilities.

[75]         The defendant argues that she had no understanding what the Declaration of Trust meant and that her statements from June 2001 to August 2010 to the effect that she understood that all assets would be shared equally, suggests that she did not exercise undue influence on her mother.  She says that her evidence that she had no understanding of the meaning or memory of the execution of the Declaration of Trust is corroborated by her behaviour.

[76]         She says that I should accept her evidence that she was put on inquiry as to why Mr. Easdon rendered an invoice to her mother and that in turn led to Mr. Scambler learning of the Declaration of Trust. It was at this point that she decided to maintain a claim to the Cadboro Bay Property and the Investments that belonged to her by right of survivorship. She says that with this in mind, she clearly did not actually influence Elizabeth to create the current situation.

[77]         The defendant argues that Elizabeth had independent legal advice or the opportunity to obtain independent legal advice. She acknowledges that Mr. Easdon’s evidence falls short of what one would have hoped for in terms of knowing exactly what was said to Elizabeth. She accepts that he may not have questioned her about the merits of the transaction and it may have been preferable had he done so. She argues, however, that the evidence of Ms. Iverson reveals that the merits were understood by Elizabeth. Moreover, she says that even imperfect independent legal advice may be sufficient to rebut the presumption in conjunction with other evidence that the transaction was in accord with the transferor’s wishes.

[78]         She argues that it is clear from the evidence of Ms. Iverson that Elizabeth knew and appreciated what she was doing.

[79]         She argues that, while her mother may have been influenced by her in various aspects of her life, there is nothing improper in that. The transaction should be set aside only if the influence was undue. The court has to be satisfied that the transaction was entered into contrary to the true will and intent of the person acting under the influence of another.

[80]         She acknowledges that Elizabeth was undoubtedly influenced to some degree by David. She was also influenced by Ms. Iverson and the relationship between herself and her daughter as well as her relationship with her sons.

[81]         She argues “that at the end of the day, the court may be unhappy with the effect of what has happened.” However, she says that the court should focus on the timeframe of June 2001 and not October 2014.

[82]         She argues that she has demonstrated that at least three of the five factors set out in Stewart v. McLean, 2010 BCSC 64 at para. 97 and referred to in Modonese v. Delac Estate, 2011 BCSC 82 at para. 119, aff’d 2011 BCCA 501, as rebutting the presumption of undue influence have been made out.

[83]         In Geffen v. Goodman Estate, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 353 at 378-379, 381, the Supreme Court of Canada considered undue influence.  There the court said:

What then must a plaintiff establish in order to trigger a presumption of undue influence? In my view, the inquiry should begin with an examination of the relationship between the parties.  The first question to be addressed in all cases is whether the potential for domination inheres in the nature of the relationship itself. …

Having established the requisite type of relationship to support the presumption, the next phase of the inquiry involves an examination of the nature of the transaction…

…[I]n situations where consideration is not an issue, e.g. gifts and bequests, it seems to me quite inappropriate to put a plaintiff to the proof of undue disadvantage or benefit in the result.  In these situations the concern of the court is that such acts of beneficence not be tainted.  It is enough, therefore, to establish the presence of a dominant relationship.

Once the plaintiff has established that the circumstances are such as to trigger the application of the presumption, i.e., that apart from the details of the particular impugned transaction, the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant was such that the potential for influence existed, the onus moves to the defendant to rebut it. … [T]he plaintiff must be shown to have entered into the transaction as a result of his own “full free and informed thought”[.]

Since the trust instrument is unquestionably more akin to a gift or bequest than a commercial transaction, the existence of the required relationship without more is sufficient to trigger the presumption.  It remains, therefore, to be determined whether the presumption has been rebutted.  In making that determination, it is necessary to conduct a “meticulous examination of the facts”[.]

