Wills Variation and Long Marriages

Wills Variation and Long Marriages

Ciarniello v James 2016 BCSC 1699 is a good example on how the court treats the division of estate assets  at the end of  long marriages when the survivor brings a wills variation action on the basis that she was not adequately provided for in her late husband’s estate.

The parties were together 39 years and had two children of their 28 year old marriage. It was a second marriage for both.

The deceased husband also had three children from a previous marriage.

The testator died at age 80 years and held assets in his name of about $11.3 million dollars.

His surviving spouse was aged 62 and owned about $7.2 million of her own assets but was essentially “land rich and cash poor” and was draining her saving each month to get by.

There was  evidence as to the valuations of each parties assets.

His will left his estate equally to his five children, other than his half in the family home which he left to the plaintiff.

there was evidence that the deceased sought and relied upon an estate plan but the court found that the plan was outside what was reasonable for the  long time spouse.

The court varied the will by % 25 of the residue to the surviving spouse plus the deceased’s  %10 interest in a privately  owned company and the remaining %75 to  be divided equally amongst the five children.

The court reasoned that the plaintiff was entitled in a notional separation had it occurred immediately prior to the testator’s death, and concluded that the deceased did not make adequate provision for his surviving spouse, and thus the variance. The notional separation defines the minimum acceptable level of what is adequate, just and equitable.

Under the will, the plaintiff did not receive one half of the family property and the testator clearly did not discharge his legal duty to her.

The Court:

[73]         The legal entitlement of the spouse immediately before the death of the testator is the relevant time, that is, the time of the notional separation, to determine the extent of the testator’s legal duty.

[74]         As Dr. Ciarniello died on April 28, 2013, the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, should govern the analysis. Given the provision of the Divorce Act and the Family Law Act, I think that the plaintiff at a time just prior to the death of the testator would likely be entitled to an equal division of family property. While I doubt that a family law analysis would have resulted in an order for spousal support, given the condition of the testator at that time, the deceased’s legal obligation would be to provide 50% of the family property.

[75]         Assuming a notional separation of the parties immediately before death, I find the relevant values at that time for the net assets of the plaintiff were $7,194,980 and for Dr. Ciarniello’s holdings $11,342,597. I have accepted the valuations in the plaintiff’s chart I set out above. I have considered the minority interest in Nicoson at the mid-point between the two valuations.

Wills Variation-Assets Passing Outside of the Estate

Assets Passing Outside of the Estate

generally speaking, claimants do not have a claim against assets that pass “outside” of the estate in wills variation claims. The exceptions are if the transfer is tainted and legal remedies such  as resulting trust, undue influence and lack of mental capacity are available.


Assets Passing – Probably most people in North America die holding assets that pass from their name to others or their estate that pass both ” inside” and “outside” of the estate.

A deceased’s will only distributes assets that were personally owned by the deceased at the time of his or her death, and these assets are said to pass through, under  or “inside” of the deceased’s estate.

Many other assets owned by the deceased may pass “outside” of the deceased’s estate by mechanisms independent of the will.

In a wills variation action brought under section 60 WESA, a claim is limited to assets in British Columbia that pass “inside of the estate” pursuant to the will of the deceased.

If the deceased is not have a will, then there cannot be a wills variation claim and the assets will pass as an intestacy.

Similarly, there is no wills variation claim in the following assets owned by a deceased:

1.       Property owned as a joint tenant with a right of survivorship with someone else;

2.       named beneficiaries under an insurance policy;

3.       proceeds from pension plans with named beneficiaries;

4.       trusts;

5.       gifts made during the lifetime of the deceased; 

The list may not be exhaustive but it includes probably a majority of assets owned by the majority of Americans and Canadians that pass upon a death.

For example, most spousal couples likely own their property in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship, so that upon the first of the owners to pass, the property automatically goes to the survivor and does not form part of the assets that pass under the will.

As previously mentioned, it is not possible to bring a wills variation claim against a proper joint tenancy.

Court Discretion In Wills Variation Claims

Court Discretion In Wills Variation Claims

In wills variation cases now brought under S. 60 WESA , the judge has “entire discretion” in deciding pro or against a claimant on its findings of fact.

In Swain v Dennison 1967 SCR 7 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the jurisdiction of the court in such claims is statutory, not founded in equity and the entire jurisdiction of the court is discretionary.

Within reason the court can make findings of fact in its discretion which makes it very difficult to appeal since the appeal court would have to substitute its own findings of fact in place of the trial judge unless the appeal court finds that the trial judge did not give sufficient weight to relevant factors.

The BC Appeal court in Kish v Sobchak and Doyle 2016 BCCA 65 stated the following about the courts proper use of discretion:

33.   The line between the exercise of judicial discretion and the finding of facts is not easy to enunciate. For purposes of this case, I respectfully adopt Lord Bingham’s description of judicial discretion given in The Business of Judging: Selected Essays and Speeches(2000):

According to my definition, an issue falls within a judge’s discretion if, being governed by no rule of law, its resolution depends on the individual judge’s assessment (within such boundaries as have been laid down) of what it is fair and just to do in the particular case.

He has no discretion in making his findings of fact. He has no discretion in his rulings on the law. But when, having made any necessary finding of fact and necessary ruling of law, he has to choose between different courses of action, orders, penalties or remedies he then exercises a discretion. It is only when he reaches the stage of asking himself what is the fair and just thing to do or order in the instant case that embarks on the exercise of a discretion.

I believe this definition to be broadly consistent with the usage adopted in statutes. [At 36; emphasis added.]

Lord Bingham also explains that fact-finding is not “discretionary”, although some judges have described it as such. In his words:

… it is one thing to say that the responsibility of finding the facts is entrusted to a particular person or body, be he judge, arbitrator, official or public authority, and that such finding is to be treated as conclusive or virtually so. But it is quite another to describe that function as discretionary. It is, I suggest, nothing of the kind. In finding the facts the judge’s job is to consider all the conflicting evidence this way and that and decide as best he can where the truth lies. It is very much the task performed, for instance, by the historian or the journalist as part of his stock in trade. The judges of course are constricted by formalities and rules of evidence which do not afflict them. On the other hand, he has powers of compelling testimony which they would envy. It is none the less essentially the same function. Yet to say of a historian or journalist that he exercised a discretion in reaching conclusions of fact would, I suggest, be regarded as a libellous. The judge must exercise judgment, not discretion, in finding the facts, and it is usually the most difficult and often most exacting task which the civil trial judge has to undertake. [At 37; emphasis added.]

S 151 WESA – Court Allows Applicant to Sue as Executor

S 151 WESA - Court Allows Applicant to Sue as Executor

Werner v. McLean 2016 BCSC 1510 granted relief under S 151 WESA that the applicant be authorized to bring court action in the name of and sue on behalf of the personal representative of the estate as executor.

The court approval was in order to litigate whether an asset was or was not an estate asset. The court found that the applicant had satisfied the required criteria under S 151 WESA.

An application in the alternative that the executor be removed and the applicant substituted as executor  was dismissed on the basis that the executor had not acted improperly.

The court stated:

[9]             On an application for removal of a trustee, the court’s focus is on the welfare of the beneficiaries of the trust estate: Letterstedt v. Broers (1884), 9 App. Cas. 371 (P.C.); Conroy v. Stokes, [1952] B.C.J. No. 111 (C.A.). Not every act of misconduct should result in removal. The question is whether the acts or omissions endanger the trust property or show a want of honesty or proper capacity to execute the duties or reasonable fidelity: Letterstedt, at 386.

Section 151 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1)  Despite section 136 [effect of representation grant], a beneficiary or an intestate successor may, with leave of the court, commence proceedings in the name and on behalf of the personal representative of the deceased person
(a)  to recover property or to enforce a right, duty or obligation owed to the deceased person that could be recovered or enforced by the personal representative, or
(b)  to obtain damages for breach of a right, duty or obligation owed to the deceased person.

(3)  The court may grant leave under this section if
(a)  the court determines the beneficiary or intestate successor seeking leave
(i)   has made reasonable efforts to cause the personal representative to commence or defend the proceeding,
(ii)   has given notice of the application for leave to
(A)  the personal representative,
(B)  any other beneficiaries or intestate successors, and
(C)  any additional person the court directs that notice is to be given, and
(iii)   is acting in good faith, and
(b)  it appears to the court that it is necessary or expedient for the protection of the estate or the interests of a beneficiary or an intestate successor for the proceeding to be brought or defended.
(4)  On application by a beneficiary, an intestate successor or a personal representative, the court may authorize a person to control the conduct of a proceeding under this section or may give other directions for the conduct of the proceeding.