[84]         In Stewart at para. 97, Mr. Justice Punnett summarized factors that may be considered to rebut the presumption of undue influence:

[97] To rebut the presumption of undue influence, the defendant must show that the donor gave the gift as a result of her own “full, free and informed thought”: Geffen at 379. A defendant could establish this by showing:

  1. no actual influence was used in the particular transaction or the lack of opportunity to influence the donor (Geffen at 379; Longmuir [v. Holland, 2000 BCCA 538] at para. 121);
  2. the donor had independent advice or the opportunity to obtain independent advice (Geffen at 379; Longmuir at para. 121);
  3. the donor had the ability to resist any such influence (Calbick v. Warne, 2009 BCSC 1222 at para. 64);
  4. the donor knew and appreciated what she was doing (Vout v. Hay, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 876 at para. 29, 125 D.L.R. (4th) 431); or
  5. undue delay in prosecuting the claim, acquiescence or confirmation by the deceased (Longmuir at para. 76).

[85]         In Coish v. Walsh, 2001 NFCA 41 at para. 23, the court said:

The trial judge also correctly set forth the law respecting the manner in which a presumption may be rebutted. …[F]actors to be taken into account in considering whether or not evidence of legal advice given to the granting party is sufficient to rebut the presumption. At paragraph 24 of Fowler Estate [v. Barnes (1996), 142 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 223 (Nfld. T.D.)], Green, J. identified factors which may affect the character of legal advice to be as follows:

  1. Whether the party benefiting from the transaction is also present at the time the advice is given and/or at the time the documents are executed.
  2. Whether, though technically acting for the grantor, the lawyer was engaged by and took instructions from the person alleged to be exercising the influence.
  3. In a situation where the proposed transaction involves the transfer of all or substantially all of a person’s assets, whether the lawyer was aware of that fact and discussed the financial implications with the grantor.
  4. Whether the lawyer enquired as to whether the donor discussed the proposed transaction with other family members who might otherwise have benefited if the transaction did not take place.
  5. Whether the solicitor discussed with the grantor other options whereby she could achieve her objective with less risk to her.

[Emphasis in the original, citations omitted.]

[86]         Was the relationship between Gloria and Elizabeth one in which there was the potential for domination? I am satisfied it was.

[87]         Both Max and Nathan testified about Elizabeth’s reliance on Gloria’s judgment. Nathan testified as to his mother’s response to visits with Gloria, how she would become agitated and say that he was trying to take her house.  Adrienne testified that, even before Arthur died, Gloria was a dominant personality, people did what Gloria wanted. After Arthur died, Elizabeth relied even more on Gloria’s judgment. By Gloria’s evidence, she had to teach Elizabeth how to write a cheque. Elizabeth would even seek her advice about letters that she proposed to write to her sons (and Gloria would keep copies of the letters). Elizabeth’s neighbour, Ms. Chelle, testified that Elizabeth admired Gloria. Elizabeth told her that Gloria ran the doctor’s office and made financial decisions. When Gloria was present, Elizabeth would nod along with Gloria’s views. Elizabeth would not contradict Gloria. After Arthur died, Elizabeth relied more on Gloria and Gloria was around more often. In the meeting of March 31, 2001, Elizabeth told Ms. Iverson that Gloria was always there to help her; that she spent a lot of time at Gloria’s; that Gloria paid her bills. On May 30, 2001, she told Ms. Iverson that Gloria looked after her investments.

[88]         Letters to Max or Nathan from Elizabeth in this timeframe are written jointly in some cases with Gloria or are in Gloria’s hand, signed by both. In other cases, Gloria writes on behalf of her mother, her uncle David, and herself.

[89]         All of the witnesses describe Elizabeth as a quiet, home-loving, family-oriented person who did not like conflict.

[90]         After Arthur’s death, Gloria was the family member that Elizabeth spent most time with. She socialized with her frequently and trusted her to handle her banking and investments. Gloria prepared her tax returns. Elizabeth was deferential to Gloria. She did not like conflict. She sought Gloria’s advice. I am satisfied that Gloria had the ability to dominate Elizabeth’s will, whether through manipulation, coercion, or outright but subtle abuse of power. In my view, the relationship was one in which there was a potential for domination.