Adoption Purposes

Adoption Purposes

Adoption is for all purposes. I advised a legal enquiry today that he could not claim against the estate of his natural father (“birth parent”) since he had been adopted by another party and that for estate claims, his adoption was for “all purposes”.

Section 3 WESA re Adoption states:

Effect of adoption

3  (0.1) In this section, “pre-adoption parent” means a person who, before the adoption of a child, was the child’s parent.

(1) Subject to this section, if the relationship of parent and child arising from the adoption of a child must be established at any generation in order to determine succession under this Act, the relationship is to be determined in accordance with the Adoption Act respecting the effect of adoption.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), if a child is adopted,

(a) the child is not entitled to the estate of his or her pre-adoption parent except through the will of the pre-adoption parent, and

(b) a pre-adoption parent of the child is not entitled to the estate of the child except through the will of the child.

(3) Adoption of a child by the spouse of a pre-adoption parent does not terminate the relationship of parent and child between the child and the pre-adoption parent for purposes of succession under this Act.

In other words on an intestacy an adopted child may not inherit from his or her birth parent and a birth parent may not inherit from a child that has been adopted , with the exception of step-parent adoptions.

Nothing however prevents the right of both children and parents to leave a gift by will to each other irrespective of the adoption.

This section also precludes a child who has been adopted out from bringing a wills variation claim ( S 60 WESA) against the birth parent’s estate.

Disabled Adult Succeeds Wills Variation

Disabled Adult Succeeds Wills Variation

Willott v. Willott Estate 1997 CarswellBC 2016, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2073, 20 E.T.R. (2d) 211 is a 1997 wills variation action where a deceased parent’s estate was required to pay additional monies to a disabled son who unable to work, survived on a small disability pension due to his mental illness.

The estate was approximately $500,000 and was left solely to the sister of the deceased.

The disabled son succeeded in his wills variation claim ( now section 60, WESA)  with the court finding that state paid disability benefits are the bare minimum and that a parent still has a moral obligation to provide more for the child’s benefit.


73      Therefore, I find that a judicious testatrix, as part of her consideration of what is adequate support for an adult child who is incapable of supporting himself due to disabilities, may take into account the provisions made by the state for that person. That is the starting point. The state provides for basic needs. But the state also is willing to provide for those needs without deduction while allowing for some “extras” for the disabled person. Thus arise the exemptions in the Disability Benefits Program Act and the Regulations to that Act.

74      I find on the whole of the evidence that Iris Willott did not make adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support of her son, and did not discharge her moral obligation to him. Lot 1 will provide accommodation for him should he chose to live there or, if he chooses to sell that property, I find it will provide him with enough money to purchase other suitable accommodation. His benefits under the regulations to Disability Benefits Program Act will cover his house insurance, taxes, fuel, water, hydro, garbage and basic telephone expenses (s. 5 Schedule A). In addition, benefits will provide him and his wife with medical and dental coverage, eye care, prescriptions and home support. But the monthly amount of $608 which he will then receive (assuming he and his wife are together) is not sufficient, I find, to maintain him to the standard which was reasonable given his own circumstances at the time of his mother’s death and the other factors the court is required to consider when dealing with Wills Variation Act actions, including the size of the estate.

75      I find that Mr. Willott should be provided with a further lump sum which (together with the remainder of the cash bequest which he received under the will) will enable him to purchase a reasonably reliable vehicle and certain household items which he requires. Many needs for the later will be satisfied by his receipt of the balance of Iris Willott’s effects which all the defendants agree he should have. I find the additional amount that Mr. Willott should receive is $20,000. If Mr. Willott, with the assistance of his wife and others, plans efficiently, this sum should also suffice to cover his initial vehicle insurance costs as well as living and other transitional expenses which he will incur over the one to three months which I estimate will be the time during which he will not receive benefits due to receipt of funds from the estate. Should Mr. Willott choose to sell the property he can and should plan the sale and any purchase of other property to minimize the time during which he will not receive benefits.