[91]         Has the defendant rebutted the presumption of undue influence? Does the evidence satisfy me on the balance of probabilities that the Declaration of Trust and the transfer of the Cadboro Road Property into joint tenancy were the result of Elizabeth’s full, free, and informed thought?  I am not satisfied that they were.

[92]         What constitutes undue influence?

[A]ll influences are not unlawful… pressure of whatever character, whether acting on the fears or the hopes, if so exerted as to overpower the volition without convincing the judgment, is a species of restraint … Importunity or threats, such as the [donor/beneficiary] has not the courage to resist, moral command asserted and yielded to for the sake of peace and quiet, or of escaping from distress of mind or social discomfort, these, if carried to a degree in which the free play of the [donor/beneficiary]’s judgment, discretion or wishes, is overborne, will constitute undue influence[.]

(Hall v. Hall (1868), L.R. 1 P. & D. 451 at 482 [Sir J.P. Wilde]).

 

Recognizing Undue Influence

undue influenceThe BC Law Institute published a checklist on recognizing undue influence situations for lawyers and dealing it:

1. Interview will-maker alone (Basic Rule).

Rationale:

  • Ensure it is clear that professional is acting for will-maker.
  • Professional needs to avoid appearance of a joint retainer.
  • Confidentiality of solicitor/client communications.
  • Professional needs to satisfy him/herself that will-maker has testamentary capacity.

Exceptions for taking instructions from another person (A):

  • A is disinterested and is acting as an interpreter (no kinship, financial interest, or social connection).
  • Including A (a relative or interested person) is unavoidable. Remain alert.
  • A is Spouse. Remain alert. If any concerns that spouse is not speaking accurately for will-maker, meet with will-maker alone.

 

2. Ask non-leading, open ended questions to

determine factors operating on will-maker’s mind.

Examples:

  • How/why did you decide to divide your estate this way?
  • What was important to you in deciding to divide your estate this way?
  • Why did you choose [proposed executor] as executor of your will?

 

  3. Explore whether will-maker is in a relationship

of dependency, domination or special confidence or trust.

See examples of open-ended probing questions in BCLI Guide, pp 33 -34.

Sample questions to consider:

  • Do you live alone? With family? A caregiver? A friend?
  • Has anything changed in your living arrangements recently?
  • Are you able to go wherever and whenever you wish?

 

  • Does anyone help you more than others? Who arranged/suggested this meeting?
  • Does anyone help you make decisions? Who does your banking?
  • Has anyone asked you for money? A gift?
  1.   Explore whether will-maker is a victim of abuse or neglect in other contexts.

Sample questions to consider (note need for tact, discretion and awareness for client’s physical safety; refer to community resources if and when appropriate):

  • Has anyone ever hurt you? Has anyone taken anything that was yours without asking?
  • Has anyone scolded or threatened you? Are you alone a lot?
  • Has anyone ever failed to help you take care of yourself when you needed help?
  • Are there people you like to see? Have you seen these people or done things recently with them?
  • Has anyone ever threatened to take you out of your home and put you in a care facility?

 

  1. Obtain relevant information from third parties when possible and if the will-maker consents.

 

6. Obtain medical assessment if mental capacity is also in question, but remember that mental capacity to make a will is ultimately a legal test.

7. Compile list of events or circumstances indicating undue influence.

See list of “Red Flags to Watch For” opposite.

  8. Make and retain appropriate records whenever red flags are present.

Detailed notes; checklist recommended; information supporting practitioner’s conclusions and ultimate decision should include: red flags identified, inquiry pursued, information obtained, memoranda to record reasoning for conclusion.


9. If Index of Suspicion remains high after
reasonable investigation, decline retainer to prepare the will.

 

WHAT  TO WATCH FOR

Undue Influence – Recognition/Prevention

The red flags listed below may indicate the presence of undue influence on a will-maker.

This list is not necessarily complete or definitive. It is an aid to practitioners to identify

potential undue influence and provide an “index of suspicion” so that they will be alerted

to carry out the necessary inquiries before preparing a will for execution.

See the text of the BCLI Guide for more detailed discussion.

 

-Will-maker invests significant trust and confidence in a person who is a beneficiary or is connected to a beneficiary (e.g. lawyer, doctor, clergy, financial advisor, accountant, formal or informal caregiver, new “suitor” or partner).

YES NO N/AODD

Isolation of will-maker resulting in dependence on another for physical, emotional, financial or other needs.

 

. Physical, psychological and behavioural

characteristics of will-maker.

Examples:

Dependence on beneficiary for sight, hearing,

mobility, speech, illness, illiteracy.

Signs of neglect/self neglect (emaciation,

inappropriate clothing, bruising, untreated injuries).

In state of shock after stressful situations (e.g. bad

news, death of close person).

Non-specific factors (e.g. loneliness, sexual

bargaining, end of life issues).

Cultural influences/conditioned responses (e.g.

subservience to traditional authority in extended

family; yielding to pressure for fear of revealing

family conflicts leading to loss of face in community).

Impaired mental function from a psychiatric

condition or a non-psychiatric cause (e.g. trauma or

stroke).

Signs include (see BCLI Guide for full list pp 24-25):

  • Sudden onset of confusion.
  • Short term memory problems, disorientation, difficulty with finances.
  • Signs of depression (e.g. irritable, agitated, difficulty making decisions, sad face, bowed head, general lethargy).
  • Delusions.
  • Extreme sense of well-being, continuous speech, inability to concentrate, poor judgment.
  • Apprehensive or appearance of being worried, distressed, overwhelmed.
  • Client is intoxicated/signs of substance abuse.
  • Down’s syndrome, autism or other developmental disorder.
  • Inability to answer open-ended questions. Circumstances related to making of the will and/or the terms.

Examples:

  • Unusual gifts; sudden change for no apparent reason; frequent changes.
  • Marked change in instructions from prior wills.
  • 3rd party initiates instructions which also benefit 3rd party; beneficiary speaks for will-maker; beneficiary offers to pay for new will; will-maker relies exclusively/unusually on notes to

give instructions.

  • Spouses: joint retainer but one spouse provides instructions while other remains silent.
  • Recent death of a family member and other family appear to influence changing existing will.

 

 5. Characteristics of influencer in will-maker’s family or circle of acquaintance.

  • Overly helpful.
  • Insists on being present during interview with lawyer/notary.
  • Contacts practitioner persistently after instructions are taken.
  • Person is known to practitioner to have history of abuse, including violence.
  • Practitioner observes negative and/or controlling attitude to will-maker.
  • Practitioner is aware that influencer is in difficult financial circumstances and/or engages in substance abuse.

 

. Practitioner’s “gut feeling”.

  • Body language of will-maker indicates fear, anxiety, insecurity, embarrassment etc.
  • “Influencer” is off putting or difficult to deal with at appointment.
  • “Influencer” is rude to staff in office or on telephone, or is overly solicitous.

 

FLOW CHART

 

OF RECOMMENDED PRACTICES

 

Undue Influence – Recognition/Prevention

DOES CLIENT

HAVE TESTAMENTARY

CAPACITY?

 

IF NO

 

DO NOT PROCEED

OR IF UNSURE,

MAKE APPROPRIATE

DO NOT PROCEEDOR IF UNSURE,MAKE APPROPRIATE

NOT SURE

 

PRACTITIONER DECISION DEPENDS ON NATURE AND LEVEL OF CONCERN:

  • SUSPICION ONLY. DOCUMENT FILE. PROCEED.
  • SERIOUS CONCERNS. DO NOT PROCEED.