76      In addition, Mr. Willott should have the benefit of a trust as contemplated by the Disability Benefits Program Act and Regulations. This trust shall be in the amount of $100,000. Mr. Willott shall receive the income from this trust to the maximum allowed under the regulations. The balance of the annual trust income, after payments of all costs related to the administration of the trust, shall be paid to the Society, from whose share of the estate the trust shall be created. Upon Mr. Willott’s death the capital of the trust shall revert to the Society. At present this means Mr. Willott will receive from the trust a maximum of $5,484 per year or $457 per month in addition to the $608 in monthly benefits which he receives. If necessary, counsel may speak to the question of the appointment of an appropriate trustee.

77      The trust shall be created from funds from the sale of Lot 102 which shall be listed for sale forthwith. Mr. Willott may call for the transfer of Lot 1 and the balance of the funds owing directly to him at any time from the date of this judgment but not later than three months after the establishment of the trust. Until that time, he shall be entitled to interest on the funds owing directly to him in the amount of 5% per year payable at the time he receives the funds. Should Mr. Willott chose to defer the transfer of Lot 1 he will not be entitled to any accounting with respect to the income from it, nor shall he be responsible for any of the expenses relating to it.

78      The additional lump sum payment shall fall rateably on the estate. Mr. Onwood’s share of the estate shall be satisfied next after that of Mr. Willott. Thereafter the congregation’s share of the estate shall be satisfied, following which the Society shall receive its share.

Will Variation: Daughter Awarded Entire Estate

Will Varied to Give Daughter Entire Estate

Hagen-Bourgeault v. Martens 2016 BCSC 1096 varied a will (S. 60 WESA) to give a 25 year old daughter with two young children on social assistance, the entire estate of $2,200 per month until 2025, instead of her husband of two years who was well off but left the entire estate under her will.

The court found that the husband beneficiary of the estate had was financially independent and had limited legal or moral entitlement to the estate.

The daughter in turn had great financial need.

The Court Stated:

The leading Canadian decision on variation principles is Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 807; 93 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145. In delivering the Court’s unanimous judgment, McLachlin J., as she then was, confirmed that the language of the WVA confers on the trial court a broad discretion to make orders that are just in the specific circumstances of a case, and in light of contemporary standards. The WVA is to be seen as imposing limitations of testamentary authority. At a minimum, survivors are not to be left destitute, such that they will impose a burden on the state; but what is to be considered “adequate, just and equitable” is not limited to need alone.

Entire estate

[20]         Tataryn further discusses the means by which competing claims are to be assessed:

How are conflicting claims to be balanced against each other?  Where the estate permits, all should be met. Where priorities must be considered, it seems to me that claims which would have been recognized during the testator’s life — i.e., claims based upon not only moral obligation but legal obligations — should generally take precedence over moral claims. As between moral claims, some may be stronger than others. It falls to the court to weigh the strength of each claim and assign to each its proper priority. In doing this, one should take into account the important changes consequent upon the death of the testator. There is no longer any need to provide for the deceased and reasonable expectations following upon death may not be the same as in the event of a separation during lifetime. A will may provide a framework for the protection of the beneficiaries and future generations and the carrying out of legitimate social purposes. Any moral duty should be assessed in the light of the deceased’s legitimate concerns which, where the assets of the estate permit, may go beyond providing for the surviving spouse and children.

[21]         In my judgment, the needs of the plaintiff, in relation to the very modest size of the estate, completely outweigh all claims of Mr. Martens. Mr. Martens, though he was no doubt the loving spouse of the deceased, had only a short relationship and demonstrates no financial dependence upon her during their lifetime. The amount of the structured settlement fund did not increase in value during their relationship. He has no claims founded in unjust enrichments. In the circumstances, he would not have been entitled to spousal support on the breakup of their marriage. His legal and moral entitlement to a share in Michelle’s estate is consequently limited, at best. Furthermore, the size of the estate is so modest that in their entirety, the structured settlement proceeds would appear to be sufficient only just to lift the plaintiff and her two dependent children out of poverty, and then only for so long as the fund lasts.

[22]         In the present case it does little violence to the testator’s intentions to make an immediate full reapportionment in the plaintiff’s favour. It is a fair inference, from the evidence, that the testator’s decision to leave to Mr. Martens’ discretion the amount of support to be paid to the plaintiff, when the will was made in 2012, may have reflected some hesitation as to the plaintiff’s ability to exercise good judgment. Whatever qualms may have led the testator to structure her will in this fashion, as opposed to leaving an outright gift to the plaintiff, there is no evidence now which points to any such concern. Indeed, the mechanism of the structured settlement itself would serve as a check on the funds being squandered. The plaintiff appears, on the evidence, to have survived a difficult adolescence and now to be doing her utmost to see to the need of her children, in very challenging circumstances.

Interim Payments Under Wills Variation

Interim Payments Under Wills Variation

Grant v Grant estate 1997 Carswell BC 3773 allowed a widow in need of funds to receive interim payments under the wills variation provisions of WESA.

The Grant and Hecht cases are only a few reported cases of the ability to apply to court for an interim distribution of funds where appropriate provided there is no risk to the ultimate redistribution of the estate  should the will be varied.

The Judge in the Grant case  stated:

In Hecht v. Reid et al, 39 E.T.R. 165, Justice Donald as he then was, reviewed this section, came to the conclusion that a partial legacy under a Will can be paid notwithstanding a pending claim for variation when the risk that the Variation Order will encroach upon the funds needed to satisfy the legacy is remote.

13      In my view, the jurisdictional question has been settled by this court.
14      The only issue for determination is whether the proposed payments to Nancy Grant pose a risk to the ultimate distribution in the event
there is a variation to the Will.

Public Policy Protects Wills Variation Claims

Public Policy Protects Wills Variation Claims

If a will contains a penalty provision, known as a forfeiture clause, threatening to impose a penalty upon a beneficiary if a will is contested, then in that event,  wills variation claims are protected by public policy so that such a clause is not enforceable in wills variation actions.

Wills variation claims are now found at section 60 of WESA.

Bellinger v. Fayers, Nuytten  2003  BCSC  563 reviewed the law relating to forfeiture clauses including how they relate to wills variation claims.

The deceased’s will contained the following forfeiture provision: 

          “7.      IT IS MY FURTHER DESIRE, because of an expressed intention of one of the legatees to contest the terms of this my Will, that should any person do so then he or she shall forfeit any legacy he or she may be otherwise entitled to.”

Kent v. McKay (1982), 139 D.L.R. (3d) 318 (B.C.S.C. )

held the forfeiture clause void in so far as it purported to limit claims the Wills Variation Act.

He found the condition contrary to public policy because it attempted to penalize the legatee for bringing a successful action provided by statute

In reaching this decision Justice Lander relied on the Australian case Re Gaynor,(1960) V.R. 640 (S.C.), He then found as follows:

“It cannot be denied with respect that the intent of the Legislature in creating the Wills Variation Act, is to ensure adequate maintenance and support for specified individuals.  It is a matter of public policy that support and maintenance be provided for those defined individuals and it would be contrary to such policy to allow a Testator to circumvent the provisions of the Wills Variation Act by the creation of such as para. 9.”

Marriage Like Relationships

Marriage Like Relationships

Weber v Leclerc 2015 BCSC 6550 reviewed the law relating to what constitute a marriage like relationship in a matrimonial dispute where the female was against the institution of marriage and opposed such a finding of being in a marriage like relationship.

The parties did a considerable number of things together that would indicate that their relationship was marriage like, whether the female intended it to be or not:

The parties lived together from 2002 until at least 2011, or later (according to Mr. Weber). The following facts are not disputed:

  • Mr. Weber has two sons, and Ms. LeClerc has one. The children resided with them (although Mr. Weber shared parenting responsibility with his ex-wife), before they left home as adults.
  • The boys were about the same age. Mr. Weber and Ms. LeClerc raised their separate children together.
  • They had family portraits including themselves and all three boys that were displayed in their home.
  • They shared a bedroom and had sexual relations throughout that period and were monogamous.
  • They had a family dog and a boat.
  • The parties had contact with extended family, particularly Mr. Weber’s family. They visited that family and exchanged Christmas gifts and received presents from them.
  • The parties purchased property together and shared expenses. The title of the home in which they lived is in Ms. LeClerc’s name, although Mr. Weber made a contribution to its purchase and shared mortgage payments, until the mortgage was paid off in 2008.
  • The parties purchased other properties together and generated income from those properties according to Mr. Weber. This is not contradicted by Ms. LeClerc.
  • For the most part, the parties kept their finances separately. Ms. LeClerc assisted Mr. Weber by loaning him money from time to time. Mr. Weber repaid those loans.
  • The parties vacationed together, along with their sons. They collected memorabilia from those vacations and stored them with labels stating: “Weber LeClerc family”.
  • Mr. Weber and Ms. LeClerc shared meals together, although Mr. Weber was busy with his son’s hockey activities.
  • They both did the grocery shopping.
  • They spent their evenings together, although Mr. Weber would watch television and Ms. LeClerc would read in a separate room.
  • They went out together as a couple for dinner or to dinner parties with friends.
  • Mr. Weber and Ms. LeClerc did not discuss marriage, except perhaps on one occasion. Ms. LeClerc is opposed to marriage.
6      The parties disagree on how they spoke of each other, whether it was as a spouse or partner. Mr. Weber says he would introduce Ms. LeClerc as his wife, Ms. LeClerc disagrees.



In Austin v. Goerz, 2007 BCCA 586, the court explained that no single factor is dispositive of the issue of whether the parties were spouses. For example, financial dependence was at one time considered to be an essential aspect of marriage of the marital relationship. That is no longer the case. At paragraph 55 the court states: “Today marriage is viewed as a partnership between equals and there is no principled reason why marital-equivalent relationships should be viewed differently.”

The court adopted the judgment of the Ryan-Froslie J. in Yakiwchuk v. Oaks, 2003 SKQB 124 at paragraph 58:

[58] It is understandable that the presence or absence of any particular factor cannot be determinative of whether a relationship is marriage-like. This is because equally there is no checklist of characteristics that will invariably be found in all marriages. In this regard I respectfully agree with the following from the judgment of Ryan-Froslie J. in Yakiwchuk v. Oaks, 2003 SKQB 124:[10] Spousal relationships are many and varied. Individuals in spousal relationships, whether they are married or not, structure their relationships differently. In some relationships there is a complete_blending of finances and property – in others, spouses keep their property and finances totally separate and in still others one spouse may totally control those aspects of the relationship with the other spouse having little or no knowledge or input. For some couples, sexual relations are very important – for others, that aspect may take a back seat to companionship. Some spouses do not share the same bed. There may be a variety of reasons for this such as health or personal choice. Some people are affectionate and demonstrative. They show their feelings for their “spouse” by holding hands, touching and kissing in public. Other individuals are not demonstrative and do not engage in public displays of affection. Some “spouses” do everything together – others do nothing together. Some “spouses” vacation together and some spend their holidays apart. Some “spouses” have children – others do not. It is this variation in the way human beings structure their relationships that make the determination of when a “spousal relationship” exists difficult to determine. With married couples, the relationship is easy to establish. The marriage ceremony is a public declaration of their commitment and intent. Relationships outside marriage are much more difficult to ascertain. Rarely is there any type of “public” declaration of intent. Often people.

[12] Madam Justice Dardi in J.J.G. v. K.M.A., 2009 BCSC 1056 provided a helpful summary of the authorities in paragraph 37:begin cohabiting with little forethought or planning. Their motivation is often nothing more than wanting to “be together”. Some individuals have chosen to enter relationships outside marriage because they did not want the legal obligations imposed by that status. Some individuals have simply given no thought as to how their relationship would operate. Often the date when the cohabitation actually began is blurred because people “ease into” situations, spending more and more time together. Agreements between people verifying when their relationship began and how it will operate often do not exist.

In summary, in undertaking an analysis of whether persons are living together as spouses, the court must examine the relationship as a whole and consider all the various objective criteria referred to in the authorities. The presence or absence of one particular factor will not be determinative. The court must recognize that each relationship is unique and, in applying a flexible approach within the context of the particular relationship, make a determination as to whether the parties intended to and were living in a marriage-like relationship.

Ms. LeClerc’s lack of belief in the institution of marriage is beside the point. As is pointed out in Yakiwchuk, people may choose not to be married for a variety of reasons: “[t]heir motivation is often nothing more than wanting to ‘be together”‘. This appears to have been the motivation here.